

Marine Corps

Gazette



AUGUST 1960
FORTY CENTS



OKINAWA

Home of the Third Marine Division

Cover painting by AMSgt John C. De Grasse



Futema—Home of MAG-16, A.5-1.7

Key to Places on Cover

- | | |
|---------|----------------------------------|
| D.5—4.5 | Okuma, Officers' Recreation Area |
| B.3—2.8 | Yaka, Enlisted Recreation Area |
| A.5—1.8 | Rex Area, 3d FSR |
| B.6—2.8 | Camp Hansen, 3dTkBn, 3dAntiTkBn |
| A.8—2.0 | Camp Koza, 3dPioneerBn |
| B.1—2.2 | Camp McTureous, 3dSerBn |
| B.5—1.8 | Camp White Beach, AmTracCo |
| A.3—2.5 | Kadena Air Force Base |
| A.0—1.3 | Capital City of Naha |



Camp Schwab—3d Marines, 3dReconBn, C.5-3.2



Camp Hauge—12th Marines (Artillery) A.8-2.3



Camp Sukiran—9th Marines, A.5-1.8



Camp Courtney—Division Headquarters, B.1-2.3

Marine Corps 1960

The Marine Corps Association Newsletter

An unofficial digest
of news of interest
to our members

Less Plight, More Fight

The Battle of the Budget is over and HQMC planners have a clear goal: to give the taxpayer more combat readiness for his dollars.

First step: reactivation of BLT 3/7 at CamPen on 15 Jul, shortly after the budget bill was passed and signed into law. It's the first of five deactivated BLT to be restored during the next two years. Also, as previously reported here, a sixth BLT may be formed from troops at Quantico and Washington.

For the first time in three years Congress omitted funds for a 200,000-strength Corps, extra funds which DoD had refused to release. The effect would limit full mobilization, CMC told Congress. The Corps could deploy three division-wing teams, but would have to strip the training base to support them.

With things this tight, how will the Corps squeeze out three more BLTs than the two Gen Shoup promised Congress in January? It's a complex story; here are some of the main factors:

- 1) Savings from the transplacement program. The system saves Marines. In particular, the tour length leaves a useful non-FMF tour during a four-year hitch.

- 2) There's a Marine power windfall. In 1961 and 1962, the shift to four-year enlistments will give peak stability. This temporary gain evaporates in 1963. While it lasts it helps flesh out the BLTs, activate the promised Hawk battalions, and up FMF manning levels.

- 3) A squeeze on the non-FMF billets. This is for both quantity and quality. As warned in January, you can expect to get along with the "average Marine." Billet criteria will be lowered, standardized, and simplified. This has a top planning priority. It's a key to "lateral input" into the transplacement program. Lateral input means that no longer will stabilized units get the bulk of their lower ranks direct from ITR. Some input will be from Marines completing a non-FMF tour first. This will equalize promotion chances, training, duty assignments for more ITR grads. It's a step to better stability outside the FMF.

At the same time, there are plans to extend transplacement. Top priority: Division artillery, RLT Hq. Then, other division support units.

Remember, these are plans. Plans can be upset. The 10% cut in travel funds in the House budget stymied these plans. The Senate put the money back, as only the Marine Corps got all the travel funds it asked.

GMST Training

G-3 has asked IG to remind COs that MCO 1510.2B (GMST training) directs proficiency, not repetition.

CMC is concerned with results of training; methods and procedures are the prerogative of the CO. Subjects need not be scheduled monthly, quarterly, or even annually—nor for every Marine.

CO must take action to see that his Marines know the subjects for their rank. Recommended: periodic practical or practical and written exams.




Figure 1

Wanted: Ideas

Take another look at MCO 3900.3. This order spells out a whole new system of Marine Corps Research, Development, Test and Evaluation. Features are:

- Greater coordination and responsibility at Quantico, less in HQMC staff agencies.
- An annual review of programs, with a Landing Force Development Guide (LFDG) to be published yearly—or oftener.
- A concurrent look at both TO and T/E, tactics, organization, and equipment. There'll be no test of an item without study of where, when, and how it fits into future fighting plans.
- A forward-looking planning cycle, based on long-range plans and concepts of operation. Basically, all planning begins with a forecast of fighting 8 to 12 years ahead, then works backward.
- Troop tests by FMF units of new concepts of operations, TOs, and T/Es. The FMF can expect to begin such tests soon.

Action: YOU. Note from Figure 1 that the whole RDT&E cycle passes through the vital stage of troop tests. Ideas from the field will be definitely cranked in. Better yet: get yours in early. Para 6 asks that ideas on better tactics, techniques, and gear be sent to Commandant, Marine Corps Schools (CMCLFDA) via channels.

The Budget		
	Asked	Authorized
Military Personnel, Marine Corps	\$607,000,000	\$606,746,000*
Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps	25,000,000	24,831,000
Operation & Maint., Marine Corps	176,000,000	174,686,000
Procurement, Marine Corps	94,000,000	91,180,000

*Plus \$500,000 transfer from MC Stock Fund

SNCO Promotion Picture

Revised instructions on marking fitness reports are working. That's the background to MCO 1611.3A which instructs that officer and now SNCO reports be marked this way:

- Justify OUTSTANDING or UNSAT marks (in Sec 16a or 19)
- Show number of same grade who get each mark.
- Do NOT refer to individual unless UNSAT.

G-1 analysts scanned a big sample (7,000) of officer reports submitted before and after MCO 1611.3. They found the "spread" they were looking for. Also, no more are higher ranks averaging higher marks.

A spread in marking will, of course, help selection boards. With SNCO selection boards postponed, many SNCOs will have one of the new reports in their jacket. That's not the reason boards were postponed. One reason: G-1 wants more time to tie up in one package recent recommendations from the field. These include several made during the General Officers' Symposium.

Also, the selection of senior grades first is more desirable. The schedule now is: SgtMaj, MGySgt, 1stSgt, MSgt—September; GySgt—October; SSgt—January.

The basic reason some SNCOs get promoted fast while some don't is uneven distribution by MOS fields. Shortages of skills is one factor—but only one—in determining proficiency pay. (Also considered: formal training, reenlistment rates, and combat leadership factors.)

For the benefit of SNCOs or would-be SNCOs who might be interested in retraining in another MOS, here's a shopping list based on MCO 7220.12B which sets up 9,007 P-1 pro pay awards this year. Four of the Category I (65% eligible) fields are actually now overpopulated; 17 of Category II (12½% eligible) are overstrength, many others near strength. A selected list of those most understrength includes:

Category I		
MOS	Skill	% on Board
0848	Field Artillery Operations Asst.	40%
1161	Refrigeration Mechanic	59%
1444	Phototopographer	59%
2536	Special Radio Operator	37%
2741	Radar Technician	57%
2761	Radio Relay Technician	33%

Category II

0781	Antiaircraft Missile Batterymen	56%
1391	Bulk Fuel Man	46%
1413	Construction Surveyor	59%
1461	Illustrator	60%
2181	Fire Control System Repairman	58%

Of course, there's another answer without retraining: Qualify as a DI or a translator. They're 100% eligible for pro pay. Further, DI duty gets special consideration by selection boards.

Warm Welcome for WOs

"I think it is extremely important that the officer corps understand our warrant officer program and provide a warm welcome to these officers as they report to duty." That's the word from Marine Corps AC/S, G-1 MajGen D. M. Weller.

He's written to major commanders explaining the new program (reported in a GAZETTE Special Report last month). Gen Weller explains that the Corps wants WOs from whom "we can reasonably expect 20 years of service as a warrant." Also, he notes that the law envisions a minimum of 15 years to go from W-1 to W-4. These factors explain the emphasis on screening corporals and up with six to eight years service, although for the next three years 40% of appointments go to senior SNCOs and temporary officers.

Summing up, Gen Weller says, "I am confident that, once on the job, the performance of duty by these young officers will be our program's own greatest justification."

Rearmament

East Coast units will be first to rearm with weapons using the NATO-standard 7.62 ammo.

M14 rifles and M60 MGs go to FMF LANT, 2d ITR, MCS, and MCRD (Parris Island). Delivery is expected in 4th Qtr FY 61. With the new rifles will come a pistol belt with magazine pouch. The M60s will have the M122 tripod.

Plans are to rearm FMFPAC, 1st ITR, and MCRD (San Diego) at the end of FY 62. However, FMF units will be getting limited amounts next summer for troop tests. Also, as noted in the GAZETTE special report this month, 1st MarDiv gets the first HOWTARS.

Non-FMF units will have to wait until 1963, the Marine Corps Reserve perhaps one more year. However, next year's budget could change the whole picture.

Air Taxis

More than 4,250 Marines, US and ROK, rode in HMR-162 helicopters during SEAHAWK. LtCol M. M. Cook's air taxi service was around-the-clock, 959 day, 414 night landings aboard USS Princeton, at HLZs in Kyongpu area. To meet heavy schedule, MSgt J. M. Mack's maintenance crews worked 22 out of 24 hours servicing 18 helicopters. VMO-2 Marines were just as busy, logged 175 flight hours in three days. Squadron operations were directed by Capt C. A. Cary, included evacuation, liaison, recon, TAO, search and rescue.

Spare Parts on Master Menu

There's a major development in Marine Corps supply.

At the unit level you'll be able to order all spare parts from one master list. It's the "Application Listing," now being printed. Instead of checking all individual repair parts lists, this master list shows all 322,000 items used by the FMF and each of the equipments on which they can be used.

This is only a first step in inventory control. Each of those items costs about \$1000 a year to stock. The number can now be cut drastically. Already, Part II of the list has isolated 50,000 parts not needed in the FMF, 10,000 not needed at all.

Actually the list is a by-product of data processing. All parts are now coded and this list is one of the first runs. Future runs will help Inventory Control Point, Phila., to cut stocks still further.

Sample of the problem: the new HAWK missile system has 30,000 parts. Some 20,000 are common to other items and are now stocked, 10,000 are peculiar to Hawk. It would cost \$1 million a year to stock all these. Instead, only those that are "Maintenance significant" will be stocked. Data processing will help here—in fact, makes control possible. In effect, during WWII the only feasible system was to simply order a complete vehicle, unassembled, as spare parts for each nine assembled ones. Result: storerooms out of spark plugs, fan belts; but bulging with fenders and wheels.

The new system also allows better swapping of parts among services, will help DoD, as well as USMC, save money.

Shh! Wraps Off

The wraps are now off a number of previously classified developments as a result of the Army's Project MAN.

Most hush-hush: the man-portable, atomic-firing *Davy Crockett* weapon system. *Armor* now reports that it comes in a light, short-range XM28 model and a heavier XM29. The XM28 breaks into a three-man load; the XM29 is jeep-mounted, but can be man-packed a short distance to a ground mount. Both a nuclear and fragmentation warheads are expected. There'll be spotting rounds and firing techniques like a mortar. Even so, troop safety is an admitted problem.



Davy Crockett—Model XM-28



Davy Crockett—Model XM-29

Other developments:

- General Electric has designed a new tank fighting light using xenon. It projects normal light or infra-red. The M60 tank will have it, plus a new 7.62mm M73 MG, a 105mm gun, and a diesel engine which extends cruising range to 350 miles. The M48A1 tank will be "retrofitted" with the same engine, gun, and advanced fire control system. There's also a new M85 .50cal MG. Both MGs are short receiver type, fire from an open bolt. This avoids cook-offs, speeds barrel change, eliminates headspace adjustments.

- Infantry reports two opposing systems: the *Dan Patch* mechanical mine layer puts down 150 AT mines in 10 minutes; a jeep-mounted hydraulic mine detector sniffs them out, stops the jeep when it finds one.

- The AN/MWQ-S8 jams VT fuzes. It's compact enough to be mounted in a $\frac{1}{4}$ -T trailer.

- Under development: an amphibious $\frac{1}{4}$ -T truck. The Army's asking that it have plastic body, wheels, seats and top.



Under test at MCLFDC; a light anti-tank weapon (LAW) designed for squad use. Weapon resembles sawed off 3.5" rocket launcher (bazooka).

Records

Maj W. J. Traynor's VMA-121 claimed 6,000 accident-free flight hours after Capt Ron Cardwell landed his A4D at Iwakuni strip 23 June.

School News

At least three changes in Administrative Chief School (Parris Island, S. C.) are marked in the first class of FY 61. Course is now 9 weeks (it was 10), more students (75) are enrolled, rank eligibility is restricted to ASSgt, Sgt. Bigger and shorter classes means 150 more 0141s yearly will be school trained.

Missile or F8U?

Cross training between Marine mis-slemen and aviation's GCI operators starts in January on the West Coast. The idea is to acquaint Marine air defenders with a concept of each other's mission: air defense via missile and manned aircraft.

The Corps' first Tactical Data System (built by Litton) is due to start operating at El Toro early in 1961. Planners believe it will help missile and air controllers to know something about each other's job. Computer furnishes target information, knowing what to do with it is up to electronics operators. Which button to push? Missile or F8U? Cross training is expected to help them decide.

The GAZETTE & The Generals

"Impetus (for the MCA) starts at the top," the General Officers Symposium was told. "For a professional magazine to be supported by less than 50% of the regular officers is a sad commentary."

"The Commandant believes that all officers, regular and reserve, should be members of the Association. Such support will result in increased quality, interest and professional value."

Wings For Warrants

Division of Aviation has asked G-1 to create a new billet, fill it with WOs. The billet: Combat Information Center Officer. Actually, CICOs will perform duties similar to those of enlisted radar operators (AIO) who flew in second seat of the old F3D. They lost their jobs when single seat F4D phased in. Two new aircraft, A2F and F4H, both dual place, long range, all-weather attack bombers, have again brought a need for airborne radar operators. Planners want WOs for two reasons: more complex electronics gear requires a higher learning capacity (GCT of average WO candidate is 124 a GAZETTE survey showed), and close contact between officers, on and off duty, makes for better teamwork. By FY '67 when all planned two-seat aircraft are in fighter and attack squadrons, DivAV says they will need 349 CICOs.

By the end of this fiscal year a total of 37 WOs may be drawing flight pay. Along with planned 31 CICOs there are six WO pilots, former NAPs promoted from enlisted ranks. No more are planned. Static for several years, the NAP program has been cancelled. Remaining billets for flying SNCOs, who hold a non-flying MOS, (there are 98) will be absorbed in retirements.

Recruiting Problem

Marine recruiters have a new problem: not enough volunteers for aviation technical schools. More recent Marine recruits, it seems, prefer ground duty.

MCO 1130.21B points out that aviation quotas are based on existing school vacancies. Further, there's no intent to downgrade prestige. Applicants will train as Marines first, technicians second. Good promotion chances are predicted.

Cleanings

The Navy has cancelled the *Corvus* missile. It was to be air-to-surface, radar homing, with a reported 100-mile range. On the way: a souped-up Honest John. Designers are paring off three feet, half a ton of weight, says *Ordnance*. A new rocket motor will boost range by 15,000 yards, a 50 percent improvement on current 15-mile radius.

Aviation Requal Firing

Marksmanship Division is weighing a revised firing schedule for aviation Marines. If approved, after once qualifying with M-1 (190 or better) over "A" course, aviation Marines will then fire annually only short (200-yd) "B" course. Qualified aviation Marines now fire "A" course once every three years, "B" course in between.

Hiss Act Hits 250

The "Hiss Act," barring retirement pay to those convicted of a "felony" has hit five Marines, might affect 250 in the next three years.

A Marine with even an old-style deck court on his record could be hurt. The key is the maximum sentence allowable, not what the court did. It's a felony if the law provides either death or more than one year confinement. Most Ma-

rine cases seem to be unauthorized use of government vehicles.

HQMC hopes one of two Congressional bills will afford relief, limit application to serious GCM cases. Such a bill might be passed this year. If not, affected Marines may request to be kept on active duty. A transfer to FMCR without pay would preserve rights while awaiting a new law. One more possibility: a presidential pardon.

Reserve Short Shots

First Marine Reserve outfit to train on Terrier: Fresno's (Calif.) 4th 75mm AAABtry, commanded by Maj J. E. Peddy, at 29 Palms during annual summer exercises.

Seven flights, consuming 30,000 miles, were needed to shuttle summer Reservists between West Coast training sites and home or vice versa. 3dMAW's VMR-352 pulled the trick. Here's the way it went: Two flights carried 92d RifleCo from Fallon, Nevada, to home (Ft. Smith, Ark.); same planes picked up 6th RifleCo in Little Rock, Ark., landed it at CampPen. Flights three and four carried 78d RifleCo from San Diego's North Island to home (Wichita, Kan.), returned 26th RifleCo to North Island. Flights, five, six and seven airlifted home from El Toro, 4th 105mm How Btry (Madison, Wis.), jumped to Minneapolis to pick up units of 26th not carried in first airlift.

When 75mm Skysweeper was struck from USMC artillery rolls last May, one battery hung around 29 Palms for use by summer 1960 Reservists. There, on the last day of June, Omaha's (Neb.) 3d 75mm AAABtry fired the last round from the last of the Skysweepers. They got the job because of their firing record against radio controlled drones during the two weeks training period.

All About Shooting

Busiest whistlestop in the nation: Port Clinton, Ohio. Shooters began arriving last week in July by train, plane, POC, and bus to compete in the granddaddy of target shoots—The National Matches at Camp Perry. More than 100 Marines are entered in team and individual contests running through 28 August. On the rifle squad are 40 shooters; from these, three six-man teams will fire National Trophy Matches. Pistol squad has 38 shooters, will field at least two

A Marine Range Battalion, expressly set up for the purpose, is helping to run operations at Camp Perry. LtCol E. E. Schott commands the 22 officers, 522 enlisted Marines from 2dMarDiv, Force Troops and MCS, Quantico. The unit will provide target service for Marine, Navy, Coast Guard shooters firing in the matches, will also hold classes on small arms for NRA novice shooters (12-20 years old).

teams to defend Gold Cup won last year by USMC Blue. Score: 1127.

San Diego's MTU shooters, warming up for Camp Perry, made a clean sweep of the Rocky Mountain Regional Pistol Championships, in Denver, last month. GySgt Michael Pietroforte won Grand Aggregate (873x900). Marines won all three team matches. Familiar faces that may be missing from Camp Perry's firing line: Capt W. W. McMillan, GySgt J. E. Hill and W. C. Rose. These veteran shooters are making small bore, free rifle Olympic tryouts 1-5 August at Ft. Benning, Ga.

East Coast shooters sharpened up for Perry at first Inter-Service Rifle Championships at Quantico, last three days in July.

Home Fronts

For stay-at-home shooters who compete only against qualifying scores it may soon be easier to hit the bullseye with .45cal pistol. Marksmanship Division has drafted a proposed change to MCO 3574.2: "Two-handed grip described in FM 23-35 will be taught and is authorized for shooters to use at their option in annual familiarization and qualifying firing."

Proposed two-handed grip condensed from FM 23-35: Grasp pistol firmly in right hand per usual. Seat butt of .45 firmly in palm of left hand. Close fingers and thumb of left hand around right hand for maximum support.

No changes in target, distance or rate of fire.

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Howtar—homemade fire support

Special GAZETTE Report

Close Support Artillery: New Prospects

The HOWTAR is on its way to the FMF this summer, but an ideal close support weapon won't be ready until at least 1962. Decision on what that weapon will be will take another year. Here's the picture:

• **Howtar**—Marine Corps has paid Rock Island arsenal to assemble 30 from on-hand 4.2" mortar tubes and 75mm pack howitzer carriages. Each division will get one

battery for troop test. The first nine go to 1stMarDiv by 30 August.

Despite its catchy name (HOWitzer-morTAR), HOWTAR is no big advance. The bob-tailed pack howitzer carriage is heliliftable, readily towed, and quick to set up. Its stability and ruggedness are better than the 4.2", may add accuracy. The 4.2" tube won't shoot farther, continues previous problems of minimum range, lack of direct fire. As-set: a 1/4-ton 4 x 4 will tow it.

• **Italian 105mm Mountain Pack Howitzer**—This looks good in tests. British are buying it; US Army airborne units, West German Army may. Its only real advantage over standard 105mm is light weight. It would take two years to budget for and get delivery of this piece. Still to be checked: ability to fire a more powerful round.

• **XM-70**—If all goes well, each division could have a battery by early 1962. On the other hand, this six-shooter may never fire except in test. It's the rocket-boost principle which has drawn closely-counted Marine Corps R&D money to this program. One opinion: "The boosted rocket principle represents the best combination of gun-missile characteristics obtainable within the present state of the art."


Someday, planners feel, rocket boost will be applied to other artillery weapons, also naval guns, as the best way to keep accuracy while getting a big jump in range.

• **Possibilities**—If the HOWTAR passes troop tests, it may replace all conventional 4.2" mortars in division artillery. It won't replace the 105mm howitzers. It's strictly interim, could be replaced itself by the Italian 105mm if the XM-70 program "slips." So far the XM-70 has been a model R&D program, meeting design requirements right on schedule. The next big hurdle: a thorough wring-out for accuracy. Staying on schedule, XM-70 could be ready as soon as the Italian contender and save money (the Italian piece costs eight times as much as a HOWTAR).

But (a big one) an artillery piece must have a sure supply of ammu-



Italian 105mm Mountain Pack Howitzer . . . good but costly




De Brame invented first revolving machine cannon in 1861 (inset). A century later—the XM-70 evolved.

tion. Marine Corps can't go it alone on ammo. The Army has pulled out of the XM-70 program, but is still interested in the XM-54 rocket-boosted round. It could be adapted to Army artillery developments which now stress self-propelled models.

A couple of facts stand out in relation to the XM-70 program. First, this is the first "entire weapons system development" to be given to MCLFDC, who along with developing the weapon is evolving concept of employment, and recommending TO, T/E.

Lifting The Ammo—'Copter transportation for ammunition also has a new look. MCLFDC asked for a helicopter pod and launcher trailer combination to carry a ready supply of rocket rounds. Rock Island Arsenal built the prototype. Light in weight, floatable, it provides for rapid overland movement with the launcher, at any hour of day or night. It has helicopter resupply and lift capability.

Now with full responsibility for developing the XM-70, MCLFDC will ask for more stringent firing tests. Their idea is to wed the latest round with the latest prototype (the XM-70E1) strive for accuracy and stability. Next test firing of the XM-70 is slated early next month at Aberdeen Proving Grounds.




Carrier for rockets fits Corps needs . . . it floats

LtCol F. J. Sheppard, project officer for XM-70 since 1957, is staying with the project in a new capacity. CMC recently authorized a new billet, XM-70 Liaison Officer, at Rock Island Arsenal, where the new weapon will be turned out. He will fill it. Replacing him as fulltime project officer is **Maj W. E. Magon**, MCEB.

Special GAZETTE Report

Close Air Support: A 4D Multiple Carriage

By Capt Hal Vincent



The new look in conventional weapons is here. During the past few years emphasis on aircraft and systems that deliver nuclear bombs has slashed our limited war capability. Since WWII there have been more than 30 areas of conflict—over half requiring conventional forces and armament. But conventional close air support available to the troops has become less and less potent, thanks to phasing out of the propeller-driven AD Skyraider. Modern jet light attack airplanes have fewer stations for external stores. The availability of those stations is further reduced when external fuel must be carried.

From unclassified studies, it appears that the most generally useful weapon is the small general purpose or fragmentation bomb. The 250 pound GP bomb is one of the best. Two 250 lb. GP bombs may well be more effective than one single 500 lb. bomb. To carry them, however, is neither realistic nor economical with modern jet attack planes with only three bomb stations. To get maximum destruction, we need either more external racks on the airplane—an expensive design, development and retrofit program—or more bombs per station.

Air Development Squadron FIVE, based at the Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California, began an investigation of ways to increase the station loading in late summer 1959. Two feasible methods resulted within a month.

The first and simpler, but less satisfactory, method was to band three 250 or 500 lb. LD or GP bombs as a cluster. Lugs at either end of the band fitted the suspension locks on the airplane. This arrangement was designed, built and flown with satisfactory results. The payload, however, was only nine bombs and these bombs were restricted to two salvos. (The wing stations were released simultaneously to prevent an erratic snap roll upon release.)

The next method investigated was the prototype Multiple Carriage Bomb Racks (MCBR). On the basis of early Douglas Aircraft Company reports on the clustering of general purpose bombs, VX-5 fabricated "home-made" equipment to demonstrate the principle of multiple carriage of low drag conventional bombs. The MCBR is an adapter rack for the A4D Skyhawk which allows six 250 or 500 lb. low drag GP bombs to be carried on each station, instead of one as formerly.

The MCBR consists of an adapter beam; three bomb racks at the forward end of the beam; and three bomb racks at the after end of the beam. An advancing station selector switch is integrated into the beam and allows single, paired, or salvo release to be selected prior to take-off. Conventional safing wire fusing is provided for all racks; but provisions for electric fusing may be incorporated in contract production models if suitable devices are developed.

The prototype MCBR was built in October 1959. The MCBR was flown and bombs were released in many combinations at airspeeds in excess of 500 knots. A salvoed drop of bombs was demonstrated at the 1959 Naval Air Weapons Meet, "Top Gun," at Yuma, Arizona, in November 1959. Thereafter, the prompt and forceful support of senior Marine and Navy commands attested to the timeliness of the multiple carriage principle, and greatly expedited its introduction to the fleet and field units. The prototype bomb racks of VX-5 design were delivered to the Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, Maryland, for evaluation. Shortly thereafter, production prototype devices, evolving from close liaison with VX-5, were sent by Douglas to the Test Center. Both the VX-5 and the Douglas MCBRs were reported favorably to the Bureau of Naval Weapons in May 1960.

A look at the MCBR quickly reveals its worth. With multiple carriage, six bombs may be carried on each station of the A4D instead of the single bomb. While the rack was developed with the GP bomb in mind, it also lends itself to carriage of many various combinations of frags, fire bombs, etc. The multiple carriage principle can therefore provide an effective and very versatile system for conventional weapons delivery. It offers multiple release for single passes over a target using a low level or a stand-off attack. Retarded bombs now being developed will provide suitable aircraft escape from the weapons released at very low altitudes. When used for low level visual deliveries they should provide greater accuracies against point targets. Multiple releases will further increase the probability of destruction for these small or point targets. The weight added to the external stations has been kept to a minimum. The carrying capacities of all stations are fully used with



Capt Vincent, a 1950 graduate of the US Naval Academy and the Basic School, is also a graduate of the Navy Test Pilot School, Air Force Fighter Weapons School, Fleet Air Gunnery Unit. He served as a platoon leader with 2d Bn, 8th Marines. Aviation tours include duty with VMF (AW) 214, VMF 115 and MAG 33 in Korea, and Flight Test at Patuxent River. He is now project pilot for the MCBR at VX-5, China Lake, California.

minimum aerodynamic drag during flight. The high speed, low visual silhouette and maneuverability of the A4D should reduce the airplane vulnerability to ground fire. The speed of the airplane should step up the pace of air support by reducing call-to-strike times significantly as well as at least quadrupling the destructiveness per trip.

Air Development Squadron FIVE has recently received a CNO project to develop new or modified tactics for less vulnerable and more effective air delivery of conventional weapons by jet light attack aircraft. This project considers such factors as type of target, delivery mode, aircraft ordnance load combinations, close air support requirements, accuracy and the delivery environment including terrain and weather. Work is progressing toward the development of a suitable retarded bomb which may be used on the MCBR for extreme low level delivery. All weapons capabilities will be more

thoroughly investigated. During the course of the project, tactics will be determined which properly fit the multiple carriage principle to ground warfare. Developing tactics to give proper, timely and accurate close support to our troops on the ground will be a major part of the flight program. Limited war design concepts for future weapons systems may well be determined during the course of the project. Test results under Project O/V 5 FY 60 will be published by Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force.

The A4D Skyhawk with multiple carriage will soon take its place in operational Marine units. The A4D with multiple carriage now compares favorably with the aging prop-driven light attack airplanes in load carrying ability, range and versatility. It is far superior in speed, evasion and aerodynamic design. Its greater destructive capability is certainly welcome for support of the Corps in limited war.



Bottom view of prototype racks and bombs. Production models have provisions for six bombs on each rack.

PROFESSIONAL SCRAPBOOK



THE SINAI CAMPAIGN OF 1956

EDGAR O'BALLANCE. 215 pages, Illustrated.
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., N. Y., \$5.00.
Bookshop Code #AU-10 (\$4.25)

The following extracts from this new book speak for themselves:

"A number of factors contributed towards the Israeli success. Perhaps the main one was the high standard of leadership of the senior officers, their knowledge of their job, their drive and determination. All Israeli officers, both staff and regimental, were marked with a high degree of intelligence, which was not by rigid plans and staff tables, as is so often the case in large armies today.

"They were young and fit, keen and quick thinking, and strongly imbued with the aggressive spirit so necessary to win battles. Doggedness, an admirable trait in defense, is not sufficient in itself to defeat an enemy—something more is needed and that something is "offensive mindedness" and the will to win, which all Israeli officers had in a large measure..

"The Israelis' standard of individual training was better by far than that of their enemies. Discipline was good and all fitted into the war machine by cheerfully accepting hardships and unpleasant tasks.

"Actions of fighting units were fully co-ordinated with the supply services. The fighting troops always took precedence, as is not always the case in huge armies in which the tendency creeps in for fighting formations and their movements to become dependent upon the supply service.

"The column commanders seemed to have had a wide latitude as to how to achieve objectives and full freedom to exploit favorable opportunity without prior reference to a higher command.

"Initiative was maintained. The Israeli officer was always in front of his men leading them on. Nothing was allowed to stop the advance. Supplies, other than fuel and water, were never waited for; it was the task of the supply unit to catch up to the fighting troops.

"The chief reason for the Egyptian defeat was the quality of the Egyptian officers, their lack of ability, lack of aptitude, lack of keenness, their poor morale and the absence of any aggressive fighting spirit. The soft-living Egyptian officers hated the desert, despised their men and generally took unkindly to campaigning.

"There was little aggressive spirit. Morale was not high, and the troops were unwilling, ignorant and illiterate. The officers, for the most part were contemptuous of their men.

"We see that an officer must have many traits which will help him become more proficient and successful. *Keep in mind that you must:*

- know your job
- have determination and drive
- be physically fit
- extend an aggressive spirit
- increase your intelligence, and
- know and respect your men."

TV Quote of the Month

"... We must have at least a division (of US "Spies") here. . . We are going to let them remain here until the day of final judgment. . . That is, I say the day of final judgment, the day the Marines land here."—Raul Castro

What It's All About

Professional Scrapbook is aimed at platoon leaders but there's information here for all Marines: Pertinent extracts from military books, a bit of Corps history, useful hints from experienced leaders, new trends in strategy. We run Scrapbook as space permits, welcome contributions from our readers. Payment on publication.

Swagger Sticks in His Craw

WITH OR WITHOUT STICKS, MARINES have been known to swagger. This is an impressive sight on liberty, but not on patrol.

Swagger does not stop bullets. To the contrary, on at least one occasion it has invited them.

Take, for instance, the true experience of a replacement rifle platoon leader whose company had just relieved another on the Korean MLR. The relieved company reported no enemy activity on the Marine side of the valley. Just to make sure, however, one of the more experienced officers from the fresh company was ordered to take a patrol down the largest finger in front of the company's position.

The replacement lieutenant sat with some of his men on the MLR and watched his veteran friend lead a squad down the mysterious finger. It was a chance for the newcomer to learn how things were done in the field.

However, the first thing he noticed was that the combat veterans did not unsling their rifles after negotiating the barbed wire. Nor did they stop talking. Nor were they told to.

All this was dismissed by the replacement lieutenant as an oversight. He was, in fact, impressed with the swagger implicit in those slung M1s and the cocky chatter.


After all, he thought as the troops disappeared down the slope, it's broad daylight, these are combat veterans and this is our side of the valley. But he had the nagging impression that the scene was more like a John Wayne movie than a patrol into the unknown.

Silence fell on the mountain—but not for long.

The stillness was ripped by a burp gun and shattered by the miscellaneous explosions of a fire fight.

Now it was the replacement lieuten-

(Continued on page MCA-9)



THE WIZARD OF ODDS

*The problem he solved two centuries ago
serves civilian and military communications today*

Jacques Bernoulli, the great Swiss mathematician, pondered a question in the early 18th century. Can you predict mathematically what will happen when events of chance take place, as in throwing dice?

His answer was the classic Bernoulli binomial distribution—a basic formula in the mathematics of probability (published in 1713).

The laws of probability say, for instance, that if you roll 150 icosahedrons (the 20-faced solid shown above), 15 or more of them will come to rest with side "A" on top only about once in a hundred times.

Identical laws of probability govern the calls coming into a telephone exchange. Assume a group of 150 telephone subscribers, each of whom makes a three-minute call during the busiest hour of the day. Since three minutes is

one-twentieth of an hour, the probability that any one subscriber will be busy is one in 20, the same as the probability that side "A" of an icosahedron will be on top. The odds against 15 or more subscribers talking at once are again about 100 to 1. Thus it would be extravagant to supply the group with 150 trunk circuits when 15 will be sufficient for good service.

At Bell Telephone Laboratories, the mathematics of probability have been developed into a tool of tremendous value in telephony. Use of the probability theory helps the Bell System provide, at a reasonable cost to its customers, the world's most elaborate communications network. And the advanced mathematics which help create better telephone service are also applied extensively in Bell System defense work.



BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM

AUGUST 1960

VOLUME 44

NUMBER 8

40¢

ADVERTISERS' INDEX

Bell Telephone System	1
First National Bank of Quantico	6
Kaman Aircraft Corporation	Cover IV
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation	54, 55
Lyman Gunsight Corporation	56
Marine Corps Association	Cover III
Philco Corporation	7
Radio Corporation of America	5
Raytheon Corporation	9
United Aircraft Corporation Sikorsky Aircraft Division	3
United Services Automobile Association	27

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Marine Corps Gazette

Professional Magazine for United States Marines

Published by the Marine Corps Association in order to provide a forum for the expression of matters which will advance knowledge, interest and esprit in the Marine Corps.

IN THIS ISSUE

10	A Pattern for Limited War	Col J. A. Donovan
20	Combat Course	Capt M. E. White
22	Let's Perk Up Our Reserves	Capt C. R. Venditto
24	Princeton Landing	Maj B. F. Meyers
28	The Lieutenant's Gatlings	Edward A. Dieckmann, Sr.
36	The Strike Cell—Part II	Capt J. G. Martz, III
38	Report From Ready Forces—3dMarDiv	
	Part I—Combat Readiness	
	Part II—Programs to Improve Readiness	
46	The M-14 Rifle: A Comparison	Maj J. F. Conroy
50	Does The Leader Make The Difference?	MSgt C. V. Crumb, FMCR

DEPARTMENTS

Message Center	4	Reserve Column	34
Extension School Challenge	8	Room For Thought	45
Salty Skipper	19	Observation Post	52

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
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CopterNews from Sikorsky

Navy tests helicopter minesweeping. A new job for helicopters—seeking and destroying enemy mines—was demonstrated by the Navy recently at Panama City, Florida. A Sikorsky S-60 lowered, streamed, towed and retrieved its new lightweight minesweeping gear. The test demonstrated the helicopter's capability as a self-sufficient aerial mine-sweeper, and it further demonstrated the vast gain in safety that a copter—flying above the explosive range of the mine—can bring to minesweeping operations. The S-60 is the first of a new family of all-purpose transports now under development at Sikorsky. These unique configurations require no conventional cabin to lift cargo, and can carry detachable pods for equipment, personnel or weapons.



Copter catches five out of five as first air-to-air recovery is demonstrated. New possibilities in aerial recovery of nose cones, drones, and reconnaissance missiles were revealed recently by the first demonstration of helicopter air-to-air recovery techniques. Using recovery gear developed by All-American Engineering Company, a Sikorsky S-55 completed five out of five pickups of a package suspended from a descending parachute. The demonstration, before Army, Navy and Air Force personnel, pointed up the copter's maneuverability for this mission. In case of a miss, for example, the copter can make several more passes before the chute hits the water or ground.



Interservice news. Not to be outdone by the remarkable helicopter feats of civilian telephone "pole planters," a Marine HR2S crew transported and planted a series of antenna poles each 92 feet long and 5,000 pounds in weight on California mountain tops. P.S. Mission was actually performed for the Air Force. Credit Marines with big assist on this play!

 *A New World of Mobility by*
SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT

Stratford, Connecticut/A Division of United Aircraft Corporation



MESSAGE CENTER

For letters of professional interest. Length: up to 250 words. Rates: up to \$20.

Something to Chew On

... What the devil has happened to the GAZETTE recently?

From my corner, it now looks like a quasi-official newsletter designed for those who want to second-guess the Commandant, or to find out what they should already know. As such, I suppose it's useful for second lieutenants, or for anyone trying to keep up with the transfers and promotions of old friends.

But it's certainly a sorry excuse for a professional magazine whose purpose supposedly is to aid the self-education of Marines aspiring to greater knowledge and higher command.

For one thing, it's become just as parochial as it could possibly be—in a period of time when parochialism is the colossal curse of all the services, and one of the greatest hindrances to the development of thoroughly competent officers. Take your June issue as an example. Who cares what Kaneohe Bay looks like! What are its functions, and how do they fit into strategic planning? Who cares how to execute a carrier deployment—except pilots who already know how! How does that deployment fit into concepts for the employment of the FMF in possible theaters of operations? Who cares what current personnel policies are! How do they further (or detract from) the capabilities of the Marine Corps to carry out its assigned missions? Etc., etc., etc.

It looks like "progressive education" has finally hit the GAZETTE. The idea seems to be, not to feed a man what he needs, but what he "wants."

Anyone content with regimental duties can already obtain from MCS, publications, and his own experience all he'll ever need to know about the handling of men and materiel. But officers who aim at higher command and staff billets (and NCO's who want to become sergeants major) must become adept at manipulating not only men and materiel—but also *ideas*.

So feed us *ideas*. Not little ideas, but big ones—on the world of conflict in which the Marine Corps must make its way. Show us how the future is being carved!

And show us also where new ideas are to be found and studied—short of Senior School or the higher joint and combined schools, where they're usually so nicely canned. Don't review just the best-selling books that make good sacktime reading on the one page you label (ironically) *Room for Thought*. Review the books in which there's real food for thought!

If HQMC wants an official pipeline for its latest doings, then let HQMC pay for the GAZETTE. If you want my hard cash, then give me something to chew on.

Capt W. C. Wiseley, USMCR
25154 W. Malibu Rd.
Malibu, Calif.

Breaking All Ties

... Re MCA Newsletter June '60: MCAS, Beaufort, is shown for Wirgman Trophy with new record of 1111. I was

team captain of 1958 Wirgman Trophy Team (MB, NRC, Norfolk). Our score: 1111.

I continue to enjoy the GAZETTE and feel that the Newsletter is a tremendous innovation for keeping all hands current as to news items, policies, etc.

Capt W. R. Stenahl, Jr.
H&S Btry, 1stMAAMBn
29 Palms, Calif.

Ed: *Marksman Division, HQMC, ruled a new record for MCAS, Beaufort, in keeping with a long-time tradition that top score at longest range is the tie-breaker. At 600 yards Beaufort fired 383; Norfolk 378.*

Marking Targets

... In June MESSAGE CENTER Capt T. M. Reedy wanted to know how to mark targets for close air support at night. The co-ordinated use of tracer ammunition in two dispersed automatic weapons can fire on their separate azimuths over the known or suspected target. This would clearly put an X over the target. The FAC could control the aircraft and designate the time of marking. If heavy small arms fire precludes the recognition of the correct X, the magnetic azimuth from an illuminated point on the deck to the correct X could be given to the pilot.

1stLt N. H. Smith

MB, Navy 1506
FPO, New York

Ed: *In other words:*

... That's an easy one. Just like ol' VMF(N)-513 (Nite Mares) did in Korea in '51. Use star shell or tracers from front line machine guns to converge at the target, or overhead illumination by parachute flares.

The tough problem is to get someone to clear you to work in that close to troops at night. We did it in VMF(N)-513 but not very often.

Col J. R. Anderson
CO (1951) VMF(N)-513

MARTD, MARTC
NAS, Dallas, Texas

More Advantages

... SSgt F. J. Farrell, in rebutting Lt J. W. Rider's article, "Your Troops Want Better Training" (GAZETTE, Mar '60), strongly states the advantages of a team of instructors located at the regiment S-3 level.

This on the surface appears to be a most workable solution to professional presentations. However, every young graduate of the Basic School *must* as part of his learning process be able to present military instruction to his own troops. The advantages of this system are many:

- Review for the young lieutenant of subjects he must know to be able to teach and use.
- An opportunity for variety in presentation.
- Timely subject matter, to dovetail

with planned training operations of the unit.

• A better opportunity to evaluate the results of instruction presented during training operations.

• Emphasis on particular training needs within a subject of a given unit which would vary within a regiment to a large degree.

• Close supervision by the company commander of the instruction presented.

In addition, the platoon sergeants, guides, squad and fire team leaders must practice technique of instruction to constantly improve their ability to teach with rank and experience. All NCOs are potential instructors and must be given the opportunity to teach military subjects to their respective units.

Capt J. F. Meyers, Jr.
OSO, 151-153 N. Upper Street
Lexington, Kentucky

Check and Double Check

... In 1945 an army friend of mine, a senior chaplain, asked the manager of a mid-town New York hotel to cash a personal check. The manager said, "Sure Padre, come on in the office." As my friend was writing his check the manager went to the safe and pulled out a stack containing several hundred checks. "Padre," he said, "I'm glad to cash your check because you are a chaplain, but I don't mind telling you I am hesitant about cashing checks for service men." "These," he said, riffling through them, "are bad checks from service personnel during the past three years. It's obvious I have to be careful. Interestingly enough, though, do you know that only one out of this whole stack was from a Marine? Quite a while after this Marine's check bounced, another Marine came in to cash a check. I was bragging to him that in three years I had only one bad check from a Marine. As he finished writing he said, 'How much was this bum check?' When I told him twenty-five bucks he said, 'I'll buy it.'"

Col J. Leffers

Washington, D. C.

Peeling the Banana

... There are quite a few errors of fact—some of which should have been fairly obvious—in "King of the Banana Wars," by 1stLt R. H. Greathouse, in the June 1960 GAZETTE.

• Haitians speak French or Creole, not Spanish, as your author repeatedly quotes them in such phrases as *Viva La revolucion*, etc.

• The American Legation in Haiti, like its successor today, the American Embassy, was and is located in Port-au-Prince, the national capital, not (as stated on p. 29) in Grande Riviere du Nord, a small inland village containing no US diplomatic or consular agency whatsoever.

• The Caco revolt was not "a centuries old revolution." It started in 1918. Previous Caco revolutionary activity frequently occurred during the 19th and early 20th centuries, but Caco-ism as such was not a sustained revolutionary movement, or indeed an organized movement at all.

• Your photograph on p. 19, although entitled, "Marines quell riots . . ." does not show Marines, but rather Haitian *Gendarmerie*, who can be recognized by the cut of their breeches, by the uniform of their officer, wearing the *Gendarmerie* sun helmet, and, in an 8X10 of this picture, by the color of the men themselves. In any case

(Continued on page 6)

CREATIVE ELECTRONICS FOR DEFENSE



STRANGE "FISH" UNDER THE POLAR ICE

Revolutionary RCA Magnetic Video Tape Recorder to Speed Navigation Training of Submariners

Aboard the nuclear submarine Sea Dragon, the first undersea magnetic video tape recorder will record and store data on under-the-ice characteristics from externally installed TV cameras. Upon return to base the recorded information will be displayed for the benefit of undersea service trainees.

The RCA undersea recorder is a marvel of compact design (dimensions 20" x 20" x 100"). It nestles in a torpedo rack, and represents a 60% space reduc-

tion over existing video tape equipment.

Among the exclusive RCA developments are: the now famous "Tiros" satellite recorder; a radar system designed to take the first pictures of a nose cone re-entry vehicle; a unique tape cartridge completely adaptable to any size recorder. For literature describing new RCA defense and commercial products developments, write Defense Electronic Products, Radio Corporation of America, Camden, N. J.

Out of today's defense needs...tomorrow's electronic advances



The Most Trusted Name in Electronics
RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA

(Continued from page 4)

this photo dates from 1929, a decade after the events recounted in your article.

• The 2d Marines did not land from the *USS Washington* and were not the initial landing force in Haiti. *Washington's* Marines which landed at Port-au-Prince were the 12th Company and the ship's detachment. The initial increment of the 2d Regiment arrived almost a week later aboard the *USS Connecticut*. I do not believe—but am not sure on this point—that Hanneken was a member of the forces aboard the *Washington*.

• The landings in Haiti were not, as your author states, "the opening round of a 20-year bout historians refer to as the 'Banana Wars.'" Most historians date the beginning of the Banana Wars with our intervention in Nicaragua in 1912.

• According to the reports of the Major General Commandant and the Secretary of the Navy, the Haitian Gendarmerie, when organized in 1916, had an initial group of 112 American officers, NCO's and petty officers (not 53 as stated in your article).

• The Cacos were not, as the article states, "a tribe . . . who kept the island in a continuous state of chaos for more than 300 years." The term "Caco" is generic and occupational, describing a type of rural political banditry in Haiti; it is not in any way ethnic or tribal. Furthermore, Caco activities did not commence until appreciably after the overthrow of the French in 1804. Prior to that time Haiti, one of France's richest and most productive colonies, was anything but chaotic.

• Caco-ism was not confined, as Lt Greathouse states, to the north of Haiti. It was

prevalent in the central region, and also in the south, where Cacos were, as stated in Bellegarde's *La Résistance Haïtienne*, nicknamed *picquets*.

• In 1919, John H. Russell was a colonel, not a brigadier general, nor was he then or ever commandant of the *Gendarmerie D'Haiti*, as stated by the article. At that time he was the Marine brigade commander. Later he became the US High Commissioner to Haiti. The Gendarmerie commandant of the moment was Col F. M. ('Dopey') Wise.

• Charlemagne Peralte did not build Ft. Capois. This was an old French fort which he occupied.

• The dollar value of 10,000 Haitian *gourdes* in 1919 (as today) was \$2,000, not \$9,600, as you state.

• Your version of the death of Charlemagne is at some variance with the one generally accepted, which is that Hanneken opened fire on Charlemagne with his pistol, being followed by Cpl Button with the BAR, rather than the reverse as the article relates.

I would be very curious to learn your sources for the passages of dialogue variously attributed to Conze, and more particularly to Hanneken, on pp. 31-33. If authentic they represent important new historical material not previously known. If, on the other hand, they are imaginary, or largely so (a la *True and Argosy*), they have no place in what purports to be a piece of serious military history appearing in a professional journal.

John A. Lejeune's original charter for the Marine Corps Association listed as its primary purpose, "recording and publishing

the history of the Marine Corps." If today's *GAZETTE* still steers by the objective of Lejeune, somewhat more discrimination seems in order to insure that what the *GAZETTE* presents as Marine Corps history is historically accurate, professional, and authoritative.

Col R. D. Heinl, Jr.

US Naval Mission
Haiti

A New SWAG Contract

... This topic pertains to just a few officers of the Marine Corps: Reserve officers serving on active duty with the reserve establishment. We, since I am one of them, are in a somewhat nebulous situation. I am referring to what our thoughts and actions will be when and if the Marine Corps is ever called on again to take an active part in a "shooting war." Sure, our immediate reaction would be to request orders to get in there and wind it up fast. But, how qualified and capable are we of accomplishing this task successfully?

For a large majority of us, it's been a long time since we've served with the FMF. Surely our concept of infantry, artillery, tank, and other tactics are a bit rusty and even outdated. True, we stay abreast of equipment and tactical changes through MCI and MCS courses, MCOs, bulletins, and various reading materials that filter across our desks. Most of us even get a chance to see these new concepts in action, brief periods during two weeks annual field training. You and I know this isn't enough. We are occasionally called upon to give instruction in these various subjects; granted, we do our job. But as Marine Corps officers on active duty we are lacking one vital item. *Experience*. As commissioned officers, most of our active duty has been limited to two or three years immediately after our being commissioned. We lack recent experience. Practical experience has never been obtained by reading or watching. How can we get it?

First, we can request TAD orders for available formal schools, most of which are of two week's duration. This is hardly enough time to refresh one's memory let alone receive practical experience. We would also have to contend with the problems we know exist and are constantly occurring at our units or headquarters.

Second, (and I think this may be the answer) is a new type "SWAG" contract. There are probably many different ways this could be arranged but the basic idea is to include some FMF duty in the contract. A suggestion along this line might be: three years with the reserve establishment, a year in the FMF, preferably overseas where training is more accelerated than stateside FMF duty. This would give the reserve officer a chance to re-acquaint himself with the FMF, learn the new T/O's, equipment, and tactics by first hand practical experience for which there is no substitute.

I am sure this would make the individual reserve officer more aware of the changes taking place in the Marine Corps, give him the experience he is lacking, and instill new confidence in himself by being "in the know" with first hand information and not "hand me down" seconds.

I know there are many "bugs" in what I have laid forth, but I do sincerely believe this would make a better officer Corps and a better Marine Corps Reserve.

Capt H. R. Bollin

Asst I&L
2dCommCo
Brooklyn, N.Y.

Marine Corps Gazette • August 1970

TIME
TO
MOVE?



Orders In?



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- Borrow by mail

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What's up...and where?

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vision of SAGE**

ALRI, the Airborne Long Range Input system of the U. S. Air Force, is the seaward extension of SAGE, the vast electronic network that warns of aircraft approaching the North American continent. Philco will develop, produce and modify the airborne height-finding radar as an ALRI team member under the system manager, Burroughs Corporation. Philco was selected for this vital work because of its long and extensive experience in the development and production of military airborne radar and its major contributions to radar technology. Here is further evidence of Philco's leadership in advanced electronics . . . for reconnaissance, communications, weapon systems, space exploration and data processing.

Government & Industrial Group, Philadelphia 44, Pennsylvania

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Sierra Electronic Division • Western Development Laboratories



The Extension School's CHALLENGE

BASIC SCHOOL LEVEL

- 1** What is the difference, if any, between an envelopment and turning movement?
- 2** The advance party for an infantry battalion in tactical column would normally be composed of one
- fire team.
 - squad.
 - platoon (minus one squad).
 - company.
- 3** A unit leader can most effectively control his unit by
- closely checking each individual of his unit.
 - supervision of his subordinate leaders.
 - training his subordinate leaders and delegating his responsibilities to them.
 - constant observation of his unit from his OP.
- 4** In selecting intermediate objectives, the platoon commander should
- select terrain occupied by the enemy.
 - select terrain not occupied by the enemy.
 - use only those specified by the company commander.
 - select as many as he deems necessary to accomplish his mission.

JUNIOR SCHOOL LEVEL

- 5** An example of an intelligence source is:
- An aerial photograph.
 - A flak analyst.
 - A POW interrogator.
 - A reconnaissance company.
- 6** In processing information into intelligence, the determination of whether the information is of possible present or future value occurs in the process of:
- Recording.
 - Evaluating.



WHY NOT

**Increase your worth to the Marine Corps through professional study?
Enroll in *The Extension Course Program* NOW.**

- Interpreting.
- None of the above.

- 7** The G-2/S-2 has completed his collection plan. Following this he:

- Formulates the essential elements of information.
- Prepares specific orders and requests for information.
- Determines indications to satisfy the EEI.
- Revises the intelligence estimate.

- 8** The Intelligence Collection Plan is:

- Prepared for the use of the intelligence personnel and the intelligence officer and is not disseminated.
- Prepared at Division/Wing and higher levels only.
- Disseminated to subordinate commands and all available collection agencies.
- Used primarily in connection with the processing of information.

SENIOR SCHOOL LEVEL

- 9** The counterpreparation is a system of prearranged fires delivered when an enemy attack is imminent. Upon whose order is the counter-preparation fired?

- The supported unit commander.
- The commander of the artillery in general support.
- The landing force artillery officer.
- The force commander.


- 10** The responsibility for the preparation of the over-all naval gunfire support plan rests with the

- landing force naval gunfire officer.
- attack force commander.
- amphibious task force commander.
- landing force commander.

- 11** The main difference between the tactical air control center (TACC) and the tactical air direction center (TADC) is that the TACC

- controls aircraft while the TADC directs them.
- has a much more elaborate communication system than the TADC.
- is commanded by the Navy and the TADC is commanded by the Marine Corps.
- is responsible for the entire objective area while the TADC is responsible for only a portion of the objective area.

Answers on page 35



Five-story high antenna for Pincushion radar will be part of a new Advanced Research Projects Agency installation to be set up in mid-Pacific.

A unique radar designed to track and identify the warhead of ICBMs thousands of miles away is now being developed by Raytheon.

Designated "Pincushion", because of its microwave beam pattern formation, the 80-ton Raytheon radar will be part of Project Defender, ARPA's program to develop advanced anti-ICBM concepts.

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EXCELLENCE IN ELECTRONICS



USS *Shangri-La*

PATTERN FOR LIMITED WAR

By Col J. A. Donovan, Jr.

He that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much or as little of the war as he will, whereas those that be strongest by land are many times never the less in great straits.

—Francis Bacon, 1615

TODAY, IN THIS ERA OF JET SPEED and the dawn of the space age, Bacon's statement is as valid as it was over 300 years ago. But because of rapidly developing technologies and revolutionary new military concepts we tend to lose perspective of certain such fundamentals.

The current world power struggle has produced three general frameworks within which strategic planners attempt to design our forces and define the battle: the cold war, the limited war, and the general war are the frames of reference. Yet, our planning artists are not in complete agreement on the pictures to be depicted within these frames. There are varied ideas as to the military pattern to fit each design.

This is our problem.

The free world is fortunate that it has had both the time and the imagination to consider and debate and evaluate the structure and nature of the military forces and strategy for each type of war. Unfortunately, time is running against us and we must now settle on basic designs—even if some of the service planners are offended. Life or death may be the rewards of our decisions.

As the mutual deterrence of thermo-nuclear annihilation in the general war picture becomes more widely accepted, and so general war more unthinkable, increased interest is focused upon the limited war prob-

lem. What should be the pattern of our military organization and posture for limited war? What weapon systems, roles and functions are best suited to the prosecution of a limited war? What theories, concepts and doctrines are most valid and acceptable for the solution of the limited war problem? The answers to some of these questions are to be found in an analysis of the nature of the limited war, the criteria for types of limited war forces, and the organization and command of these forces. The conclusions should give us a pattern for limited war.



Definition of Limited War

Any discussion of limited war must be based upon some understanding and agreement as to what it is. A limited war essentially is a conflict short of general war in pur-

sueance of limited national objective and confined to a limited geographical area. Involved are two or more belligerents employing limited military forces. These may be combinations of US and allied or indigenous units against enemy combinations of "aggressors," "volunteers" or armed insurrectionists.

The limited objectives preclude annihilation of the enemy and unconditional surrender. Alternatives, avenues of escape, and hope for a reasonable settlement must be kept evident to the enemy. Such a war may mean a long drawn-out campaign for tactical advantage. It may well become a war of attrition and calculated risk. It must, however, be a war with a National purpose to further a National policy—but it can't be expected to settle a problem fully. Life is a process of living with problems and if we would avoid the "all-out" war, we will have to live with our "limited" problems. Maintenance of a status quo may be sufficient purpose. Such a war may be kept limited, however, only if the Nation is always in a position to fight a general war.

Limited yield, "tactical type" atomic weapons must be held in readiness to employ in the limited war if they are needed. This is a stated National policy. The great unknown factor, however, is the use of tactical atomic weapons in the

limited war. There is yet no assurance that the employment of these weapons can be confined and controlled. The decision to employ any form of nuclear weapons will have to be carefully weighed in terms of risks in balance with the limited objectives. In this definition we will consider that firepower is limited to the conventional weapons necessary to attain tactical objectives in the furtherance of the limited strategic objectives.

Other than the possible chain reaction of the employment of tactical atomic weapons in the limited war, we can normally expect a limited war to remain limited. Great international wars do not grow out of chance outbreaks of local hostilities. They are the result of the deliberate decisions of governments.

We must, however, continue to prepare for the general atomic war while recognizing, in the case of threat of such war, all existent political, psychological and social forces in the world will almost certainly press action toward a limited war.

The Critical Areas

In the present world political climate, limited war may result from a variety of causes. Insofar as America and its free world allies are concerned, the areas most likely to be the scenes of limited wars are the peripheral countries bordering the predatory Communist bloc. There we find the political, social, economic and geographic environments for Communist-motivated aggression contrary to free world interests. There Communist infiltration, coup d' etat, armed insurrection, "volunteer" liberation forces, guerrillas and invasion by satellite, may call for aid or intervention by the free world forces.

On this so called "periphery" of the Communist World we see certain danger areas that have been generally agreed upon by the military planners as being the most likely locales of limited war. Here we find that the danger is from the cumulative effect of "creeping aggression." Here also, political-military tactics are difficult to deter with a thermonuclear threat. Because of their importance to the free world, and their sensitivity to Communist pressures, and because they lie in the historic direction of expansion of the two



Col. Donovan believes the problems of limited war are the "big ones," rate the most attention from military planners. He came into the Marines in '39 after graduating from Dartmouth (PLC), spent all of WWII with Sixth Marines. He was E&P of LEATHERNECK Magazine for two years (1948-50), taught tactics at Junior School and Basic School, commanded 2/9, later became ExO, Ninth Marines. He's now with G-4, HQMC.

major communist powers, the two general areas of the periphery considered most likely scenes for limited war are the Middle East and South Asia. (Figure 1) There are other possible areas but solutions to the limited war problems posed by these two areas should provide us a suitable pattern for the others.

In the Mid-East and South Asia—the "rimlands," the periphery from Syria to Vietnam—we see a region most tempting to Communist limited-liability enterprises. There the Communists have recently been most industrious. This region is vastly important for its hundreds of millions of people and its vast resources in oil and other resources. It is

astride the vital sea and air communications between Europe and the Far East—the Suez, Red Sea, Indian Ocean, China Sea highways which are of such consequence to the trade by which the free world largely lives. It is important to freedom of movement between the Atlantic, the Indian and the Pacific Oceans and their air spaces, and is of interest to a global power whose strategies are based upon freedom of action.

The nature of the Communist threat in these areas takes many forms and Communist aggression is conducted on several fronts: political, economic, social, psychological, and military. Resistance to all of




Figure 1



Terrain in the critical areas varies from barren, trackless desert

these fronts is beyond the ken of the military. We are herein concerned with a design for the military aspects of this problem. The essentially military tasks and techniques to consider within the boundaries of limited war should help us establish the criteria and the types of forces to be used.

The missions facing the limited war planner for these critical areas include: (1) the show of deterrent force, (2) protection of American and allied citizens, (3) protection of our national and economic interests, (4) assisting friendly governments to resist civil disorder and armed rebellion, (5) providing logistic, air or weapons support to indigenous ground forces, (6) conducting military operations against enemy forces on a variety of scales, and (7) going to the rescue of any nation "requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international Communism," as authorized in the Eisenhower Doctrine to prevent the creation of new Red satellites.

Limited War Operations

It is then evident that in the limited war we can expect to experience such prosaic military operations as control of civil disturbances and restoration of order, anti-guerrilla actions, defense of vital areas, and the many forms of offensive ground operations.

Throughout the critical Mid-East, for example, we can anticipate that mechanized infantry-artillery and armor-heavy formations in wide open maneuvers, such as were seen

there in the WWII years and as recently as the Sinai campaign, will be the typical operations of an extended campaign. Small airborne and vertical envelopment operations should have tactical value, but the stamina and ground mobility of air-lifted forces in this barren and trackless land is questionable. Most of the vital objectives in this area are approachable from the sea and are also well within range of naval amphibious force operations.

In contrast, the jungles, paddies and deltas of South Asia do not lend themselves to mechanized or armored maneuver. In that part of the world, as it has been in the past, the infantry formation is appropriate. This is the land of patrols, raids and ambush, the perimeter defense and night operations. Aids to mobility would be such ordinary means as trucks, amphibious vehicles, helicopters and the naval amphibious lift. Water is the most available avenue of approach for major maneuvers and also the most common obstacle.

A study of the Mid-East and South Asia areas will also reveal that the sea approaches are not only the most accessible but the most logical for both the deployment and subsequent support of a limited campaign. As long as the naval amphibious task forces are properly deployed there should be no standing requirement for large scale air deployments or airborne assaults in the initial stages of a limited intervention situation. On the other hand, the rapid and timely aerial deployment of relatively small combat formations to a troubled

area may help prevent a sudden situation from deteriorating or may quickly provide the necessary support or build-up for a beleaguered ally. Such a move need not necessarily require an "assault" type landing. A simple administrative air landing may suffice.

By the same token, when considering limited war operations, our naval amphibious forces should not think exclusively in terms of the "assault" landing. There are few fortified and defended beaches in the world today. There are particularly few of them in the under-developed areas being considered. A fortified coast line is a luxury even a major power, fully mobilized, can rarely afford. Our amphibious forces should find many undefended landing sites along the coasts of the critical areas.

When we visualize the nature of a limited war, let us not be distracted by WWII patterns, training habits, or general war doctrine to the point where we automatically see the "assault landing" as the only method of deployment onto a foreign shore. There is no need to parachute all over the country-side or splash in among the bathing beauties if we can simply push an LST up to some dark beach and quietly put the troops and *all* their equipment ashore. The "assault" is actually only a phase of offensive combat we must employ when we cannot accomplish our mission by maneuver or fire. The "assault" is not always a necessary step in the airborne or amphibious operations sequence. This by no means suggests that we should neglect the development and cultivation of our assault skills, either amphibious or airborne. When needed they cannot be performed by amateurs. In our limited war concepts and plans, however, we should recognize that the timeliness of our arrival at the scene, the skill with which we land the right amount and type of combat power, our mobility in the combat zone, and the efficient prosecution of our limited objectives, are all equally as important as the techniques used in landing.

Criteria for Limited War Forces

In the analysis of any problem there must be established certain criteria by which we gauge and test the possible solutions. In the light

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of the most probable tasks, character and geographic locales of limited war, the nature of limited war forces can be fairly well defined.

Generally, such forces should be able to operate in any climate and terrain, but specifically we are interested in the Mid-East and South Asia. In the first we are considering a hot, dry desert, barren, underdeveloped and trackless area where oil-fields, ports, pipelines and a few population centers are the vital areas. Most of the key objectives are approachable from the sea.

In the second area we find the hot, humid, lush, underdeveloped, paddy and jungle terrain typical of the littoral civilization of South Asia. This is the terrain of the river barrier and the waterway. The critical localities of South Asia are surrounded by sea approaches.

Limited war forces must be able to operate in these areas independently or, when possible, with friendly indigenous forces and units of other free world allies. They should be able to deal with the complete gamut of limited contingencies including political infiltration, civil riot, armed insurrection, guerrilla and partisan warfare, or military aggression and penetration by a border nation.

These forces must have both a military and political capability. They should be able to organize and work with the local populace for the common effort.

They should be flexible forces in size and combat power, able to exert the proper type of force at the correct time and place. To do so they must be mobile by land, sea and air.

This sort of precision will require a responsiveness at air speeds in a matter of hours and at sea speeds in a few days. It can be best attained by forces deployed reasonably near the critical areas. Furthermore, these forces must be trained and ready with plans, SOPs, and joint and combined operations capabilities.

To operate in the underdeveloped regions there must be minimum dependence upon land lines of communications and elaborate logistic bases.

Finally, the limited war contingency force must be free of other military commitments and able to speedily focus its entire attention upon its task.



. . . to hot, humid, lush, underdeveloped paddies and jungles.

Types of Forces

One aspect of limited war planning that usually confuses the issue is the uniservice concept of the *type* forces to be employed. The military planner tends to visualize the type of situation which best fits his service's particular characteristics.

The Army thinks in terms of land operations well suited to a two or three division corps including division slices of all the arms and services. This "school solution" is well supported by lines of communication, logistic commands with supply depots, replacement camps, laundry units and motor pools—typical of the field Army. Furthermore much of this, they believe, should be moved by air into battle.

The Marines, on the other hand, like to think in terms of an amphibious assault requiring a Marine divi-

sion or two with Marine aircraft wings under a Marine command in a neat, tight operation including only the supporting Navy.

The Navy planners stress the merits of sea power and surface lift to support a limited war effort but continue to neglect amphibious shipping requirements in favor of the exotic submarines, giant carriers and missiles more pertinent to the strategic deterrent role.

Meanwhile the Air Force has relatively small interest in the limited war, as it does not fit into their jet, nuclear, air power philosophies. They are ready, nevertheless, to deploy a Composite Air Strike Force of fighter-bombers to the critical area at the drop of a hat. This fighter-bomber force is, however, trained and equipped primarily for isolation and interdiction of the battlefield with tactical atomic weapons rather



U.S. Naval aircraft should dominate the skies.

than for close troop support with conventional weapons.

Actually such concepts, plans, and forces are often remote from the specific requirements or even actual capabilities. First, the nature of contingencies in the areas we are considering are more likely to call initially for the deployment of small precision, selected, or token forces. Ground divisions and air forces are needed in expanded situations. Second, there simply aren't enough US military transport aircraft or ships immediately available to move divisions and large support forces quickly and concurrently in an emergency. We have to face up to the facts of numbers and types of forces actually available and their ready transportation means. Finally we should plan to employ only the minimum force required for the task. Practicing economy of force and an objective consideration of the type forces best suited to the task, we can develop sound task forces and operational concepts. The purpose is to design measured types of flexible forces capable of applying truly precise combat power. We must consider the peculiar characteristics of each type of armed force to see how it best fits in the limited war picture.

Air Forces

First, then what is the probable role of air power in the limited war? More and more we appear to be designing ourselves for a type of atomic air war from which there is no return and to which there is no alter-

native. The heavy jet bomber for strategic bombing and nuclear weapon delivery is hardly a tool for limited war. In fact there is some question as to the capability of modern bomber aircraft to deliver conventional bombs. There is no doubt that these strategic bombers are the ultimate force we must have in reserve, the atomic deterrent which gives the enemy good cause to limit the war. By the same token, the latest versions of Mach-2 interceptor aircraft and their counterparts in the family of ground to air missiles have no clear place in limited air war. If the enemy employs the type of offensive weapons that will require these air defense systems, it will be a major air battle and probably an unlimited air war.

Each year our tactical or attack type bombers become faster and more related to atomic weapons delivery concepts and less concerned with the more prosaic role of close support of ground operations with conventional weapons. With the demise of the Navy-Marine AD and F4U type aircraft, American ground forces have lost their last true close support aircraft. Admittedly the aviators can make a good case for jet aircraft in the ground support role—but the fact remains that most jets fly too high and too fast to find battlefield targets. They don't carry the varied firepower and they can't stay on station awaiting the needs of the ground battle. It's understandable that every combat pilot should desire the security of jet power in today's skies—but we must remember

that attack bombers are primarily a means of delivering selective ordnance in support of sea or land operations. The jets of today require practically unlimited air space and obvious ground targets. These are not typical characteristics of the limited war. Certain jet attack types such as the Navy-Marine A4Ds and the planned A2Fs have presumably good tactical support characteristics. This problem of satisfactory close support aircraft types is far from solved, however.

The Navy's aircraft carrier forces should, however, be able to provide most of the combat air support needed in the initial phases of an intervention or limited war. In the critical areas being considered there is no major enemy air power to contend with. US naval aircraft should be able to dominate the skies with little or no contest. If such air dominance is not assured *before* intervention, then there can be no limited ground effort until the air battle is won. Such an air battle would be most difficult to limit. A repetition of the odd pattern of the Korean aerial duels at the Yalu sanctuary is hard to visualize. In Korea there was no real contest for control of the air over the battlefield.

Naval aircraft, in addition to patrol of the air over the limited area, can provide the interdiction and isolation of the battlefield, and tactical air support in conjunction with the precision, close troop support provided by embarked Marine Corps attack squadrons. Direct support of the landing force can also be provided by Marine transport helicopters flying from helicopter assault ships. These are capabilities unique to the Naval amphibious force.

Related to this primarily Navy-Marine air support is the deterrent threat of SAC, poised in the background, and the presence of the Air Force's Composite Air Strike Force in a forward deployment posture. This latter unit of fighter-bomber types may quickly join the air battle if the Navy carrier forces need help or relief and if the Air Force bases are within fighter-bomber range.

If a limited war expands into a prolonged land campaign, as in Korea, Marine Aircraft Wing and Air Force TAC units may be deployed into the objective area and to air fields ashore to support the ground operations and assure con-

trol of the air. It is not visualized, however, that battles for air superiority in terms of past history will be typical of limited wars of the type we are here considering.


The airplane is, however, the great fact of modern power. In limited war it probably won't be the decisive implement but the nation that can best employ modern air power to limited ends will be dominant. In the limited war, air transport, both fixed wing and helicopter, may provide the responsiveness and mobility that will dictate much of the tactics. The ability to deploy selected ground combat forces by air for intercontinental distances on short notice should be one of the capabilities of a major air power. Precise packages of combat units landed by helicopters from naval task forces or by parachute from far ranging troop carriers upon the sensitive objectives at the periphery of the enemy areas may attain strategic results beyond what their limited size would indicate. In the limited war, speed, precision and technique may well be the primary means of keeping the campaign from deteriorating beyond the desirable limits. So the possibilities of direct air support in limited war operations are almost limitless when we mean close tactical air support, troop transport, supply, evacuation and observation.

Land Forces

Should a limited war contingency indicate a requirement for substantial land combat forces and if a land campaign in the pattern of Korea develops, then we must be able to quickly augment the Navy's amphibious troops with US Army formations. In its traditional role, the Army should provide the sturdy infantry divisions, armored units, medium artillery, engineers and skilled logistic support in the kind of deliberate and powerful effort for which an Army is intended.

The Army's part in the limited war concept is the usual role played throughout history by the Army of a maritime (that is, strategically mobile) power. It is today, with air mobility added to sea mobility, no different in principle than it was when the sailing ship was its instrument.

In any intercontinental deployment of these heavy types of Army forces, most formations will have to



The airplane is the great fact of modern power

move by conventional sea lift. Economy and our military air lift capacity restrict us from moving little other than small airborne or infantry type formations for long distances by air. If our sea forces are kept in proper strength and location there should be no requirement for large scale Army deployment by air.

Although today the tendency of many is to couple mobility of ground forces with airlift, this still is not the most logical way to move large bodies of troops, heavy equipment and supplies. And it is far from being the cheapest. Airlift gains its distinct value when time is counted in minutes—when a small, light force can do the job quickly. The requirement of large units for significant quantities of supplies over longer

periods of time calls for the tonnage carrying capacity of the ship which permits loads to be computed in terms of tons rather than pounds.

As has been noted the assault phase and its technique are not the primary criteria for determining types of ground forces for execution of limited war tasks. More important is the *right type* of force, properly equipped and sustained for the particular requirements of the situation.

Finally the ground force capability for limited war should include in addition to suitable types of combat and support units, such special forces as: Unconventional Warfare units, indigenous support commands, Joint Military Assistance Advisory Groups, Logistic Support Groups, and a Civil



... Deliberate and powerful effort for which an Army is intended

Affairs and Military Government capability.


Sea Forces

As most of the critical areas on the periphery of the Communist bloc are approachable from the high seas, our basic instrument for limited war will be our sea borne forces. The initial steps of deterrent show of force, or moderate military aid or intervention are well within the capabilities of the balanced fleets.

The fleets occupy a unique status under international law. Naval forces traditionally represent the sovereignty and independence of their state more fully than anything else can represent it. They enjoy many immunities not customarily granted under international law to aircraft or other units of the nation's armed forces. They operate almost totally in international waters which are available to be used by all nations.

A unique characteristic of the Naval amphibious force is its ability to apply selected and precise force at the sensitive area. It can be deployed to the scene before the war turns hot. There it can show the flag as a deterrent force. It can land liberty parties of sailors and Marines to spend money and further the people-to-people program. Or these same troops can go ashore armed to support a friendly local government. They can launch combat units, including varieties of aircraft, to support embattled indigenous forces. Finally, they can employ the full scope of the air-ground team's combat power, including helicopter and beach landings at vital points, to accomplish limited National objectives. These same forces can be returned quickly to their ships where they can remain as visible reminders of America's determination and authority. The Marine landing forces withdrawn to their ships can remain available in the area for further operations with a good order of flexibility and sustained logistic support. No other type force has this flexibility, this wide choice of techniques for applying its power or the capability of doing it so precisely.

Lebanon again demonstrated the classic role and unique value of modern sea power. The balanced fleet makes possible the forward deployment, close to troubled areas of diversified force—air, Marines and warships, that is poised but not committed to action. Such a task force



Our basic instrument for limited war: seaborne forces.

serves as a visible evidence of "leashed" American strength that can move swiftly. Moreover, such military power is mobile, independent of advance logistic bases on foreign soil and, being on the high seas, its presence cannot be challenged by anyone.

Joint Operations

Once we have accepted the essentially naval character of the initial phases of a limited war operation, we can better evaluate force requirements and command relations. However, there is another current military philosophy affecting our concepts of limited war and the contingency plans for such events. It is based generally upon the tri-elemental theory of the unified operation and the transparent approach of "me too-ism." This is the idea that each Service *must* get in the act. It invokes the doctrine of the joint command of air, ground and sea components in the ideal of a unified effort. This theoretical approach results in plans and operations not designed to precisely apply the *right* force—but rather a compromise to give everyone an opportunity to contribute.

Although President Eisenhower stated, in his Defense Reorganization message of April 1958, that there would no longer be separate air, ground and sea battles and implied that all future operations would be of a joint nature under a unified command, he certainly did not mean that *each* of the four services must participate in every deployment on an equal basis. A joint task force can be two or more services

combined as necessary to accomplish a task.

This does not suggest that limited war planning should not be done on a joint services basis. Quite the contrary. Fortunately the reorganized Joint Staff in Washington and the area unified commands should assure the joint nature of future plans. Nevertheless, there will be a call for greater objectivity in determining the proper types and sizes of forces in the contingency plans and a proper perspective of the limited war picture. The probable phases and evolution of the limited war pattern should be considered in composing the joint military effort and in determining the force requirements.

The unified command plans must not be used as the means for *justifying* each service's new operational concepts or force ambitions. Rather the estimates, concepts of operations and requirements stemming from the area commands should *reveal* the type forces needed, how much, their movement priorities, and the command relations. When and if an emergency situation appears to be developing beyond the capability of the Naval carrier and amphibious forces, Army and Air Force reinforcements must be prepared to enter the fray. Then the operation will evolve from an essentially naval operation to an expanded joint operation with a joint tri-elemental force command being both logical and necessary.

A current deficiency is our readiness to put such joint headquarters into the field on an operating basis. A joint staff is only as effective as its combination of trained personnel,

equipment and procedures. A joint staff cannot be thrown together and expected to function well. The excellent combat forces we have now ready, deserve equally proficient staff leadership in joint operations. A related deficiency is in the area of approved doctrine to guide the joint task force operations and procedures. This is particularly apparent in air operations. Special effort must be made to correct these deficiencies immediately.

Command Organization

Again, if we recognize the logic of the predominantly naval nature of initial limited intervention efforts, we can reach some specific patterns for the controversial aspects of command relations in the limited war picture.


We have seen that deployed and balanced fleets are properly the primary or initial instruments of our foreign policy in the limited war area. The pattern has been established for a fleet projecting its forces ashore under a Specified Command, as did the Sixth Fleet in the Mid East—and have seen the Seventh Fleet and Taiwan Defense Command conducting deterrent deployments and preparations for possible limited support of an ally in the Far East. This time under the Unified Command of CINCPAC.

The questionable aspect of the command pattern is, "At what phase is it necessary to introduce the joint headquarters and the Joint Task Force into the limited war situation?"

An answer would be simply, "When the nature of ground and air operations in the limited war area approach a scope and duration beyond the capabilities of the fleet and its amphibious force."

During the essentially Naval phase of an intervention, dominated by Naval air forces and Fleet Marine Forces, there is certainly no need or logic to complicating a time-proven command relation with the tri-service joint task force organization.

In the initial phase of the intervention or assistance (Figure 2) the Marine landing force commander (Amphibious Troops Commander) should be in command of all US ground forces ashore. All air support will be under Naval command until such time as command is passed ashore, then it will be a Marine air command until such time as Air Force support of the limited war op-




eration becomes the dominant air effort.

The close command and working relations between the Navy and the Fleet Marine air and ground units justifies this type of organization at this phase. The arbitrary and theoretical tri-elemental organization of Air, Ground, and Naval commands as components of a specified or joint task force with the ensuing complexities of coordination and communications is not supportable. At this early and truly limited phase of an intervention the command organization should be kept simple and in consonance with the type and size of forces employed. It is also a proven system based upon experience and well developed Navy-

Marine doctrine.

The Marine Division-Aircraft Wing teams have been specifically tailored and trained for just such precise operations. Furthermore, in the Fleet Marine Force Troops and FMF Headquarters we have the communications and air-ground staff ready to command the situation.

If the deployment and force build-up phase in an expanded situation or prolonged land campaign develops, we might expect a command relations pattern as in Figure 3. Here the Joint Headquarters or joint task force recognizes the participation of all Services in an expanded joint effort. The Army with a corps or field army type headquarters becomes the land forces component.



The Navy reverts to a lesser support role and becomes the sea component. The Air Force furnishes the bulk of the air component. The over-all command is a unified headquarters consisting of a joint staff trained and in existence, as previously suggested, or the joint headquarters can be formed around the nucleus represented by the in-being air-ground team headquarters of the Marine amphibious troops commander.

The fleet's Marines are the logical bridge in this transition from the predominantly naval phase to the joint phase dominated by the Army in a ground campaign. The Marine amphibious troops and air units may then subsequently phase out of the operation to return to their primarily amphibious or reserve posture under the Naval component.

The Pattern

We can then conclude that the proper pattern for limited war is along the following general lines:

1. It will be initially predominantly a naval operation because sea power is the logical and traditional implement of National policy in limited contingencies. The high seas have historically been accessible to maritime powers as avenues of approach to all the strategic littorals of the world. The balanced fleet can move freely in the vicinity of a critical area with no question about violation of a nation's sovereignty.

2. The fleet's amphibious forces are the trained and ready precision forces to be projected ashore for limited objectives.

3. Initial Army and Air Force participation will be to supplement and support the amphibious troops and naval air effort.

4. An expanded and prolonged operation will call for Army reinforcement and build-up of suitable



ground forces for a ground campaign and to conduct civil-military aid programs.

5. A prolonged air contest will require a major Air Force participation and control of the air prior to land operations.

6. The joint character of the operations should hinge upon the nature of the forces actually required and contributed rather than upon a philosophy of equal representation of each service in the plans.

7. Small aggressions and limited objectives do not call for retaliation with nuclear bombs. In the bal-

anced fleet with its unique amphibious components the United States has a highly mobile military force in being that gives us the capability of immediately reacting against small-scale Communist aggression on a graduated retaliatory basis.

8. The forward deployment of alert naval forces is as important as fast transport systems and is the economic means of providing initial combat forces, build-up forces and sustained support of limited war efforts. However, a modern military air transport capability is a necessary supplement of the mobile surface systems and air support will be a substantial logistic factor in limited war.

9. Command organization for limited war is proper when it is simple, flexible, trained and in existence. It should reflect both joint planning and the nature of the dominant type forces executing the initial tasks and subsequently the type forces that may be needed to accomplish the limited National objectives.

Conclusion

One of the dangers facing the military man today is that in his preoccupation with the changing techniques of his profession and with the sacred functions of his service, he may lose sight of his mission, the reason for his existence. No military service, or the concepts of its operational doctrine, is an end in itself. We cannot become so concerned in evolving theories which visualize the type of war most suitable to our function that we lose the perspective required to evaluate the changing scientific, military and political environment in which we live. For only with enlightened perspective can we see the pattern of limited war.

USMC

What Hath Goode Writ

LIMA COMPANY, 9TH MARINES was in process of running a company attack problem in the northern section of Okinawa. The base of fire had lifted, and the assault platoon was on the objective, a craggy peak almost in the center of the island. The company commander was in the process of moving up to supervise reorganization on the objective. He halted long enough to take a field message from a panting runner. Message follows:

Sir:

We have taken the high ground. All Okinawa from the broad Pacific to the East China Sea lies trembling at our feet. Not a "habu" can slide slithering on its stomach but what we see him.

For God, For Country, For Yale & For Connolly,

Y'r most obd't & humble servant

C. J. GOODE
2dLt USMCR

\$15.00 to Capt James P. Connolly II

Marine Corps Gazette • August 1960

THE SALTY SKIPPER

SAYS

Use Your
First Sergeant



■ THE OTHER DAY, I WAS WONDERING HOW OTHER COMPANY COMMANDERS USED THEIR FIRST SERGEANTS. I CALLED IN MY OWN AND BROKE OUT MCO 1400.3B. IT DIDN'T TELL US MUCH.

"CAPTAIN, I'LL VISIT THE FIRST SERGEANTS IN THE 1ST AND 3D BATTALIONS. YOU TALK TO THE SKIPPERS IN OUR BATTALION," STOVER SUGGESTED

"GOOD IDEA," I SAID.

"THERE ARE OTHER BATTALIONS AROUND BUT COMPARED TO THOSE IN OUR REGIMENT, THEY'RE SECOND RATE," STOVER SAID.

"DON'T BOTHER WITH 'EM," I SAID.

A week later, Stover told me he'd talked to the first sergeants. "Frankly, Captain, I didn't find out much. I helped them more than they helped me," he said ruefully. "I got a few ideas, not many."

"ME TOO, TOP," I SAID, SCRATCHING MY HEAD. "TELL YOU WHAT. OUTLINE YOUR DUTIES AS YOU SEE 'EM. I'LL ADD OR SUBTRACT AS NECESSARY."

"AYE, AYE, SIR. FIRST, NO ADMINISTRATION. SSgt Kiner KNOWS I'LL HELP IF HE HAS PROBLEMS BUT HE'S THE ADMIN CHIEF AND KNOWS IT." Stover jabbed his jutting chin. "EVERY DAY I LOOK AT A SQUAD BAY OR TWO AND I GET TO TO THE STOREROOM THREE OR FOUR TIMES A WEEK."

"NOT ON A SCHEDULE, I HOPE?" I ASKED. WHEN STOVER SHOOK HIS HEAD "NO," I WENT ON, "THAT'S DANGEROUS—ESTABLISHING A ROUTINE. IF THE MEN EXPECT YOU, THEY'LL WINDOW-DRESS AND I MIGHT AS WELL HAVE NO FIRST SERGEANT."

"RIGHT, CAPTAIN," STOVER SAID EMPHASITICALLY. "I DON'T KNOW WHERE I'M GOING NEXT MYSELF. IF ANYTHING'S WRONG AT THE STOREROOM OR A SQUAD BAY, I GRAB THE SUPPLY OR POLICE SERGEANT."

"YOU NEVER KNOW WHERE YOU'RE GONNA BE EXCEPT THURSDAY?" I ASKED.

"EVERYBODY KNOWS I'LL BE IN MY OFFICE FROM 1500 TO 1700 AND 1930 TO 2100 ON THURSDAY EVEN THOUGH IT'S NOT IN WRITING. THEY KNOW THE DOOR'S OPEN, TOO. YOU WERE RIGHT ABOUT THE ORDER. THE MEN BRAG ABOUT ME COMING IN EVERY THURSDAY WITHOUT AN ORDER. THEY SAY THE OTHER FIRST SERGEANTS ONLY COME IN BECAUSE THEY'RE ORDERED TO."

"WE'VE RUINED MANY FINE CUSTOMS ORDERING PEOPLE

TO DO THEM," I SAID. "WE LIKE TO CARRY ON TRADITION BUT HATE BEING TOLD WHAT TO DO AND WHEN TO DO IT."

"I TALK TO THE GUNNY TWICE DAILY, INSPECT TRAINING, VISIT THE BATTALION STAFF," STOVER PAUSED AND GROPED FOR A WORD.

"I KNOW, SMOKY," I SAID. "YOU PUT OUT FIRES BEFORE THEY GET STARTED. IT DOESN'T SOUND LIKE MUCH BUT I KNOW THE GOOD YOU DO."

"I'VE LEFT THE MOST IMPORTANT THINGS TO LAST. I TALK TO CHIEF BIXBY AT THE DISPENSARY AND BOTH CHAPLAINS EVERY DAY," STOVER SAID.

"THE CHAPLAINS AND MEDICS CAN TELL YOU THINGS ABOUT YOUR OUTFIT AND HELP YOU STOP TROUBLE BEFORE IT STARTS," I SAID.

"FINALLY, I INTERVIEW EACH MAN JOINING. I WELCOME HIM AND TELL HIM WHAT WE EXPECT OF HIM," STOVER PAUSED AND THEN WENT ON RESOLUTELY. "THIS MAY SEEM STRANGE," HE TOOK A DEEP BREATH, "BUT I DO IT. I CHECK HIS RECORD FOR HIS RELIGION. I'VE NEVER SEEN A BOOK THAT DIDN'T LIST A RELIGION. I TELL 'EM WHEN AND WHERE CHAPEL SERVICES ARE HELD AND ALSO WHERE THE NEAREST CIVILIAN CHURCH OF THAT FAITH IS."

"IT WORKS," I SAID, NODDING APPROVAL. "I'VE NOTICED AN INCREASE IN CHURCH ATTENDANCE FROM THIS COMPANY WHEN I USHER."

"IF THEY'RE PROTESTANT, I TELL 'EM YOU USHER," STOVER SAID. "IF THEY'RE ROMAN CATHOLIC, I TELL 'EM MR DURHAM ASSISTS FATHER MCBRIDE AT MASS. I TELL 'EM NOT TO QUIT GOING TO CHURCH BECAUSE THEY'RE IN THE MARINE CORPS. IF THERE'S A WAR, THEY'LL START LOOKING FOR GOD FAST. THEY BETTER LEARN WHERE TO FIND HIM BEFOREHAND. THERE MIGHT NOT BE TIME WHEN THE SHOOTING STARTS."

"THAT'S IT, SIR," STOVER SAID. "ANY ADDITIONS OR SUBTRACTIONS?"

"ONLY THIS," I SAID. "HERE ARE YOUR ORDERS, FIRST SERGEANT. STAY OUT OF ADMINISTRATION; CHECK ON POLICE AND THE STOREROOM BUT DON'T USURP THE DUTIES OF THE SUPPLY OR POLICE SERGEANT; MAKE YOURSELF AVAILABLE TO THE MEN WITHOUT APPOINTMENT; INTERVIEW EACH NEW MAN, ENCOURAGING HIM TO GO TO CHURCH; AND TALK TO THE CHAPLAINS AND MEDICS DAILY. SOUNDS SIMPLE, DOESN'T IT? A MAN WHO CAN DO THESE JOBS WELL IS WORTH HIS WEIGHT IN GOLD."

USMC

COMBAT COURSE


By Capt M. E. White

ACTUAL COMBAT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO duplicate in the training program. It is therefore surprising that it has taken us so long to perfect and develop one of the best training and morale-building devices in the infantry field — the Unit Combat Marksmanship Competition. We have used infiltration courses and various field firing problems for training Marines. Yet, because, I suppose, of the safety factor, most unit commanders have been reluctant to employ live firing with any appreciable movement. Sometimes an individual or two runs over a prescribed range and fires a few rounds at indicated targets (with one or two safety NCOs or officers at his heels).

Then in 1957 HQMC announced a squad level competition between infantry regiments to determine the Marine rifle squad most proficient in combat marksmanship in the entire Marine Corps. Immediately, live firing training received a much needed shot in the arm.

Each infantry battalion held its own competition to determine which squad would be entered in the Regimental competition. Within the rifle companies, almost no squad was operating at authorized strength. Considerable shuffling went on, not only to bring a squad up to T/O strength, but also to see that the Marines in the company squad were a trifle above average. Winning squads from the Battalion competition entered the Regimental competition. The winning squad from the Regimental competition competed against winning squads from the other infantry regiments of the Marine Corps.

During September 1959 the Second Annual Unit Combat Marksmanship Competition was held at



MCS, Quantico. The winning squad was First Squad, 3rd Plt Co "C", 1st Bn, 7th Marines, 1st MarDiv.

At Quantico, prior to the competition, considerable planning and support was necessary to see that each squad had a fair chance at winning.

Rehearsals were run during February and August by Marines from Schools Demonstration Troops. The range and control measures to be used by the competing squads were checked out. Everything conceivable in the way of breakdowns occurred. Radios didn't function; the electric power was shut off over a whole section of Virginia, including the competition range. No effort was spared to make certain each squad had the exact same chance to win, and was subjected to exactly the same amount of noise, targets, control, and simulated fire.

Automatic pop-up type "E" targets represented aggressor infantrymen. Double targets represented automatic riflemen. These targets could be raised and lowered elec-

trically and would fall when hit. Gunfire simulators were used as rifle and machine gun fire. These were activated by electricity and used a mixture of oxygen and acetylene. In addition, simulators were used for white phosphorus and VT artillery fire. Demolitions represented ground bursts. All of these "Combat Situation" effects were run from a control tower.

Order of competition was determined by lot; the squad leaders drew cards. After determining their competition sequence, the squads were known by that number only, and none of the umpires knew the military designation of the squad they were judging.

The concept of the problem placed the competing squad as part of a larger unit, in an assembly area well behind front lines. The squad was then briefed on the general situation. They then were lifted by helicopter to a covering landing zone and oriented on the special situation.

Scoring was based on such factors as over-all appearance, actions, control, use of cover and concealment, helicopter lift procedures, fire distribution, fire and maneuver, ABC passive defense measures, orders of the leaders, and number of hits on each target. Even the number of unfired rounds in the squad after the exercise counted in the scoring.

Lessons

Upon deplaning and getting the special situation (although not under enemy fire or known enemy observation) almost half the squads moved out through use of fire team rushes. This was energy-consuming in the 90 degree heat and high humidity of Virginia. Also if the enemy were further away than they actually were, heat exhaustion or heat prostration could have been a larger casualty producer. As it was, two cases of heat exhaustion resulted. Conserving energy for endurance is vitally important. Small unit leaders should be indoctrinated that the pace must be controlled to allow for continuous action. Exhaustion prior to meeting the enemy can only lead to delay or defeat.

The reaction to incoming artillery in most cases was not up to par. Only about a third of the squads dispersed and moved on through the impact area at a quick pace. Another third hit the deck and took advantage of all available cover and just waited. The remaining third of the competing squads did nothing, apparently, and just continued the same type movement which was in progress when the artillery fire began.

While some of the BARmen were outstanding shots, fire control still remains a big problem, even on the fire team level. Sometimes the fire team leader must forego firing his own weapon to properly use his



Capt White believes Unit Combat Marksmanship Competition is one of the best training devices and morale builders available to small units. His article critiques last year's contest (won by 1st Sqd, 3d Plt, C/1/7), offers sound advice for squad leaders who will be running their squads through the combat course this year. The Third Annual Unit Combat Marksmanship Competition is slated for Quantico, 6-9 September.

other weapons, assign sectors of fire, and to insure proper fire distribution. All levels must continually review proper return-fire methods when a unit is taken under surprise fire. For return fire to be effective, the entire target area must be taken under fire, not just the most exposed targets.

A rifleman must learn to first fire at that portion of the target corresponding to his position in the squad or fire team. He then should distribute his remaining shots over that part of the target extending a few yards to the right and left of his first shot. The BARman should always cover the entire squad or fire team target designated by the fire team leader.

A troop leading step frequently overlooked was the reconnaissance. Some type, be it only visual, is a must, before issuing the squad order to the fire team leaders. Also, if possible, issue the order to the entire squad, rather than just the fire team leaders. Many fire team leaders confined their orders to the perfunctory "that way, let's go."

On the plus side, quite a few squad leaders had small, printed five paragraph order forms, which fit into the Squad Leaders Notebook. These forms helped in recording information about the various situations presented by the umpires who acted as platoon commanders.

The consolidation phase of offensive combat showed a lack of indoctrination for almost all units. Squads were slow in assuming the hasty defense, and even slower in pursuing the enemy by fire when fleeing enemy troops were pointed out. Also, with fleeing enemy, the range increases rapidly. Experience is needed in rapid sight adjustment. The small number of hits obtained on targets exceeding 300 yards range bears out this point.

Finally, very few squad leaders remembered the basic fundamental of an impending atomic attack—seek cover or dig in. Most squad leaders were apparently looking for something more complex, and overlooked the obvious.

However, with the general aggressiveness displayed, had there been the equipment available, a concrete shelter would have been constructed in no time at all.

In summary, all squads were enthusiastic and competent representatives of their parent regiments. They exhibited a spirit of aggressiveness and training which would make any leader proud to be associated with these men. The Unit Combat Marksmanship Competition is a highly effective method of training squads in a realistic situation. It has provided keen competition in an area where competition is mandatory.

USMC



Let's Perk Up Our Reserves

By Capt C. R. Venditto



"LIEUTENANT, I'D APPRECIATE YOUR not saying anything about this, but the real reason I'm getting out of this program is because it's too damn dull."

These words were not spoken by some Marine craving for a taste of civilian life, but by a Marine Reservist with three stripes, an excellent service record, and a great many disillusionments about the reserve program.

This sergeant didn't leave with bitterness, but with the feeling that his reserve unit didn't show him anything, especially variety.

The Marine Reserve has no variety, you say? It's dull? Impossible, "My unit is always in top shape, we have special activities, a rifle team, a high rate of attendance, good morale and most of the men go to summer camp." To those CO's who can say this, nothing more needs to be said, but how many outfits can honestly make this claim?

Unfortunately, monotony has replaced enthusiasm in many units. Drill after drill, the reservist is subjected to the same repetitious methods, which only fortifies the commonly heard remark that, "Only a war could change things around here."

Too often some CO's have missed

the importance of getting their troops away from the drill halls and lecture rooms. Of course, they make summer training, they march in the Memorial Day Parade, and occasionally a group acts as a color guard, but what else is there to spark morale? What else is there to get reservists not only interested, but bright-eyed and bushy-tailed about their units?

One of the areas of instruction in which reserve CO's are especially lax is in getting their troops out to area resources which are available to them. Schools and colleges make use of these by periodically taking their students from the classrooms on field trips. Results are amazing. Higher morale, keener interest in subjects and most important, the ability to make practical application of their knowledge.

Why not, then, implement such a program for reservists? What's that you say? It isn't on your training schedule. Why not then? Only you can put it there.

What's that you're saying, making tours has nothing to do with your training? I agree, tours do not, but knowledge, if it is of practical value, definitely has its place. Maybe CO's had better check their overall reserve mission again, for developing

interest and enthusiasm is still paramount to our organization.

Most of us have noticed that reserve newspapers and CO's constantly lament poor attendance, but seldom is any positive action suggested.

Let me give you an example of what I mean by positive action. Quantico-based Marines have often been taken on field trips to Bull Run, site of the opening battle of the Civil War. Here these men sketched the terrain, noted fields of fire, examined weapons, supply routes and seriously interpreted tactics. What did they learn from this experience? For most they absorbed the strategy of this battle, something that possibly no lecturer or training film could have given them.

Many reserve units are within shouting distance of some of the sites of our nation's greatest military conflicts. Why, then, don't reserve CO's periodically visit these areas with their men during drill periods?

The Boston area, for example, is rich in military history. For example, the Battle of Bunker Hill was a bloody Revolutionary engagement. Yet, of the approximately 2,000 reservists in this area probably only a few are aware of the American defensive tactics, the British plan of attack or even why this unknown

hill was so strategically important.

I wonder if the reservists defending the hills in Korea ever realized the similarity between their positions and the gallant colonists in 1775. Both groups were entrenched on obscure hills, but most important, they were fighting for the same cherished principles. I am not alone in thinking that our reservists should learn this overall picture now, rather than tomorrow, when it may be too late.

Now I do not propose that during drills Marines continually visit historical battlefields like Yorktown, Gettysburg, Fredericksburg or the site of Custer's Last Stand. I do believe, however, that these may serve as a point of departure for perking up interest in some of our chin-dragging units.

About two years ago, President Eisenhower invited British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery to visit Gettysburg and to map the strategy of that great Civil War battle. Why? Not for totally military reasons, but because even for those two great tacticians of WWII, something could be relearned. I think we can profit by their fine attitude.

Fortunately some CO's have taken the initiative and have organized programs using appropriate resources in their areas. The only trouble is, this is the exception rather than the rule.

Some sites visited by Marine Reserve units included an Army Nike base where the men saw a dummy fire demonstration and radar tracking procedures. Another unit went aboard a foreign naval vessel and met its officers and crew. A few enterprising Marines even went on a submarine for a short cruise, but this I admit was on their own time.

At the Naval Air Station at South Weymouth, Mass., an air reserve unit received permission to visit the Air Force SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment) center in New York State. They went by plane a distance of 200 miles. Sure, it took organization, but it can be done.

There may be some who will claim that field trips are just "organized goldbricking." Properly managed, I doubt if this could ever happen. But if it does, then your unit has more than a morale problem.

Some ground units may consider a visit to nearby Marine air stations. Here they would receive instruction



Capt Venditto, who feels "there is a need for activities to stimulate young men to stay in the reserves," is working at Rutgers Univ., N. J., under a grant from the National Science Foundation. A '56 PLC graduate of Basic School, he has experience as a reporter, free-lance writer, and OIC, "The Airscoop," MCAS, Miami, Fla. He is now the Intelligence Officer, HMR-771, USNAS, South Weymouth, Mass.

in aircraft recognition, capabilities of close air support and aircraft performance. Talking to pilots and ground personnel will give these men a deeper understanding of the air-ground team.

Another excellent place for reservists to see is an arms manufacturing arsenal, where production techniques can be observed.

I believe that the world outside the drill hall offers many possibilities for developing and increasing the knowledge of reservists. It's just a matter of doing some spade work in the right direction.

If a group of officers and enlisted men from each unit would make a systematic analysis of their reserve areas, a valuable storeroom would be discovered.

An example of this type of thinking concerns one West Coast reserve unit whose gunny sergeant had an "In" with the local museum. This NCO had his platoon taken to the gun museum section of the building, where the group handled ancient muskets, cranked up an old Gatling gun and disassembled Colt revolvers from the days of the Wild West. How many reservists can say they ever held a Civil War sniper's rifle? How many can say they know the size of the minie ball, the deadly shot used by troops during the War Between the States?

This same group also made some startling comparisons in packs and rations. The men came away with the feeling that they had learned as much, or even more, about weapons and "soldiering" as in any dull lecture.

I realize that every unit is going to have organizational problems to

a limited degree, but some men like the gunny I mentioned above, are up to getting vehicles together, troops loaded and providing for rations. Sure it's hectic, but worth the trouble, just ask the troops.

Two years ago, the CO of the Marine Air Reserve Intelligence Program at Glenview wanted his intelligence personnel to learn some background on the maps they frequently used. He took more than 100 men on a tour of the Rand McNally Map Co., in Chicago. You can be sure that after this three-hour trip, every officer and enlisted man in that group had a clear idea of how maps are read, made, drawn, scaled and used.

At this point, I should stress that not only should reserve CO's perk up interest by field trips, but also by having specialists in various fields come to their units to speak on their specialties.

Some of these specialists are employed by large companies in public relations positions and this is not only their meat, but livelihood.

Always interesting are aircraft representatives who could speak to flyers and flight line personnel on production, engine, safety and new developments.

Specialists who have spoken to reserve units I have belonged to included a Russian language professor, a newspaper reporter, citizens of Korea and Indo-China, a telephone company wire stringer, a judo expert, a former member of the French underground in WWII, and a police vice-squad detective.

There is no doubt we have a good corps of reservists and with improvement we will become even stronger. Therefore, let us not be hesitant to try the different, to experiment and encourage our reserves by positive action, for only if we are "bright-eyed and bushy-tailed" about our responsibilities will we be able to carry out our assigned missions. **USMC**





PRINCETON LANDING

By Maj B. F. Meyers

"FLIGHT QUARTERS!" . . . "FLIGHT Quarters!" blares the ship's speaker system. Men move responsively and deftly to assigned stations. Helicopters are spotted and soon rotor blades are engaged. Another Marine helicopter landing is underway. The *Princeton*, LPH-5, is the Pacific Fleet's latest addition to our Force in Readiness concept of the FMF.

Just what is it like for an infantry battalion to embark and make a helicopter assault from a new LPH? Many Marines recently in the FMF have made landings from the *Thetis Bay*, our first helicopter carrier. How does the big ex-CVS type carrier differ? What are the techniques for smooth assault debarkation? How many troops can she carry? What special problems does a BLT have aboard the LPH?

The *Princeton* was commissioned during WWII as an *Essex* Class carrier (CVS-34). She saw service during the Korean conflict and was recommissioned as the LPH-5 on 14 March 1959. She is manned jointly by Navy and Marine personnel. Her detachment numbers 10 officers and 337 enlisted Marines. Partly aviation and partly ground, it is commanded by an aviator lieutenant colonel. Marines occupy key billets in all ship's departments except En-

gineering, Medical and Navigation. Performance of these Marines, in what heretofore were traditionally "white-hat" jobs, has been exemplary.


With a capacity for 200 troop and squadron officers and more than 1,500 enlisted, space isn't as critical as it is on the *Thetis Bay*. A reinforced BLT and two helicopter squadrons can be embarked simultaneously. The *Princeton* has had no major yard conversion. Her berthing spaces are therefore "brok-

en-up" in comparison to troop berthing on a standard APA. Her 27 compartments average 50 to 70 in size. They range from four men up to 157 men in size. This makes tactical integrity almost impossible. Grouping of berthing space areas, however, allows a form of unit berthing. Office spaces are very adequate.

Your BLT advance party consists of the Embark, Berthing, Mess, Police, Guard, and Ship's Platoon Officers, plus their enlisted assistants. Normally they embark at least 24 hours prior to unit embarkation. All details of embarkation, and, in fact, all major shipboard problems, are handled through the Combat Cargo Officer (CCO). He is an experienced 0302 captain, with knowledge of troop problems. He solves many would-be problems.

The Ship's Platoon varies with the operational requirements. Time available, location of loading, amount of cargo, and loading facilities must be considered. Here is a guide in organization of the Ship's Platoon:

- 1—Ship's Platoon Commander (lieutenant)
- 4—Flight Deck Cargo Handling Assistants (Staff NCO's)
- 2—Hangar Deck Cargo Handling Assistants (Staff NCO's)
- 6—Forklift Drivers
- 10—Drivers (Capable of driving any embarked vehicle)
- 16—Hook-up Men (for hooking up cargo lifts to aircraft)
- 25—Stevedores (for cargo handling and preparations prior to lifting).



Heliteams embark into assigned aircraft aboard USS Princeton.

These men, and particularly the men in the hook-up crews, should be thoroughly trained prior to embarkation.

Embarkation

Dockside loading is used whenever possible. When stream loading is required, the *Princeton* wants troops to fly aboard by helicopter. When weather or availability precludes helicopter loading, LCM come alongside and the troops brow-load to the hangar deck.

Pierside loading of cargo and vehicles is the easiest method. Ramps are used. Vehicles and cargo, other than heavy lifts, are driven aboard. Heavy lifts require dockside cranes.

When stream loading is dictated, the *Princeton* uses two stations to lift cargo and vehicles from landing craft. This is a slow process in loading the normal BLT gear. The forward starboard station has a capacity of 3,500 lbs, the after starboard, 15,000 lbs.

Most cargo is stowed near Hangar Bay #3. Loaded on pallets, the cargo is moved and spotted by forklift trucks. Mention should be made here of the three large elevators from the hangar to the flight deck. The first two (#1 and #2) are used for helicopters. Elevator #3 is used as the primary cargo elevator (#2 alternate).

Because of the danger of sand on the flight deck during flight operations, dummy cargo containing sand, dirt, or small pebbles is prohibited.

The *Princeton* carries 20,000 gallons of motor gasoline that is available for troop use. Gas cans



Maj Meyers was S-3, 1/1, the battalion landed by helicopters from USS *Princeton* during Blue Star. Before that he was with the same battalion working much the same tactics in Borneo. He came to the Marines a mite late for WWII, via Washington University and PLC, in Feb '45. In Korea's Punchbowl sector he earned Bronze Star while CO, H/3/5. He is schooled in recon, was first CO of 1stForReconCo. He is now with G-3, HQMC.

and drums from the battalion must be emptied and purged prior to embarkation.

Ammunition storage aboard a carrier is no problem. There are more than enough ammunition and pyrotechnic storage spaces.

Messing

As on any troop ship, the Ship's mess force requires augmentation. This varies with the size of the unit embarked. For an "average" BLT this will be approximately 16 cooks and 57 messmen. For enlisted messing, Gunnery Sergeants and above eat and are billeted in the CPO Mess. Acting Gunnery Sergeants and Staff Sergeants mess with the 1st Class Mess. All other enlisted eat in the General Mess. Officers pay \$1.75 per day in Wardroom Mess.

Debarkation Procedures


One of the most important factors in the helicopter assault is control during debarkation. You must get the proper personnel and equipment to the right place at the scheduled time. Without positive control, de-

barkation becomes slow and confused.

The *Princeton* control team that runs debarkation is made up of both ship and troop personnel. Primary Flight Control (or PriFly as it's called) is the nerve center of the control system. From here come orders to flight deck, helicopter and troop personnel.

The Air Officer in PriFly is responsible for the landing, handling and launching of all aircraft. All activities on the flight and hangar decks come under his control. Air Operations schedules all helicopter flight operations to support the battalion landing plan. The CCO acts as Debarkation Officer. Assisted by embarked Marines, he moves all embarking personnel and gear to the proper aircraft at the scheduled time.

When "FLIGHT QUARTERS!" are sounded, troops lay below to assigned berthing compartments. They get packs and weapons and stand by for debarkation. Troops are called away from their berthing compartments by waves and heliteams to an



HOK receives cargo hook-up.



Loading jeep through bow doors of HR2S.



Emergency billeting on after hanger deck.



Jeeps taken to flight deck for HR2S loading.

assembly area on the hangar deck. Here, in the vicinity of the #2 elevator, each heliteam is accounted for. As each wave is assembled, it is reported "ready" to PriFly by the Personnel Control Officer (Battalion's S-3A).

Heliteams are formed into either four or eight-team waves. When an eight-team wave is called from the hangar deck to the assembly area on the flight deck, two routes are used. Four teams proceed via a ladder on the forward, starboard side of the hangar deck. Their assembly area is on the forward starboard flight deck catwalk. The other four heliteams proceed via a ladder amidships on the starboard side to their assembly area. This is just inboard of the island structure on the flight deck. If a wave contains only four teams, they use the forward ladder and assembly area.

Guides are furnished for each heliteam at the assembly area adjacent to the catwalk and island structure. They lead each heliteam to its respective aircraft. Guides collect the filled stub manifests from the heliteam leaders and mark them with the helicopter number.

If too few aircraft are available to load a wave, "bumped" heliteams are sent back down to the hangar deck assembly area. Here, the Personnel Control Officer relocates them within other waves, or assigns another priority of debarkation.

Flight Deck Operations

The flight deck of a carrier during FLIGHT QUARTERS is a mass of efficient and purposeful movement. To help coordinate the many simultaneous actions of the plane and deck crews, all hands wear highly colored jersey shirts and cloth

helmets. Shirts and helmets are all color-coded and, once understood, explain much of the seeming confusion to embarking ground personnel.

Yellow shirts identify "LSE's"—Landing Signal Enlisted. Their job is to direct aircraft into the proper spot on the deck.

Blue shirts are the "plane pushers" who assist in spotting and moving helicopters on the flight deck. They place chocks and tie-downs the moment a helicopter touches down.

Red shirts identify the gas crews. Green shirts are for mechanics, brown shirts for the plane captains. The white shirts are for the troop guides and corpsmen.

The *Princeton* flight deck has 16 loading points. Thirty two aircraft can be on the flight deck simultaneously. Eight helicopters are spotted forward in the general troop loading points (1-8). The rest are packed aft with rotors folded. Initial waves for the first launch are pre-loaded on the flight deck prior to turning-up and engaging rotors. Later waves come up to the flight deck by the two routes previously described.

Cargo Debarkation

All cargo is brought to the flight deck on the #3 elevator. Here it is normally staged forward and aft of the island structure, in the vicinity of the after 5" AA mounts on the starboard side.

HR2S aircraft carrying cargo are pre-loaded prior to first launch. Subsequent HR2S loads are staged on the deck in designated spots. As soon as the helicopter lands, they are loaded through the bow doors.

Four forklifts are used on the flight deck for spotting cargo to the four external pickup areas forward

on the flight deck. Three-man handling teams, supplied by the embarkation team, hook-up external loads to the aircraft.

The Ship's Platoon leader directs the stevedores and two forklifts stationed on the hangar deck. They break out cargo as necessary, palletize and stage it into the #3 elevator, where it is moved to the flight deck.

On the flight deck, a lieutenant, Cargo Loading Control Officer, (normally BLT Embark Officer) supervises cargo movement for spotting, loading and pickup. He and his assistants insure that the correct lift get to the right spot at the proper time.

Underway Training and Daily Routine

With a full load of troops and helicopters aboard, troop training space is limited. The flight deck can be used when the ship is underway except during FLIGHT QUARTERS. The hangar deck is crowded with a full complement of two squadron's helicopters (48) aboard. It is scheduled through the CCO.

Our battalion had no difficulty in executing daily weapons inspections and physical conditioning. Troop berthing spaces were used for much of the small unit, last-minute type of briefing. Also, a pilots' ready room is made available for troop briefings and instruction.

As soon as possible after embarkation, all hands participate in the standard shipboard emergency drills.

Barber and laundry facilities are available for embarked troops. Augmentation of these shops must be provided.

Landing from the *Princeton* is an interesting and professionally rewarding experience. She is a fine addition to our FMF capability. USMC

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Charles E. Cheever
Colonel, USA—Retired
President



UNITED SERVICES *Automobile Association*

Dept. MC-12 USAA Building, 4119 Broadway, San Antonio 9, Texas



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Car Year	Make	Model	Body Type	Pass. Cap.	Serial Number	Motor No.	No. Cyls.
Cost	Purchase Date	New/Used	Current Car License	Name in which car legally registered			
				Year	State		

Is the automobile required by, or customarily used in the occupational duties of any person except in going to and from the principal place of occupation? _____

How many male operators (including insured) are under age of 25? _____

Age of each: _____ Relationship: _____

Is the automobile customarily used in driving to or from work? _____

Are any of the male operators under 25 owners, or principal operators, of the automobile? _____

If the automobile is customarily used in driving to or from work, how many road miles is the car driven one way? _____

Are all male operators under 25 married? _____

Name: _____

Rank: _____

Serial No.: _____

Military Address: _____

If car not at above address,
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MC-12

Active - Regular Retired Widow of eligible officer
 Extended active duty Inactive, but retaining commission

THE LIEUTENANT'S GATLINGS

by E. A. Dieckmann, Sr.

The Greeks had a word for it—*polybolos*. So did Gen Custer who refused to take it along to his meeting with Crazy Horse at the Little Big Horn. In eight furious minutes of the Spanish-American War Dr. Gatling's quick firing gun proved itself and justified the faith of an obscure second lieutenant of Infantry. Today the basic principle is drawing fresh study.

WHEN DR. RICHARD J. GATLING conceived the idea for the quick-firing gun that bears his name he ducked back into history over 2200 years for its operating principles. These basic principles are used today in the atom-age type Gatling, now called the Vulcan, named after the Roman god of fire and metals. The Vulcan fires 7000 rounds of 20mm cartridges from a bulge on the fuselage of a jet air-craft which exceeds 1500 miles per hour.

Col George M. Chinn, USMC, describes the first Gatling, 1862 vintage, as "one of the most remarkable firing mechanisms in all ordnance history."

The original weapon had four barrels for .58 cal ammunition. It was later adapted for calibers .45, .50, and 1-inch. The later models had from six to ten barrels mounted in a circle within a frame. The barrels

were revolved by turning a crank on the right side of the breech housing. Each barrel had its own lock, and the cartridges were fed by gravity from a hopper on top of the breech. The stationary breech was fitted with camming grooves so that the barrels turned in a block. The lock of each barrel picked up a cartridge, pushed it into the chamber, fired it, and extracted it so that it fell out through a slot in the housing as the barrel came up past it.

The endurance of the gun was phenomenal. During one trial 63,000 cartridges were fired without stopping. The barrels did not foul nor did the gun overheat. And yet the gun was used but once during the Civil War, at the seige of Petersburg, Virginia. Gen Ben F. Butler, Union Army, was responsible for this. Then they were pushed aside—buried away under a thick coating of cos-

moline in ordnance store-rooms all across the nation.

Gatlings were used against Chief Joseph and his Nez Perce Indians in 1877, the single instance of their use during the Indian Wars. One objection to the Gatling by old line officers was its weight. The number of barrels and the heavy wheel mount made it almost a small artillery piece. There were other reasons too, as will be noted a bit further on. At any rate, the gun was ignored by army brass although the Colt Company kept up with its manufacture.

Gen Custer had four Gatlings available when he set out for his meeting with destiny at the Little Big Horn in 1876. He refused them. Those Gatlings, properly handled, would have made a world of difference when he met the Sioux and Cheyennes under Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull. But, no matter how ex-



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cellent a weapon may be, it requires a certain trouble-shooter-type officer to put it to work.

The Gatling gun finally came into its own one hot afternoon in 1898 when it saved an American expeditionary force from defeat, and possible slaughter. Three of them, drawn by mules, were moved far ahead of a pinned-down battle line. When in battery front they blazed away for eight and one-half suspense-filled minutes.

The amazing thing about this episode is that those Gatlings, and their crews, were not on the expedition's muster roll. They were there because of the dogged determination and audacity of the detachment commander. He had smuggled his men and guns aboard a transport during the night of 6 June 1898 in the face of continued opposition from his superior officers.

There'll be more about this a bit later on. Now let us flash back in time to Alexandria, Egypt, 3rd Century BC, and a Greek technician named Dionysius who is directly responsible for the Gatling guns operational technique.

Dr. Gatling got his idea from Dionysius. The ancient Greek called his weapon a *polybolos*, or "many-shooter." It fired by means of torsion power, using twisted strands of human hair and tendons from the necks of horses and cattle. It had a destructive range of well over 100 yards. The *polybolos* was to be mounted on carts for infantry support operations; on pedestal fittings for use on ships and fortifications. The arrows, three feet long, were thick and heavy, and did not have the conventional feathers on the butt.

The arrows were fed into firing

position by way of a hopper on top of the breech. They dropped into a groove in a wooden cylinder that was turned by a crank on the right side of the housing. This crank was also rigged to draw the bow-string back to firing position. As the cylinder turned, it dropped the arrow into the firing slot. The drawn-back bow-string was released when the trigger baffle struck a stud at the after end of the breech housing.

The trigger mechanism was automatic. When it was ready to grasp the bow-string, following the release of the arrow, the baffle struck a stud which caused it to lock. The string was firmly held and the continued motion of the crank drew it back again into firing position as another arrow dropped into the slot. The *polybolos* could fire from six to eight arrows per minute with amazing accuracy.

But, as was the case with Doctor Gatling, Dionysius couldn't sell his idea to the big brass. The weapon was fantastic, they said—so revolutionary. Besides, if the arrows weren't perfect there was danger of jamming. So Dionysius filed his sketches and specifications away in the Great Library at Alexandria, and that was the end of it except for a few isolated instances of the weapon's use.

There are some vague hints that the Rhodians used the weapon to a limited extent protecting their merchant fleet, and that Heracleo, a famous pirate leader, used it when he attacked Ostia, Port of Rome, and destroyed a Roman fleet. But these "hints" cannot be pinned down tightly.

Now, from the *polybolos*, and the days of Alexandria, Ostia and the Rhodian merchant ships, let's jump ahead to Tampa, Florida in 1898.

Whenever the Spanish-American War is mentioned, one's mind flicks automatically upon Teddy Roosevelt, his Rough Riders, and the spectacular charge up San Juan Hill. Teddy had a good press which, when all the chips are down, he certainly deserved. But the part played at San Juan Hill by an obscure

young second lieutenant of the 13th regular US Infantry, John Henry Parker, received only the barest mention from the war correspondents who covered the campaign of Santiago de Cuba.

Parker had been bitten by the Gatling gun bug shortly after his graduation from West Point in 1892. He talked the weapon up to everyone who'd listen. "They belong right beside charging infantry," he insisted, "they're made to supply a powerful, controlled fire upon an entrenched enemy." He wrote a paper on the subject and attempted to submit it, through channels, to the War Department. It got as far as his immediate superior. Such insistent and unorthodox statements from a shave-tail second lieutenant who, according to the old line officers, was only qualified to take reveille reports, bordered upon insubordination. It was the considered concept of the War Department desk soldiers that Gatling guns had no place in offensive warfare. Their sole employment was in fortified positions.

So Parker got the brush-off. His ears knocked down, he was told to leave tactics and the rules of war to the experts.

Then came the war and, along

with his regiment, Parker became part of the mad-house that grew up overnight among the sand dunes outside Tampa.

Parker figured this was his golden opportunity. He approached his regimental commander with his idea for forming a Gatling gun detachment. Maybe it was the terrible climate, perhaps the colonel had caught a malaria bug. He was gruff and brutally frank.

"No!" he snapped. "I don't want to hear about it. I don't believe in it and I won't discuss it. That's all, Lieutenant."

Parker should have been squelched once and for all. Instead he went to his battalion commander. This officer listened, and suggested that Parker get his entire plan down on paper. Get it in tangible shape as to organization, equipment, personnel, have it typewritten, and go straight to the Commanding General himself.

Easy to say. Impossible to accomplish. Parker did get to Col Arthur McArthur, Assistant Chief of Staff, who approved the idea and said he'd take Parker to Gen Wade within a week. Parker was on cloud nine until he read the posted general order two days later. Gen Wade had been assigned to command the Philippines invasion force, taking Col McArthur along with him.

Parker was discouraged but not defeated. He knew what the guns could do and he was going to prove it once and for all. But time was running out. Rumors were thick that the expedition was shoving off any day now.

On a steaming hot afternoon, two days following the blasting of Parker's hopes, he spotted a first lieutenant wearing the bursting shell insignia of the ordnance department. He was John T. Thompson, in charge of the newly established Fifth Corps Ordnance Depot at Tampa.

They talked—about Gatling guns of course. Thompson believed in the guns too. Yes, he had 15 Gatlings at the Depot. "And there they'll stay if my guess is right," he added. "They're brand new, haven't been uncrated. Ten barrels, .30 caliber beauties. No one wants them; no one ever has. A damn shame too."

"I do," Parker exclaimed.



Overhead fire as Rough Riders advance up San Juan Hill.

Thompson shrugged. "You've tried and might as well face it. You can't fight headquarters."

"No, I can't fight them, but I've got a new idea," Parker replied. "You're the Fifth Corps ordnance officer. That puts you on the commanding general's staff. You have access to him. Here's my suggested script for the formation of a battery of Gatlings, and here's a list of enlisted men from my regiment I'd like to have with them." He hesitated a moment, eyeing Thompson intensively. "Aren't you snowed under down at the Depot?"

Thompson nodded.

"Then ask for me and these men," Parker said. "At the same time turn in the script."

Parker was skeptical. He was the most surprised man in the Fifth Corps when orders came through for him to report to the Ordnance Depot with two sergeants and ten privates for duty with Gatling guns. In his original application he had asked for 43 men and three guns. Now he was to be issued four guns with 12 crewmen. But he had a toe-hold.

He began instruction at once; drilling began after the men had completed their work at the depot. Then, on 6 June 1898, orders came through for the embarkation of the Fifth Army Corps. Each separate unit received its set of orders. There was one omission. Nowhere in the orders, general or special, was there any mention of the Gatling gun detachment. The unit simply didn't exist.

Parker hurried all over the camp trying to set things right. He was sent from staff to transportation and back again; brushed off at every turn. He told his friend, Lt. Thompson:

"I'll be damned if I'm going to be left behind!"

"Well—it'll be a long swim, John. Now let me alone. I've got troubles of my own. All the Fifth Corps reserve ammunition's got to be aboard the transport Cherokee tonight—I've got to arrange for an escort." He turned away abruptly.

Parker grabbed his arm.

"I'll take charge of the escort," he said.

"Good man!", Thompson exclaimed. "You have to rustle up




Mr. Dieckmann is retired from two careers, now devotes full time to a third—writing. He spent 20 years in the Navy (a bo'sun mate), went Fleet Reserve in 1930; retired from San Diego, Calif. Police Department (homicide) in 1954. He has written for factual detective magazines, service magazines and police journals in US and England. He is 68 years old, has eight grandchildren. His last GAZETTE article was "Beachhead—55 BC" (Sept '57).

some box cars, load the ammo, and see it safely aboard ship. Your train leaves here at six o'clock this evening."

Parker crated his Gatlings, and loaded them into the box cars along with the ammunition. Later that night he and the men of his detachment had their guns in the ship's hold. The 17th US Infantry and one battalion of the 12th Infantry piled tons of personal baggage on top of Parker's guns.

At Daiquiri, Cuba, Parker was again the forgotten man. He didn't even exist—at least until he boarded the expedition's flagship and walked in on Gen Shafter, the corps com-



2d Lt J. H. "Gatling Gun" Parker

mander.

Parker introduced himself and stated his mission. Gen Shafter grinned. "I've heard about you," he said. "You're the man they're calling 'Gatling Gun' Parker."

Parker was reassured by the General's attitude. He said that he had four guns on board the Cherokee and wanted to get them ashore. He needed 20 more men to fill his complement, adding that he'd like to pick the men himself.

"You may have the men, Lieutenant," Shafter told him, "and I'll issue orders at once to put you ashore tomorrow morning."

Parker handed him a dog-eared sheet of paper. It was a list of men he'd prepared long before with the aid of his First Sergeant, Alios Weischaar.

But the Gatlings didn't get ashore as ordered. Somehow the orders went astray. All day Parker argued with army, navy and transport officers, all of whom were his seniors, and was brushed off. That night, all caution and regard for protocol flung aside, he was back on board the flagship. One can only guess what went through Gen Shafter's mind when Parker blurted out:


"If you want the Gatlings ashore, Sir, you'll have to see to it yourself!"

Gen Shafter's reply isn't recorded, but what happened the next morning is. The general came alongside the Cherokee in a navy steam launch, and accompanied Parker's guns and men to the landing dock. There he remained until the detachment was on the beach.

Parker took full advantage of the situation. While the beach crew was still buzzing with the news that the Commanding General in person had put the guns ashore, Parker hurried to the quartermaster's corral and picked out his gun-team mules. By three o'clock that afternoon the battery was fully outfitted. The 20 picked men had reported. Parker hitched up and headed inland over a trail that an engineering officer reported utterly impassable for wheeled transport.

On the afternoon of 30 June, Gen Shafter called a meeting of his unit commanders. Parker's name was not on the list but he was there—shoved into the background, of course.

They'd attack in the morning, Shafter announced. Kent's infantry and Joe Wheeler's dismounted cavalry were to move in and assault the fortified semicircular ridge defending Santiago where the Spanish reg-



Night firing demonstration of GE's 20mm Vulcan.

ulars and the naval brigade were strongly entrenched. This assault was to be supported by Grimes' light artillery on El Pozo Hill.

Parker received no orders until he asked for them. They were incredible. He was told to move in at day-break and take up a position in support of the artillery!

Grimes' battery opened fire at eight o'clock sharp the next morning at 2000 yards. The target was a long line of trenches and block-houses topping a steep ridge far across the open ground from the jungle's edge.

The American artillery was using black powder. That first shot sent forth a dense cloud of grayish smoke that hung low above the guns in the still, hot air. Five more rounds were fired with the precision of a Fourth of July salute. Then the Spanish field guns, using smokeless powder, opened fire from San Juan Hill.

They had a perfect target—the low-hanging smoke above the American guns. The first shot was a bull's eye. So was the second, and the third. The artillery duel lasted 19 minutes. Grimes' guns (those still able to move) got out of there. The attempt at an artillery preparation for the infantry assault accomplished exactly nothing. It was at this point that the Chief of Staff ordered Park-

er and his Gatlings to the rear.

The battery drew into a clearing below El Pozo Hill and waited for orders that never came. Their own regiment, the 13th Infantry, passed them enroute to the front. There was some good-natured razzing.

"Hey, John Henry," one of the officers called out, "the fighting's up that way, boy!" A platoon sergeant shouted derisively, "so that's how you fight with those damn coffee-grinders?" A roar of laughter ran along the marching column. Parker's grim-faced men glared helplessly at their tormentors.

The advancing Americans were invisible to the enemy as they moved forward along the narrow trail through the dense woods, but the Spaniards had set up range markers for their sharpshooters and field guns. They zeroed in on the trail. Shrapnel and Mauser bullets began exploding and zipping through the brush.

Parker ordered his battery forward toward the sound of the guns. He halted in a small clearing. Then he and his first sergeant rode forward to look the situation over.

It wasn't encouraging. From the ford of the Aguadores River, he had a full view of the level, almost treeless plain extending for about 800 yards from the jungle's edge to the

foot of the steep ridge from whence came a steady and accurate fire.

Beyond the Aguadores was another stream, San Juan Creek, which would earn the name of "The Bloody Angle" that day. Parker and his sergeant dismounted and moved up until they had a full view all along the jungle's edge. There Kent's and Wheeler's divisions were deploying in the dubious shelter of the trees.

There were barbed-wire entanglements strung everywhere, from tree-to-tree, on sturdy posts—barbed-wire in depth. To move out into the wide open space into the withering fire from the hills would be suicide. To attempt a charge across those 800 yards, tearing through the barbed-wire, could only result in slaughter.

1stSgt Weischaar cursed vividly. "Our men are frozen here, Lieutenant!", he exclaimed.

Parker nodded. He pointed to a spot about 100 yards beyond the trees. "We'll go into action there, Sergeant. The range will be about 600 yards to the trenches, and 700 yards to the block-houses."

When Parker returned to the battery he learned that no orders had come through. That was the moment he decided to take matters into his own hands. He had absolute faith in the guns; complete faith in his little fighting team. Only his guns could break that deadlock up ahead. He ordered his battery of four guns forward at the trot.

He was flagged down at the Aguadores River.

Col Derby ran across the road, waving him down.

"Hold it, Lieutenant," he shouted. "Our men are still deploying."

Again the frantic battery marked time. The men crawled under the gun carriages to avoid the storm of bullets. Three men were hit. A mule was wounded and brayed in anger or in fear.

Then came Lt Miley of Shafter staff.

"I need one of your guns, John," he directed.

Parker assigned Sgt Wiegle's gun to Miley.

Then he led his three remaining guns forward, splashing through the Aguadores ford at a trot. They were galloping when they reached San

Juan Creek. Gun carriages lurched while cannoneers hung on and drivers lashed the plunging mules.

On they went, 100 yards out into the open, into a hail of bullets. Here the tough training paid off. The three guns faced the hidden enemy within seconds and the mule teams galloped back to the shelter of the trees.

Parker lifted his left arm and swung it down.

"Commence firing!" he shouted, glancing at his watch. It was exactly 1300.


At least 500 shots from each gun cracked a drumming thunder that echoed through the hills. The whole enemy fire seemed to concentrate upon the Gatlings now. Every man in Cpl Green's crew went down. He worked his gun alone. Cpl Steigerwald lost four men at once, and Sgt Ryder lost two. The Gatlings drummed on!

Parker, out in the open, with field glasses clamped to his eyes, was watching the effect of his fire. He heard a wild burst of cheering that started at the extreme left of the American line and swept across the entire front.

Teddy Roosevelt told it this way:

"Suddenly, above the rifle fire, rose a peculiar drumming sound. I jumped to my feet—Parker had brought his guns out into the open—far forward of the battle line. I think Parker deserves more credit than any other man in the entire campaign!"

For a minute or two, American rifle fire developed into a furious fusillade. Somewhere along the front, a bugler sounded the charge. Others picked it up. From the jungle underbrush sprang the Ameri-



Vulcan has six-barrel cluster vs Gatling's ten.

can troops. They swept forward, and up the steep slope in a long, irregular line, chopping down barbed-wire entanglements as they went.

The Gatlings drummed on, deadly and accurate, while the enemy fire slackened and died. Straw-hatted, white-clad Spanish troops could be seen scrambling to the rear. The Gatlings caught them and melted them like lumps of salt in scalding water.

Parker maintained his covering barrage until the charging troops were within about 150 yards of the summit.

"Cease firing," he shouted. Again he glanced at his watch. It was 1323.

The Gatlings had waited 38 years for those eight minutes of furious action.

Parker waved his mule teams forward and limbered up. The guns reached the summit and unlimbered swiftly. He was just in time to repel

a gallant counter attack by Spanish soldiers and sailors. Here Sgt Wiegle's gun rejoined the detachment. He hadn't fired a shot, but made up for it now helping to keep the enemy pinned down.

It's just too bad that Dr. Richard J. Gatling wasn't there to see his Gatlings vindicated, but he heard the story.

Parker remained a devoted machine-gunner until he died in 1942. The technique he perfected during WWI is very familiar to the Marines who have used it with such excellent effect. Remember it? An overhead barrage fire from automatic weapons, covering advancing troops, and the business of indirect machine gun fire from defilade upon an unseen enemy, the guns taking their deflection from the aiming point.

And now the Vulcan—a legacy from Dr. Gatling, Dionysius and Parker.

USMC

One of the Jones Boys

THE CADET DID POORLY on an instrument flight check and his flying instructor exploded. "Didn't your instructor teach you anything about unusual positions? Didn't he show you how to use the needle ball and altimeter?" The tirade went on. "You did terrible. What's the trouble? Did you have vertigo?"

"No, sir," was the respectful answer. "I had Lt Jones."

\$15.00 to LtCol Mark Jones

Quiz Kid

BACK FROM HIS FIRST NIGHT PATROL, the young Marine, visibly shook, asked for and got two shots of whiskey. The interrogating officer asked quietly, "Do you feel better? Got your courage back?"

"Yeah," snapped the rifleman, "and I'd just like to see anybody start asking me any questions."

\$15.00 to Col G. O. Ashley, USAF



BGen W. T. Fairbourn
Director, MCR

ONE OF THE PRIMARY TOPICS discussed at the recently-completed Marine Corps Reserve Policy Board was promotions in the Marine Corps Reserve. It was resolved that the Corps should take a closer look at present policy along that line, with an eye toward broadening opportunities in some quarters. The recommendation is now awaiting action by the Commandant.

For the most part, promotion opportunities in the Reserve today are better than ever; aside from a few kinks that presumably will be ironed-out in the near future. Last year, for example, Reservists eligible for GySgt, StaffSgt, and Sgt were considered on a ratio identical to that afforded their regular counterparts. This ratio resulted in 108 promotions to Gunnery Sergeant, 197 to Staff Sergeant and 687 to Sergeant.

In addition, a plan is now being staffed at Marine Corps Headquarters which establishes a 1stSgt, Sgt Maj/MsGt, MasterGySgt program for Organized Reservists. Detailed information on this program will be promulgated to the field at such time as staffing is completed.

Until only a short while back, Reservists in the lower enlisted ranks were held back from promotion, due mainly to the large numbers of L/Cpls and Cpls in the Class III category. The III's who were counted in the overall grade distribution allotted the Reserve, were creating a block; now wearing away as more and more end their military obligations and are being discharged. Conversely, many more Class II Organized Reservists, for the most part our Six Month Trainees, are able to get a crack at junior NCO ranks.

The overall promotion picture for these younger Reservists was brightened considerably last month, when the Commandant authorized 1,000

The Marine Reserve

meritorious promotions to Class II PFCs and L/Cpls. Promotions would be based on unit commanders' observations during the 1960 summer training period. Still remaining after the merit promotions will be 800 more to Corporal and 3,200 to L/Cpl. All will be effected this fiscal year.

Weighing all of the above factors, coupled with the single fact that our Class II Organized Reserve is fast becoming a quality organization, better trained than ever, I see an almost endless chain of opportunity for Reservists who possess the necessary qualifications, ability and spirit that earns promotions.

MARTC



BGen F. E. Leek
ComMART

THE LATE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, JAMES Forrestal, once said, "The armed forces of a democratic nation have a positive responsibility to achieve the widest possible public understanding of their missions and operations."

For the Marine Corps and the Marine Air Reserve to be properly understood by the public, constant reporting of the accomplishments by the Marine Air Reserve and the Marine Corps is required. Not only do the people to whom we wish to tell the Marine Corps story change constantly, but the Corps is constantly changing too. Not in its fundamental requirement for each individual member to be a responsible, disciplined and patriotic adult—but in its application for an integrated, highly trained force-in-readiness to meet the challenge of rapidly changing world conditions.

Never before have the citizens of our country, in peacetime, been as concerned as they are today about the security of our country—and about survival itself. Not merely the process of staying alive, but staying alive on their own terms.

We can only hope to get a small bit of their attention for the Marine Air Reserve. But get it we must! We can never tell when and where support for the Marine Corps or the Marine Air Reserve will be needed. We need to build a background of continuous understanding of the Marine Corps' *raison d'être* so when a situation arises which is momentarily unfavorable, or regrettable, as from time to time is inevitable, it will fall upon sympathetic soil, and be regarded as an isolated incident, and not symbolic of the whole.

My experience with the Marine Air Reserves for the past several years indicate that keeping the public informed about the Marine Corps is the job of every Marine Reservist from private to commanding officer. I do not believe that any news story, radio or television interview—no matter how well written—can do the job that the individual Marine is capable of doing. In fact, no one can take a Marine's place in telling the Marine story.

It is a story that should be told and must be told. To tell it, every Marine Air Reservist must keep himself well informed not only about his own unit's activity, but all Marine Corps activities as a whole.

THE SCHOOL SOLUTION

(Answers to questions on page 8)

1 The depth of the objective and the purpose of the maneuver distinguish the turning movement from the envelopment. The turning movement seeks to compel the enemy to abandon his position to meet the threat. The envelopment engages the enemy in his position or immediately in the rear of it. Reference: TIP (J)4, paragraph 17c (1).

2 (c) Reference: MCS 3-30, paragraph 9. The battalion advance guard includes an advance party, a point, as well as connecting elements, and flank patrols if used. The advance party is one platoon, minus one squad detailed to the point.

3 (b) Reference: MCS 3-30, paragraph 27b. Supervision of subordinate unit leaders is the best way to exercise control and coordination. A leader cannot individually supervise a large number of men and maintain efficient control.

4 (d) Reference: MCS 3-30, paragraph 6-7. Intermediate objectives may be designated when the company objective is not in sight, when formidable obstacles, or critical terrain features intervene, when the platoon must move by successive bounds, or for any other feasible reason. These platoon objectives are selected by the platoon commander in the number he deems necessary.

5 (a) Reference: LFM-3, paragraph 501. Answers b, c, and d are collection agencies. Intelligence sources refers to the actual origin, person, or thing from which desired intelligence information is obtained. Collection agencies are the means, units, or personnel available to the intelligence officer for acquiring information.

6 (b) Reference: LFM-3, paragraph 803. In evaluating information, the intelligence officer determines its *pertinence*, the reliability of its source, its credibility, and its accuracy.

7 (b) Reference: LFM-3, paragraph 702g. The end results of the Collection Plan are the actual or-


ders and requests of the commander to collection agencies for the collection of information required.

8 (a) Reference: LFM-3, paragraph 702a. The collection plan is a program for securing information for the commander and is constantly changing to reflect newly developed intelligence requirements. It is for the immediate use of the intelligence officer and his section and is not published to the command.

9 (d) Reference: TIP (ARM)2, paragraph 68b (2). The counterpreparation must be fired in time to meet the attack but care must be taken that it is not fired prematurely. Such premature firing would disclose artillery firing positions and furnish the enemy with counterbattery data. Further, since all artillery participates in the counter-preparation, it is mandatory that it be fired on order of the force commander.

10 (c) Reference: LFM 00, paragraph 742. LFM-7, paragraph 501a. LFM-7, Draft Revision, paragraph 502a. The amphibious task force commander is responsible for the preparation of the over-all naval gunfire support plan, based on the support requirements presented by the landing force commander, and on the naval requirements. The planning includes the allocation of gunfire support ships and facilities. The amphibious task force commander is also responsible for the formulation of the general policy as to the priority of all types of targets to be taken under fire.

11 (d) Reference: TIP(COS)4, paragraph 14a. The TACC and the TADC have essentially the same physical composition and communication requirements. The main difference between them involves command responsibility. The TACC is the command post of the tactical air commander (afloat) or of the Landing Force aviation commander, and is the center from which all aircraft and air control functions in an objective area are coordinated. The TADC, on the other hand, is responsible to the TACC for the coordination of aircraft and air control functions in an assigned *portion* of the objective area only.



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THE STRIKE CELL

PART 2

By Capt J. G. Martz III

The strike cell is a small dispersion unit of a light attack squadron; designed to increase both the defensive and offensive effort required by the enemy without a similar increase in effort on our part. The strike cells disperse the squadron as a means of passive defense while retaining an unreduced offensive capability for a limited time. The strike cell concept for employment expands greatly the military effectiveness of a light attack squadron. It can help accomplish the individual training prescribed for pilots of light attack airplanes.

During training, the objective is completion of a prescribed course plus whatever additional require-

ments are generated by new developments during the training cycle. The enemy is time: chronological time, calendar time, engine time, airframe time, pilot time, instrument time, night time, classroom time, time per annum, time per month, and time per day. The arch enemy, time, is ably abetted by weather, sickness, malfunctions, groundings, commitments and the forty-hour week.

The challenge is accepted. The lines are drawn and the battle begins.

The first clash occurs with the forty-hour week. It is defeated. It ceases to exist. But not without casualties! Fatigue becomes a constant companion and while conduct-

ing a frontal assault on the forty-hour week, the squadron must beware of the resulting weakness on its flank where lurk sickness with resulting lost manhours, sloppy maintenance and servicing of airplanes with resulting lost sorties. Work too hard and defeat yourself! Work too little and fail to reach your objective! How unfortunate when the maximum effort which can be sustained for long periods of time is insufficient to do all which must be done!

The second clash occurs on the battlefield of efficiency. The squadron learns to take advantage of groundings of various sorts to accomplish other vital training. But flying is essential to a squadron—the very reason for its existence! Ground school and basic training are necessary, but for how long can they substitute for flight operations? The squadron takes advantage of nonsyllabus commitments to accomplish training—training necessarily limited and modified by the nature of the commitment—*ersatz* training which moves the squadron toward its objective two steps and back one. For a time, there appears to be progress, but before long there

is no substitute for real training. How unfortunate when there is too little time remaining to complete the syllabus!

The third clash is with the most potent conspirator of them all: weather. No matter how brave or skillful, how daring or intrepid the squadron pilots may be, discretion is the better part of valor in fighting weather. A major portion of the prescribed course of training for an attack squadron requires nice high ceilings and good visibility. Terminal weather can be as bad as that in which the airplane is capable of operating, but no bombing practice will be accomplished unless the target has good weather. Airplanes can be refueled and rearmed during intervals between rain showers and pilots can learn to fly when the birds are walking, but the weather at the target must be good. How unfortunate to have a squadron capable of conducting flight operations in the worst kind of weather, but unable to train because the target is socked in!

After the third clash, the enemy appears to have the upper hand. The squadron is tempted to cry "How unfortunate!" and lay the blame on everything from poor support to inadequate calendar time allotted for training. Hours are flown and schedules are published. It is a losing battle. The training objective will never be reached in the face of such odds.

What hope? Consider the facts:

- more syllabus training must be accomplished per unit time to reach the training objective,
- the squadron has proven its ability to disperse on week-end cross-country navigation flights,
- the weather usually is good at the local target for some airfield in the United States,
- base facilities exist to service transients at most airfields.

The solution: on week-ends and

whenever the weather is bad at the home base target, conduct training flights from some airfield where the weather at their target is good. The routine pace of normal flight operations at home base need not be disrupted when a unit is dispersed during the week to find a target with good weather. When a dispersion unit works on a week-end at home base or some other airfield, the remainder of the squadron can rest.

Efficient use of the flight time involved really is the crux of the entire matter. Training accomplished by routine dispersion of a light attack squadron includes:

- cross-country navigation,
- instrument and night time en route,
- bombing practice on targets with which the pilots are not familiar,
- the opportunity for individuals to perform, on a smaller scale for short periods of time, those duties usually performed by more senior people in the squadron, that is, to gain some practical experience in those functions which will be required of them as they are promoted,

would have been lost at home base and using transient facilities which already exist.

Some pessimists may fear that airfields with practice bombing ranges would not allow their transient facilities to be used for training operations without prior arrangement in each specific case. The entire maneuver could be smothered in a mass of communications and liaison.

Don't worry. The strike cell is asking for nothing more from the transient servicing facilities than any other transient would: fuel, oil, oxygen, food and shelter. If the target is not in use, there should be no objection to the strike cell using it provided pilots observe course rules and range regulations. If the target is in use, dead reckoning navigation flights culminating in a single attack on the target are worthwhile training. Targets usually are willing to clear the range for five minutes to allow a transient to make a single attack. Even if the target should be completely unavailable, dispersing and returning is valuable training in itself.

Light attack squadrons will con-



• the training and experience necessary to build the teamwork required for a smooth operating strike cell capable of posing a real offensive threat to the enemy while dispersed.

The cost? No more than a squadron spends presently with the exception of the transport airplane necessary to haul the personnel and a few spares. Efficient? Remember, we are taking advantage of flying days that

continue to train and will continue to deploy. The syllabus training necessary before deployment either will be accomplished or it won't. The strike cell offers a means of accomplishing more syllabus training per unit time with the added benefit of developing a passive defense capability which would pose a serious threat to the enemy. There is a small additional expense involved. Can we afford not to try it? USMC



By Any Other Name

"AS ANY FORMER VISITOR TO Headquarters, Marine Corps is aware, the numerous heads spotted throughout the Navy Annex are not labeled 'Officers' and 'Enlisted', but merely 'Men'. This fact was evidently apparent to a major obviously on his first visit to Headquarters who approached the information desk in the lobby and inquired of the SNCO on duty, 'Sergeant, where is the nearest Officer's Head?'"

The Sergeant unhesitatingly replied, "Quantico, sir."

\$15.00 to Capt Earl C. Meek

REPORT FROM THE READY FORCES

THE 3d MARINE DIVISION

PART
ONE

COMBAT READINESS

By Staff, 3dMarDiv



BGen T. F. Riley
ADC



MajGen R. B. Luckey
CG



Col. E. B. Robertson
C/S

WHEN TROUBLE IN LAOS ERUPTED last fall, the 3dMarDiv and its air partner, the 1st MAW were ready. They are always ready to stem aggression in the Far East.

The division is ready for action any time, anywhere the requirements of the free world dictate. It is ready to move by sea or air from Okinawa beaches or airfields as soon as amphibious shipping or transport aircraft can be made available.

That is the reason why the 3dMarDiv is based on Okinawa, the Keystone of the Pacific. This largest island of the Ryukyus chain is a thorn in the side of communism largely because our forces are close to any potential area of aggression in Southeast Asia.

Combat readiness is a function of training and stability of troops.

This division lives under conditions which support training and readiness. Infantry battalions are assigned intact for 12 months. Other Marines now spend 15 months with the division. Whether 12 or 15 months, this period without the everyday problems of family life makes Marines ready for combat on a moment's notice.

Training in the 3dMarDiv is continuous. It offers variety and many challenges. Size and terrain limitations of training areas on Okinawa, and the division's amphibious training requirements, dictate many off-island landing exercises and maneuvers.

For on-island training, Okinawa has two major training areas and several smaller ones for more specialized purposes. Almost always in

use is the central training area located between the two principal division camps, Hansen and Schwab. This area has artillery and mortar ranges plus limited maneuver area. A new 50-point rifle range is located next to recently-completed Camp Schwab. Another 50-point range will soon be ready at the new Camp Hansen.

Since the central training area is the focal point of training activity on Okinawa, all major division combat and support elements will live near it by 1962. Camp Schwab, a modern, typhoon-proof, \$15 million dollar facility of concrete structures, was completed in September 1959. Now the home of some 5,000 Marines, it is the first complete facility of its type for Marines in the Far East. The 3d Marines, 3dMTBn,

3dReconBn, 3dATBn, and "C" Co, 3dMedBn, are billeted there.

At the southern end of the area, construction is progressing on a similar, but larger, facility at Camp Hansen. Permanent facilities at Camp Hansen are scheduled for completion and occupancy by major elements of the division about September 1961.

Another new facility which has a very favorable impact on division training is the MCAF, Futema, Okinawa. Here MAG-16, with its two transport helicopter squadrons and VMO-2, is located adjacent to the division. MAG-16 increases materially both the amount and cohesiveness of our vertical envelopment air/ground training.

Although the bulk of the division is located around the central training area, Okinawa also furnishes the northern training area. It offers about 100 square miles of completely different terrain. This mountainous area is heavily wooded, almost uninhabited, and has only trails and one unimproved road built by Division Engineers. This area can be used for regimental size problems, but is most adaptable to battalion or company exercises, jungle-type operations, and escape and survival training. The northern training area gets constant use by division elements.

A major on-island training effort is devoted to on-the-job and formal school training of individuals in numerous fields of military endeavor. Not only does the division train its own Marines, but hardly a day passes that Marines from allied countries, particularly Nationalist China and Korea, are not undergoing on-the-job training or formal schooling with the 3dMarDiv. This constant contact with military allies helps make combined operations successful.

The formal Division Schools are in continuous session. A total of 29 courses of instruction is offered, 11 for company grade officers and SNCO's and 18 for lower ranks. During calendar year 1959, 471 officers and 2,938 enlisted men graduated from Division Schools. Traveling teams of instructors were available to unit commanders to conduct courses at home camps.

Division schools offer the following courses of instruction:



Officer

Aerial Observer
ABC Warfare
Custodian (Classified and Cryptographic)
Demolitions and Mine Warfare
Embarkation
Military Instruction
Motor Transport (Indoctrination)

Combined Officer and SNCO
Combat Intelligence
Cryptographic
Courier, (Special Weapons)
Officers' Gunnery (Artillery)


Enlisted

ABC Warfare
Combat Intelligence
Demolitions and Mine Warfare

Embarkation

Field Radio Operator
Field Range Equipment
Infantry Weapons Maintenance
Message Center
Motor Transport (Automotive Mechanic)
Military Instruction
NCO Leadership
Personnel Administration
Projectionist
Radio Relay
Radio Teletype Operator
Supply
Typist
Wireman

All on-island training time is not devoted to field exercises and schools. An overall readiness program is not complete without mo-



Passes helped 3dMarDiv beat Army-Air Force All-Stars in Keystone Bowl.



Okinawa Marines operate six ham radio stations for hometown contact.

3dMarDiv Marines board HRS for helicopter assault on Borneo Beach.



rale-building sports and recreation. The 3dMarDiv conducts an extensive special services program which provides individual and team sports, recreational activities, a continuous intra-mural program and varsity competition in the Okinawa Inter-Service League.

The sports program benefits the participants. Equally important is the high spectator interest. Last year's attendance at football games ranged from 3,000 to an overflow crowd of 12,000 people who watched the Marine All-Stars defeat the Army-Air Force All-Stars in the second annual Keystone Bowl Game, played on the division's home field at Camp Courtney.

The division's six amateur radio stations, financed by division special services and operated by Marine volunteers, are great morale boosters. Through daily radio-telephone patch schedules with dozens of locations in the United States, 1,000-1,200 personal telephone calls are completed each month for Okinawa Marines. Additionally, from 2,000 to 3,000 high speed messages are sent home through these radio facilities.

The training on Okinawa is only a part of the division's activities. Through arrangements with our SEATO allies, Nationalist China, Japan and Korea, the 3dMarDiv benefits from an extensive off-island training program. Major elements of the division engage in off-island training almost constantly.

The most-used, off-island training area is the old division home port at Fuji-McNair, Japan. This area is available all year and offers definite advantages over Okinawan sites. It provides excellent artillery, mortar, tank and anti-tank firing ranges; good maneuver areas for infantry and tanks; fine terrain for vertical landings; cold weather training which is nonexistent on Okinawa; and an opportunity for rest and recreation visits to other areas of Japan.

Ten division units of battalion or larger size, infantry, tank, anti-tank and supporting elements, enjoyed the Fuji-McNair area during the past twelve months. Early this year the 12th Marines moved to the area for a month of artillery firing and cold weather training. During the course of the exercise, the 12th Ma-



LtGen T. A. Wornham, CG, FMFPac escorts Gen Chiang Kai Shek to CP during highly successful Operation Blue Star.

nines held a firing demonstration for ranking officers of the Japanese Ministry of Defense.

In other off-island training, elements of the division have conducted exercises in Thailand, Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Borneo during the past year. Considerable emphasis is placed on solution of the language problems incident to operating with our Far East Allies.

One of the major exercises of 1959, Operation SEA TURTLE, was held in the Pohang area of Korea. SEA TURTLE was a combined operation with the Korean Marines. BGen L. C. Hudson, formerly Division ADC, commanded the landing forces. In SEA TURTLE the operation plan was written in alternate lines of English and Korean. It provided for a helicopter-sea assault on Pohang by RLT-3, then commanded by Col Jess P. Ferrill, and KMC RLT-2, led by Col Pak Sung Chul. BGen R. L. Murray, the recent Di-

vision ADC, commanded a 1960 version, Operation SEA HAWK, in Korea during June of this year.

Another combined exercise during 1959 was executed with the British in North Borneo. The 1stBn of the United Kingdom's Foresters Regiment, commanded by LtCol M. J. D'A Blackman, RA, joined Col R. J. Batterton, Jr. and RLT-9 in this SEATO landing operation. RAdm H. S. Persons, USN, was overall SEATO commander. Elements of the 3dReconBn recently participated in another SEATO exercise in Thailand with Thai Marines and British Royal Engineers. This operation tested night landing and probing techniques.

These and many other landing exercises each year are in preparation for the 3dMarDiv's final examination in combat readiness, participation in a major Division/Wing Amphibious Exercise every other year. In March of this year it was Operation BLUE STAR. In conjunc-

tion with Amphibious Forces, Seventh Fleet, the 3dMarDiv and 1st MAW, under LtGen Thomas A. Wornham, I MEF, conducted a major tri-phibious exercise. It was held in rugged southern Taiwan which was defended by US and Chinese Marine aggressors. The major elements in the assault phase were RLT-3, commanded by Col W. Holomon; RLT-9 led by Col R. L. Stallings; the 12th Marines under Col J. P. Rathbun; and Chinese Marine Corps RLT-2 commanded by Col Ma-Li-wei. MAG-16 under command of Col E. C. Finn transported the vertically landed component of the Division assault.

Operation BLUE STAR clearly indicated the Division's readiness to operate with allied forces. Many valuable lessons were learned both by the division and its Chinese friends. The landing on Taiwan once again affirmed that the 3dMarDiv is ready to reckon with any aggressor in the Far East.

REPORT FROM THE READY FORCES

PART TWO

PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE READINESS

The basic problems confronting the 3dMarDiv are not unique. The economic "facts-of-life" limit the size of our forces and the sophistication of our equipment and armament. Our efforts must be mainly directed toward getting the most out of what we have. This

means planning, preparation, and training. The planning, to get us there with the right fighting force; the preparation, to get us there in a hurry; and the training, to enable us to do the job when we do get there. Each is essential to combat readiness.

Planning

No one knows in advance where military forces will be required, nor can the mission of these forces be predicted with certainty. If we knew these things, a plan could be developed which would be appropriate in all details. The Commanding General of the 3dMarDiv, Maj Gen R. B. Luckey also serves as Commander, Task Force 79, FMF, Seventh Fleet. In this capacity he directs the efforts of a cadre planning staff which is continually developing plans for likely happenings. However, many situations can develop rapidly, and it is impossible to make detailed plans for each possible crisis. If we could develop plans for each, we would find that many of these plans would be alike

in many respects. For instance, all plans for a specific area of operations would have similar intelligence annexes and many of the plans calling for a RLT would have identical task organizations. Several annexes would be the same in all plans except for a few minor details. These could be added in a very short time. Thus, a plan composed largely of previously prepared annexes could be generated quickly when trouble arises or even while the trouble is developing. We are presently preparing such annexes. Area studies are prepared on a continuing basis for possible areas of operation. These studies can be readily converted into intelligence annexes for an operation plan. Standard task organizations are be-

ing drawn up, one of which will always provide a force of the desired size and composition. If air lift of a portion of the force is feasible, the Marines and equipment to be air transported are designated in the troop lists. Once the task organization has been fixed, plans can be made for the required logistic support. Logistic requirements for each task organization will be determined, both for tropical and cold-weather operations. Regardless of the nature of the mission, the force will be so organized and equipped that it is completely prepared for combat operations. With these "packages" it is a simple matter to develop a good operation plan for any crisis on short notice.

MAG-16 helicopter positions 4.5-in rocket launcher for ground troops.



Preparation

With standard task organizations and a knowledge of what Marines and equipment will be air-lifted to the objective area, the equipment that can be spared from day-to-day operations is prepared for air shipment, marked and stored. This air mount-out equipment is continually inspected and is periodically rotated. If the whistle blows, it's ready to go. Unfortunately we cannot maintain complete mount-out stocks in staging. Equipment is required for training and housekeeping. However, insofar as is practicable, packaging is kept in a ready condition so that mount-out can be made in the shortest time.



Reconnaissance Battalion Marines training in use of rubber boats off the eastern coast of Okinawa.

Training

So far as training is concerned, Okinawa presents both advantages and disadvantages. Certain limitations on training areas require that we conduct many off-island exercises. A distinct disadvantage, it is not without its benefits. As a result of moving to and from the exercise areas, we maintain a familiarity with surface mount-out procedures. Each month a different BLT holds a fixed-wing aircraft mount-out drill. In this drill, it packs up, moves to the staging area and loads aboard aircraft. The aircraft do not leave the ground—an economy measure—but the objective is achieved. Most of the units of the division are intimately acquainted with mount-out operations by sea and air.

Individual training programs and objectives are pretty much the same throughout the Marine Corps, so we will not discuss them here. Unit training programs, however, are not so well defined. We have new units and new armament which have not

been combat-tested. For these, firm doctrine has yet to be developed. The ultimate reputation of these new units and the new armament may well depend upon the aggressiveness and ingenuity of the commander taking them into combat. Certainly no one is in a position to praise or criticize them from the experience of viewing a "static display." Our attitude is, "Don't knock it 'til you've tried it." That's what we're doing now, trying them in all sorts of situations and missions, in hopes of determining the correct employment. We emphasize training the unit commander to take advantage of all the new resources available to him—supporting arms, intelligence, transport. The transplacement program permits us to enter into this advanced unit training as soon as a new battalion arrives. We are becoming adept at techniques which were discussed in classrooms not too long ago.

Our location has provided us with an opportunity to train with Ma-

rines from several nations—Korea, China, Great Britain, the Philippines and Thailand. If we are ever to serve with our allies in joint operations, these experiences will be invaluable. The personal contacts and friendships which resulted will stand the Marine Corps in good stead for years to come. The problems encountered and their solutions are documented in post-exercise reports.

Perhaps this incident will illustrate one of the things which can be done to improve combat readiness. A young Marine from one of the battalions of the 3d Marines was stopped by an MP in the village of Henoko, near Camp Schwab. When asked to show his liberty card, he admitted that he didn't have it with him. When the MP asked for his ID card, he said, "I don't happen to have it with me either, but I have my Helicopter Manifest Stub." This Marine is not only trained to operate from helicopters, but he expects to! This is the essence of combat readiness.

TRANSPLACEMENT —



Amphibian tractors give Marines high and dry landing during training exercises at White Beach on Okinawa's eastern shore.

The first battalion to enter the unit transplacement program was LtCol Bill Chip's 1st Bn, 1st Marines. With its departure in April from Okinawa and the 9th Marines, and its return stateside to the 1stMar Div's 7th Marines, it had completed its 12-month overseas span.

Chip's battalion (they all take on the name of their commander) was relieved in the 9th Marines by Maj Harry Painter's 1st Bn, 7th Marines. All infantry battalions of the 3dMarDiv are now transplacement units.

How is the program working?

From the point of view of the 3dMarDiv this question can only be answered with superlatives. In teenage slang, it's the most!

The transplacement battalion enters the 3dMarDiv and progresses through cycles of advanced training with the same people in the same jobs. Gone are the days of piecemeal rotation and constant personnel turnover. The system erases the problem of repetitious elementary training for the newly arrived few at the expense of the many. Training progresses faster, the individuals rapidly gain experience, confidence and mutual trust. Unit pride is enhanced, and there is no cut-back in combat readiness due to personnel losses.

By far the most important benefit of this program has been increased combat readiness. Efficiency results from savings in time, effort and money expended on training. No unit faced with a monthly problem

of personnel loss and gain can attain as high a degree of combat efficiency as can a transplacement unit.

During its busy and productive overseas tour, 1/1 saw duty and liberty in Borneo, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan and of course, Okinawa. It became experienced in surface-borne, heli-borne and air landed operations. It worked hard, taking part in Operation BLUE STAR only two weeks before boarding ship to return home.

How did the battalion fare in personnel losses? Attrition proved almost negligible. The 1st Bn, 1st Marines arrived on Okinawa with 43 officers and 1,061 enlisted. Over a year later, they rotated to Camp Pendleton with 40 officers and 1,016 enlisted. This represents a loss of less than five per cent.

Besides seeing the Orient, individual Marines joining a transplacement battalion have the distinct advantage of being promoted within their own organization by liberal quotas based on growth potential.

The fighting strength of this or any Marine Division is based on its infantry battalions. The transplacement system assures this Division a firmer foundation and a higher degree of combat readiness than ever before possible in peacetime. From the 3dMarDiv's point of view the unit transplacement system is better than a secret weapon. What we have of the system now should be retained at any cost. Extending the program to other elements of the Division would be highly desirable.

USMC

Suspended Sentence

A YOUNG MARINE STANDING HIS FIRST main gate post was on the telephone when the Captain of the Base drove slowly past the sentry booth. The sentry dropped the phone, gave a blast on his whistle and sharply ordered the naval officer to back up. Said the captain, pointing to his four gold stripes: "I guess you don't know what these mean, son." Replied the Marine: "Chief, you may have 16 years good conduct, but you'll never get another gold hashmark if you run my post again."


\$15.00 to 1stSgt Lawrence R. Anderson

For Needy, Not Greedy

THE ADJUTANT WANTED TO LET the troops know he had created a stenographic school. He put this ad in the *Daily Bulletin*: "Officers wishing to take advantage of stenographers in the pool should report to Room 205 and show evidence of their need."

\$15.00 to Col G. O. Ashley, USAF

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The M14 Rifle . . .

A Comparison

By Maj John F. Conroy

THE M1 RIFLE AND BAR ARE being retired. The Marine's "best friend" will continue to be his rifle but the familiar M1 will be replaced by the M14 and the BAR's duties will be assumed by the M14 modified.

Why has the basic arm been changed? What will the individual rifleman gain with the new M14? Is it as accurate as the M1? Will all riflemen have an automatic weapon?

To answer these questions here's a comparison of the new rifle with the M1 and the BAR.

The M14 was developed in the US by the Springfield Armory. The rifle was known as the T44 while being developed. Behind the development was a need for more infantry fire power and a need to reduce the number of different cartridges used by the members of NATO. The French Army alone had weapons dating back to 1886. The many weapons designed and made in France both before and after WWII included several models which required unique French cartridges. On top of this, France has many US small arms plus captured German equipment. The same unfortunate muddle extends to the

automatic rifles and machine guns. The problems of ammunition resupply are obvious.

All members of NATO have not adopted the M14. The British, for example, chose the Belgian FN rifle and are adapting their famous Bren gun for the NATO 7.62mm cartridge. Actually only the round has been standardized. The Belgian FN, the Bren gun, M14 and M14 modified all fire the NATO 7.62mm cartridge.

General Description of Rifle, Cal. 30, M14

The rifle is a gas operated, air cooled, shoulder-fired weapon. It is fed from a 20-round magazine. Fully loaded, the rifle weighs 10 lbs, including sling. It looks like an M1. The receiver, bolt and firing pin are shorter because the 7.62mm cartridge is shorter. The floor plate of the trigger housing group was cut back to allow the 20-round magazine to be inserted.

In operation the rifle is similar to the M1. Gas is allowed to enter the gas cylinder and act on a small piston which forces the operating rod to the rear. This short-stroke piston system was used on the US carbine

of WWII and Korean vintage.


The rear sight and adjusting knobs are identical to the M1. The front sight is a blade-type, mounted on the flash suppressor. The M14 is primarily a semi-automatic rifle. When the selector is added it will also fire automatically.

Every rifleman will not become a full-time automatic rifleman when he gets the new M14. The selector mechanism will be added to the basic rifle when the tactical situation requires. Battalion or company commanders can convert any number of M14 rifles to automatic weapons by simply ordering the selectors installed. This can be done right in the battalion. The armorers in the service platoon can supervise the conversion.

M14 In The Role of The M1


The great similarity between the M14 and M1 will help in teaching troops about the new rifle. The manual of arms can be executed (without magazines) in the same manner as the M1 with the exception of "Inspection Arms." With the magazine removed the bolt will not stay to the rear automatically when opened. There is a bolt lock on the left side that must be secured. This can be done from the "Port Arms" position. The operating rod is moved to the rear with the heel of the right hand. When the bolt is fully open the bolt lock is secured with the right thumb. When the bolt is locked to the rear a sharp rap on the butt plate will still release it. This could cause some concern to inspecting officers.

One of the first questions about any new weapon is "how accurate is it?" The M14 can match the scores of the M1 rifle over the Marine Corps qualification course. The M14 was tested by Distinguished



FIRING
When the trigger is pressed, trigger lugs are disengaged and the hammer moves forward, driving the firing pin against the primer.

U. S. RIFLE 7.62-MM M14



Normal Maintenance

- 1 Elevation and windage knobs operate freely and retain their setting.
- 2 Check for excessive wear.
- 3 Check operating rod spring for bends.
- 4 Check hand guard for excessive cracks.
- 5 Check for pitting and excessive oil.
- 6 Check for looseness and burrs.
- 7 Free of carbon.
- 8 Clean with bore cleaner only. Use no abrasives. Do not oil interior surfaces.
- 9 Check interior for general cleanliness. Check magazine spring for tension.
- 10 Check for dents and cracks.
- 11 Ensure safety is operative.

Before Firing

Lubricate:

- 1 Lip of receiver.
- 2 Camming surfaces in hump of operating rod.
- 3 Locking recesses.
- 4 Operating rod guide on side of receiver.

Chamber and bore should be clean and dry.

Riflemen of the Marksmanship Training Unit, Camp Mathews, California. These marksmen averaged 233.5 with the M14. To compare, the M14 rifles used in these tests were not special ones. They were not new or reconditioned in any way. The rifles had been used for field testing and subjected to rough handling before being received by MTU for testing and evaluating. On the other hand, the M1s were match conditioned rifles. The shooters were completely familiar with them. Ball ammunition was used with both weapons.

Marines from MTU are the core of the Marine Corps rifle team; no doubt their experience would enable them to shoot well with any military rifle. To remove the experience factor, a platoon of recruits was issued M14s. After only 30 minutes of instruction, they fired the qualification course. Despite very bad weather conditions, the average was 204.3. This was actually slightly better than their M1 scores.


In extensive firing at the Marine Corps Landing Force Development Center, Quantico, M14 and M1 were very close.

In the overall results a pattern emerged. Shooters generally fired better with the M14 in the 200 yard standing and the 300 yard sitting and kneeling stages. The M1 scores were generally better in the rapid fire stages and 500 yard slow fire. The shooters believe the M14, being lighter and better balanced, was easier to hold for slow fire. This same lightness made it harder to hold when firing rapid fire.

There were no major difficulties


with range procedure. The basic positions used now are suitable with the M14. Shorter men may have to tighten their slings or use a more upright sitting position. This is because the 20-round magazine interferes with the left arm.

With experience in the FMF, minor changes in range procedures may be made. Perhaps the rapid fire stages will be increased to 20 rounds. A magazine changer may be used to permit loading without removing




UNLOCKING

- 2** As the bullet passes the gas port, a small amount of gas fills the hollow gas piston and the gas cylinder plug; the gas expands and drives the piston to the rear carrying the operating rod and bolt with it.



INITIAL EXTRACTION

3 As the bolt unlocks and moves to the rear, it extracts the empty cartridge from the chamber.



EJECTION

4 When the empty cartridge case is clear of the chamber, the ejector forces the cartridge base away from the face of the bolt and up and to the right—out of the receiver.

the magazine. Long range accuracy can be improved. The same match conditioning practices used on the M1 can be applied to the M14. Those Marines who believe in the use of cold steel will be glad to know that the bayonet is still with us. The M14 bayonet knife will probably have more utility uses than the M1 bayonet.

The M14 Modified and the BAR

Traditionally, the smallest man in the fire team carries the BAR. The load of this automatic rifleman will be reduced by 10 lbs. The M14 modified, you will remember, is the same rifle which replaces the M1. The difference is the addition of the hinged butt plate, bipod, and selector for automatic fire.

A heavier barrel version was tested by the US Army and Marine Corps. This model, the M15, was equipped with a barrel weighing two lbs more than the M14. With

the heavier barrel to promote cooling and cut down vibration, the M15 was to replace the BAR. But tests failed to support the need for the M15. The improvement in accuracy, cooling, and reduced vibration was not enough to justify the extra two pounds of weight. The M15 was dropped. For the light weight M14 rifle to replace the BAR, modifications were made:

- A hinged butt plate is added. Extending the full length of the butt, the new butt plate lies flush when in the folded position. With the extra length it is much more comfortable to use than was the shorter version on the BAR.
- A selector lever is located on the right side of the receiver. It is depressed and rotated to make the selection for semi-automatic or automatic fire. There are positive stops in both directions. The operation is simple and can easily be done in darkness. A large "A" on the face

of the selector is toward the shooter (rear) when in automatic selection.

All Marines who have ever been armed with the BAR are familiar with the magazine troubles. Most of the stoppages with the BAR could be traced to failure of the magazine. This has been greatly reduced in the new rifle. With the BAR there were two major causes of magazine malfunctioning. The most common was bent or damaged lips. When this occurred, the round could not move freely out of the magazine and upward into the chamber. In the M14 modified the ammunition is tripped from the magazine and travels straight into the chamber. There is much less resistance and tendency to bind.

All BARmen will recall the second source of trouble: failure of the magazine to stay firmly in place. When faced with this the BARman could only hold the magazine up or change it. Larger locking surfaces on the M14 modified have eliminated this trouble. Marines with the new automatic rifle will find it easier and faster to load and unload. The opening for insertion is larger and the release latch is no longer inside the trigger guard. Insertion and removal of magazines is now a one-hand operation. The new magazines, of light weight aluminum, functioned perfectly throughout testing.

During the development stage a throw-away magazine was considered. This was to be factory-loaded, similar to the M1 clip. When empty, the magazine would be discarded. The weak point with this magazine was spring tension. It is doubtful that a magazine would be reliable after being stored with tension always on the spring.

Selection of the bipod to be used on the M14 modified posed a major problem. A rigid, strong bipod was desired. Height adjustment without butterfly nuts or small, fragile parts was needed. The best bipod proved to be the same one used on the M-60 machine gun. This bipod was fitted to the M14 at Quantico for testing. It locks against the stock when not in use and can be extended and adjusted for height with one hand. There are no nuts to tighten or loosen. It is held in folded or extended position by positive locks.

There are several other bipods still being considered for use with the M14 modified.

Automatic Fire

By rotating the selector knob, the M14 modified becomes an automatic rifle. As an automatic rifle it is not as efficient as the BAR. This is especially true at ranges beyond 300 yards. The M14 and the M14 modified have a high cyclic rate of fire—750 rounds per minute. This high rate of fire added to the light weight of the rifle causes greater dispersion. The majority of the shooters who have tested the weapon said that light weight, excessive recoil and fast rate of fire make it difficult to stay on the target. The M14 modified produced the better scores at slow fire but at no time did it equal the scores of the BAR in automatic fire. The long range accuracy of the BAR is lost. Light weight, and increased fire power at short range have been gained.

In a field firing exercise the new weapons held their own. A rifle platoon was used in the exercise. The men fired with the M1 and BAR and then with the M14 and M14 modified. Silhouette targets were placed between 300 and 400 yards down range. The number of hits scored was almost identical. There was less than a point difference. In this case, Marines were using their own issue M1s and BAR. They received only brief instruction and an opportunity to zero the new rifles.

The best accuracy is obtained when firing in 2-3 rounds bursts. For testing purposes, the rifle was fired at the abnormal rate of 60 rounds per minute in 3-5 round bursts. There was no trouble with mechanical functioning or barrel life. After 240 rounds had been sent down the barrel, the upper hand guard began to smoke. There was enough smoke to impair the shooters' vision after 300 rounds had been fired. Actually, this rate of fire is much greater than would ever be used. With a full belt load of magazines, the BARman would expend all of his ammunition before excessive smoke developed. At the present time, a slotted fiber glass hand guard is being examined to remove the problem altogether.

It should be remembered that in all testing the M14 modified stood

up better mechanically than the BAR. Unfavorable weather conditions and prolonged firing had little effect on the new rifle. When brief periods were allowed for cooling, smoke never obscured the shooters' vision.

There are no plans, at present, to reorganize the rifle platoon or squad. While every member of the squad will be a potential automatic rifleman, only the BARman will be armed with the M14 modified. Without doubt, increased flexibility of firepower comes with the new weapons. Fire discipline and ammunition supply will no doubt be greater problems than in the past. These can be overcome by a high level of training.


What have we gained with the new rifles? In reality, there is only one rifle. This greatly simplifies training. Any man in the squad can take over the M14 modified and be-

come the automatic rifleman. The sight adjustment and all phases of loading and firing are known to him. Care and cleaning is the same as with the M14.

In fact, if the mission requires, every man can be an automatic rifleman. Night raids, rear guard action or employment on a TAOR might make this increase in combat power really pay off.


The Marine Corps is a Force-in-Readiness. With very little notice, FMF units can be in action anywhere in the world. On our flanks could be troops of any of our allied countries. The value of standardized ammunition supply is apparent.

The reduction in weight will be even more important in a helicopter-borne operation. Mobility from the helicopter and increased combat power from the M14 will increase the overall offensive power of the Fleet Marine Force. USMC



FEEDING

5 As the bolt completes its rearward movement, the top round is forced into the path of the bolt by the magazine follower which is under pressure of the magazine spring.



CHAMBERING

6 As the bolt goes forward under pressure of the expanding operating rod spring, the bolt picks up the top round and drives it forward into the chamber, completing a mechanical action which takes approximately 1/800th of a minute.

Illustrations courtesy of Infantry



DOES THE LEADER MAKE THE DIFFERENCE?

By MSgt C. V. Crumb, FMCR

DURING THE THIRTIES, THE enlisted component of the Marine Corps was made up mainly of two groups. The first was the career group comprised mostly of NCO's and a small smattering of professional privates. These professional privates were the "characters" of the Corps; individuals who, for reasons like failure to accept responsibility, no desire for advancement, addiction to the friendly creature, and others, would never deserve more than Pfc, but who lent the Corps a certain flavor that was not really unpleasant. The other part of the enlisted career group, as mentioned before, were the Non-Commissioned Officers, the real cutting edge of leadership and a very important segment of the Corps.

The second group of the enlisted component were the first cruise men, the four year enlistees, the men who comprised the major portion of the rank and file of every unit. Due to the smallness of the Corps (there were more Policemen in New York City than there were US Marines) and the scarcity of civilian jobs because of the great depression, the Marine Corps had been able to keep their physical, mental and moral qualification for enlistment very high. The men who made up this second part of the enlisted component were a highly select group; college grads marched side by side with the wheat farmer from Dakota. Accountants shined their shoes along with a worker from a closed steel mill in Pittsburgh. Cab drivers, coal miners, ranchers, farmers, teachers, students and bankers, very good mentally and physically and with no form of police record at all, these

men were, with a few exceptions, all potential leaders. The job was to get as many as possible to reenlist.

Very little in the way of conventional inducements could be offered. Paywise, promotion from private to Pfc took a Marine from \$21.00 to \$30.00; to Corporal, \$42.00; and to Sergeant, \$54.00 a month. It normally took ten years to make Sergeant. Life for a man in the ranks was not unpleasant, but full of privations measured by today's standards. Recognition from the outside was practically non-existent. Add it up any way you could, the bare fact remained that the Marine Corps could only offer the men of this group as inducement to stay: service in an elite corps, the satisfaction that a man feels when he knows he's with the best, and eventual promotion into the Non-Commissioned Officers Corps.

The NCO represented the Marine Corps to the first-cruise man and the way he represented it would make the difference as to whether or not this young Marine would decide to "ship over" and make a career of defending his country. How this was done by one NCO is the text of this article. The reason for using this text is to point up for today's leaders the techniques and principles of leadership practiced by this NCO and the effect these practices had on the men who followed him.

When I joined the first platoon of "A" Company 4th Marines, Shanghai, China, Bill Reeves was the Platoon Sergeant. He looked like a leader, tall, erect, neat, lean and raw boned. A leader's appearance is very important, especially so the first time he meets with the man for whom he

is going to accept complete responsibility. We can't all be six feet two like Bill Reeves but we can all be erect, neat and lean. When we left Boot Camp we were ramrod straight. Some remained so through conscious effort and self-imposed discipline. Others of us allowed our carriage to become less than erect in the years that followed boot camp; in some cases little realizing how this hurt our appearance even though we knew that military posture was the mark of a leader.

Neatness, the quality for which US Marines are known throughout the world, is an aspect of their leader which men take for granted. To be any less in this quality than the high standard that being a Marine calls for subtracts very seriously from your appearance as a leader.

Nothing detracts from a picture of leadership like obesity. I have served under Marines who carried around several extra pounds and who were good leaders, but I frequently found myself wondering how they did it. I believe it's easier to be a leader if you present the appearance of one. Sergeant Reeves' appearance was that of a leader.

Bill sounded like a leader. This is a big area and covers a number of things. Sgt Reeves never cussed us out. At a time when the men in the ranks were often addressed in terms anything but congratulatory, to Bill we were always either "men" or "marines." He spoke only when necessary and then with force and I refer to more than volume. Bill had the volume for the drill field and he had the force to be convincing in a man-to-man-situation in private. While in front of his troops, he very seldom engaged in private chit-chat with the other NCO's over trivia not related to matters at hand. Nor did he engage in small talk with his troops either singly or in groups.

I never heard him offer an excuse for the failure of one of his men or for the platoon as a whole. When a discrepancy or shortcoming was detected in the First Platoon the only remark made by the Platoon Sergeant was "Yes, sir," "I see, Sir," and "It will not happen again, Sir" and those of us who were within hearing knew by the sound of his voice that the last was no idle promise.

Bill hardly ever used sarcasm or ridicule. At a time when the sarcas-

tic and cutting remark was a common disciplinary tool in the mouths of the Marine Corps NCO, our Platoon Sergeant used it sparingly and only when some wise individual needed to be reduced to proper size. Bill normally reprimanded in private. Many were the times that an individual was told "Remain after this formation," "Report to me at the bayonet course" or "See me in my quarters at 1300." However, if he had something good to say about one of his men, it was said in front of all.

Bill was not easy with his praise and therefore when he did commend one of his men it meant something. On one occasion at a troop inspection he said to me "Crumb, it looks like you'll become a real Marine after all." I marched on air for the next two weeks. Bill knew when a word of praise would help an individual who was having trouble keeping up. He was more likely to commend a Marine with very little talent who was doing an average job than he was to commend one with a lot of talent who was doing only a good job.

Bill knew how to use praise and reprimand; when, if ever, to use sarcasm or ridicule; when in doubt, be silent, never to offer excuses and address your Marines like Marines. Bill sounded like a leader.

Sgt Reeves acted like a leader. Whenever he was seen on liberty, at a baseball or rugby game he presented a picture of dignity and composure. During off duty hours in the barracks he gave quiet assurance to the individual who was taking a beating on the handball court or was having difficulty with a night training assignment. While on duty he presented a picture of solid command and quiet control. If the Platoon was late for a formation or someone in the formation made a glaring error, Bill did not get flustered; he instead reestablished control in an efficient unhurriedness, accompanied by calm words of assurance.

In the event the Platoon was given a difficult or tedious assignment, Sergeant Reeves never made excuses or blamed his superior. He quietly told us what the job was and that we could and would do it as well or better than any other rifle platoon in the Regiment. He would then set

about calmly and patiently to make that promise come true.

Bill made sure we got everything we deserved. He checked our clothing and equipment carefully and we drew these items when we needed them. If a formation caused our platoon to be late for chow, he met with the Mess Sergeant to make sure we were provided for before he would eat. When promotion examinations were scheduled, the first platoon was represented better than any other.

On one occasion a theft was reported. The circumstances were such that a member of the First Platoon was the prime suspect. Sgt Reeves, when asked for his opinion, stated very strongly to the Company Commander that this Marine was no thief. On the basis of Bill's assertion, this man was removed from the list of suspects and thereby saved the embarrassment of a Company Commander's interview. The money was subsequently found to have been misplaced and not stolen.

On the other side of the ledger, when it was clearly proven that a Marine from the First Platoon had

in regard to this man to see if and when he himself had failed. I understand now that the mantle of leadership sometimes felt heavy on his shoulders.

Sgt Reeves always showed a concern for our welfare and progress, when we were operating under some control, during rifle requalification, for instance. At a time when a private's pay was twenty-one dollars a month, the extra three or five dollars a month he could make on the rifle range made requalification time extremely important. Bill would make it his business to find you in the barracks probably after night chow and inquire as to your progress and offer his help at least three times during the two week requalification period.

Bill Reeves acted like a leader.

As was mentioned at the beginning of this article, most of the first cruise Marines left the Marine Corps at the expiration of their first enlistment. However, this did not seem to be the case for the men who served in the First Platoon, A Company 4th Marines during the Spring and Summer of 1937. For during the years that followed I have either read of, heard of or met most of these men and they were still meeting their responsibilities as Marines very well. One was among the first to be distinguished on Guadalcanal; another was taken on Wake Island and gave his life interceding for his men in a Japanese Prison Camp. One got the Silver Star for gallantry on Iwo Jima. Still another was mentioned in *Leatherneck* as one of "Three Gunnies" who distinguished themselves in Korea.

During and after the Great War I met others, serving as Officers, Warrant Officers, Sergeants Major, First Sergeants, Gunnery Sergeants, Mess Sergeants, Supply Sergeants; some not heroically on the field of battle but all with responsibility and a high sense of duty, doing jobs that had to be done and done well if the Marine Corps were to maintain the name of being an elite outfit.

Why did the men of this one platoon turn out differently? Could it be that the leadership Bill Reeves exercised helped to convince us that the Marine Corps was the life for us? Does the Leader really make that much difference?

USMC



wilfully neglected his responsibilities as a Marine, Bill would step aside and let the sure and stern process of military discipline take place, watching this scene with sadness and pointing out to the rest of us how it affected the man, the First Platoon and the Marine Corps, and I feel sure, analyzing his own leadership

OBSERVATION POST



This department is for new, constructive ideas. They may be controversial; they must be short. Payment at regular rates on publication.

Figurehead or Sergeant Major?

By CWO J. L. Fawcett

WHERE OH WHERE IS THE OLD TIME Sgt Major of yesterday? Anyone with over fifteen years in the Corps knows of whom I speak. He was the epitome of efficiency in the battalion office—he ran the office. No administrative problem or technicality was too tough for him to solve or unsnarl. He was the “bible” for any knotty problem that arose. He could quote Marine Corps memos and letters of instruction verbatim, and if anyone was obstinate enough to demand proof of his wisdom he could lay his hands on the reference in a flash.

A good adjutant could be an excellent one with the help of a competent (and all of them were) Sgt Major. Many a Second Lt. wearing Eagle’s Insignia today can remember the guidance received from these salty old war horses. An adjutant with a good Sgt Major had the world by the tail. He could put his feet up on the desk and relax, and if he had a wormy problem tossed at him by his SgtMaj it was always accompanied by a recommended (and generally accepted) solution.

Today we find the situation reversed. With our present over-emphasis on the holiness of the SgtMaj rank we find today it is the adjutant who burns the midnight oil and digs out the answers—he is the man who gets the ulcers. The SgtMaj is the man with his feet on the desk—and brother I mean this literally! Show me a SgtMaj today who can honestly say he has put out a full day’s work for a full day’s pay and I will show you an exception—there are probably a few.

We find today that duties assigned to most SgtMajs are so limited and inconsequential as to be ludicrous. He is secretly laughed at by the balance of the staff NCOs who know he has nothing to do and is “coasting,” waiting out his “30”—if he is dedicated enough to stay that long. The rest of the staff know the inner workings of the battalion CP and they know that the hard

work and savvy of the adjutant and a person designated as the “Personnel Sgt Maj” (who is really a hardworking underpaid SSgt or GySgt) really make the outfit click.

The lofty and self important SgtMaj is elevated so high in position under our present setup that there is no reaching him with the innermost problems of the battalion. I can personally name three battalions where the SgtMaj holds forth in an office that is bigger and more sumptuous than the battalion Exec’s—who is generally a major. This office is replete with all the comforts of home—sofa, easy chairs, squawk boxes, typewriter (what for?), and the old personal coffee pot. To make this matter more ridiculous, if the adjutant happens to be a CWO2 or even a Lt you find that the SgtMaj draws more money than does his “Boss.” This is rank responsibility?

I could go on for hours. While I was on Okinawa the Division SgtMaj had his personal jeep. It could be used any time of the day or night. Try and get one for official business during the daylight hours today, you company grade officers!

I think we have to sit down and re-evaluate the worth and the value of the SgtMaj rank, and we’ve got to do it now. Let’s let these people run their office, and earn their money and their prestige. We are taught that we are promoted for our future potential, and not as a reward for past good or brave deeds, or for mere time in service. Let us quit making the SgtMaj a stooge for the old man—his number one cloak and dagger man, ever ready to run in and tell him that a company’s head was without toilet paper on Tuesday. These people aren’t acting as Marines, they are figureheads. With our limited quota of Marines and Manpower today to man the ramparts of our many commitments we cannot waste a man or overlook a bet to use every Marine to his fullest potential.

I will no doubt be the subject of much criticism for my stand. So be it. I am not an adjutant. It does not make a bit of difference to me personally whether the SgtMaj runs his office or not, but I feel that someone has to raise his hands in protest and I herewith raise mine. Give staff NCOs responsibility, they say. All right. Let’s do it. But let’s start at the top and work down!

MS&M Bn 1stFSR
Camp Pendleton

A Better Way . . .

To Fasten Seat Belts

By Capt James W. Dion

INTERESTED IN HELICOPTER SAFETY? You had better be . . . seems that we have to log a lot of hours in them . . . and that is not restricted to those who get the flight pay. As one who has an O3 prefix I have long cursed the day that someone designed our present seat belt. Seems that every time I sit in one I always end up with my neighbor’s belt parts and mine are under me or be-

tween the seats. No time to correct the previous man when you are holding on for dear life in vertical movement, the answer would seem to be a very simple modification to be attached to our present belt.


The attachments would be constructed of an elastic type material which would hold the belt in the confines of the seat where it belongs, but would be loose enough not to bind when being used. Cost would seem to be very minor and the peace of mind might even encourage our most KIWI-minded to get up on the Corps’ bandwagon.

Capt James W. Dion, USMC
MB US Navy Ammo & Net Depot
Seal Beach, California


Marine Corps Gazette • August 1960



No. 1 man places his rifle first.



No. 3 man follows with his rifle.



M-1s can be done the same way.

A Better Way . . .

To Stack Arms

By Capt Charles T. Williamson

THE RECENT ADOPTION OF THE M14 rifle by the United States Armed Forces poses new problems in the manual of arms. For example, the M14 does not have a stacking swivel. Without this useful item Marines now appear doomed to a future of grounding arms or slinging arms when, in former days of the "Old Corps," they would have stacked arms. In my opinion, the practice of grounding arms should be avoided whenever possible.

One possible solution to this problem

may be found in Haiti where the Army has been armed for years with the Belgian FN Mauser rifle. This Mauser does not have a stacking swivel. The system they employ is simple and effective, as shown by the accompanying photographs. This "sling rest" method of stacking arms is, I feel, much more military than grounding arms and makes an excellent appearance on the parade ground.

The three Haitian Army soldiers who stacked arms for the pictures used their FN Mausers to illustrate the steps. Then, for comparison, they stacked M1 rifles in order to show the versatility of the system. It will be seen that the only requirement for stacking arms as illustrated is a relatively clear space on the

ground, a tight sling on the stack man's rifle, and a minimum of two rifles.

For years American military rifles have had stacking swivels which have made possible a sturdy, "locked" stack. While the method I am presenting here does not have the strength of our former stacks, it is by far a preferred alternative to grounding arms. Should further trial using the M14 prove this method unsatisfactory for general use in the field on rough terrain, then I recommend it as an expedient on the parade ground until a more suitable method can be found.

USMC

U. S. Naval Mission to Haiti
c/o American Embassy
Port au Prince, Haiti

A Better Way . . .

To Shoot at Night

By Capt Robert C. Rice

THE IMPORTANCE OF NIGHT TRAINING cannot be overemphasized. One especially important phase of this training for the Rifle Company is the night firing exercise. Are your troops deriving the value they should from this type firing problem; or are they merely squeezing off an unrealistic number of tracers to achieve the glowing mesh of interlocking FPL fire? Are they aiming or pointing their weapons?

FM 23-5 explains how to aim the M1 at night. However, lining up the front and rear sights is only half the problem, and this technique can be improved upon by putting small pieces of white tape on the front and rear sights. The other half of the problem is finding the target. You can't aim at what you can't see.

One solution is to use artificial illumination such as rifle grenade or mortar flares. The other solution is to have targets that you can see. A realistic

night firing target can be made using a silhouette target, salvaged comm wire, discarded AN/PPC-10 batteries, a "pig-tail" (light bulb socket), and a 20 or 40 watt bulb. Staple the "pig-tail" to the stake on the silhouette target, connect the comm wire and lead it back to a position behind the firing line to the AN/PRC-10 batteries and insert one end of the wire in the battery terminal. By alternately making and breaking contact with the loose end you cause the light bulb to flash on and off simulating a gun flash. Except for the absence of a report, the similarity is extremely real, another essential for effective combat training. Four or five of these targets distributed across the front of your firing line at distances ranging from 75 to 300 yards will create a realistic, interesting, and effective firing problem. After the completion of firing you can retrieve the targets and critique the firing. Just a hint, place a few other silhouette targets at a greater range, or higher, in the vicinity of each target. This will show that most shots are overs—that at night you need to aim below the target.

This device can also be used with mortars. In this case just a "pig-tail" on

a stake protected by a small sand-bag bunker can simulate an enemy machine gun bunker. Dig the comm wire in about 6" for about 50 yards from the target and it will be pretty difficult to silence the "enemy machine gun."

Night FIREX's are a necessary phase to unit marksmanship instruction and an essential part of a night training program. Ensure that they are as realistic, therefore, as effective as safety limits will permit. The homemade gunflash simulator can make them so.

Just one last parting shot. Have you ever tried using balloons for targets on a FIREX? Where else can you get "pop-up" targets for a penny apiece? USMC

1stBn, T&T Regt
MCS, Quantico, Va.

A BETTER WAY

What's your better way?
How about passing it along to
the rest of the Corps? We'll
pay for your field expedient
device, idea or what-have-you.
Send to Gazette, Box 1844,
Quantico, Virginia.

Troop and Stomp

By Capt Walter Grant

THREE THERE WAS A TIME IN MILITARY history when close order foot drill was an absolute necessity—it was the only means of moving troops from one place to another; and, more essential, it provided the troops practice in the basic battle formations they used against the enemy.

It is human nature to make virtue of necessity, and thus close order drill has become one of the most venerated military traditions.

Today, however, complicated drill formations serve about as much military purpose as does ballet dancing—in fact, the latter would probably be better exercise.

Close order drill is touted as an efficient means of developing leadership in junior officers and NCOs. But, leadership would be more effectively developed in small unit tactical maneuvers—by drilling our companies, platoons, squads, and fire teams in the use of modern fighting formations under actual field conditions.

An hour in the boondocks will impart ten times more leadership than will an hour of running through the humdrum formalities of parade-ground drill.

As for the value of troop and stomp as a means of instilling the concept of obedience in the minds of the rank and file, this discipline could also be imparted with far more desirable results if the same amount of time were devoted to small unit tactics.

Let's take advantage of the salient advantages of our American fighting man's personality—initiative and adaptability. A day on the parade ground stifles these traits; a day in the field develops them.

Of course, if we dropped formal drill, we would still need some rudimentary close order formations: To get the troops to the chow hall, for example; or to move a tactical unit from one assembly area to another. A simple formation would serve these needs—three or four ranks, perhaps. A couple of simple drill movements are all we would need, too—facings and column move-

ments. There is no legitimate need to burden the troops with fancy flanking and oblique maneuvers, since they are never used anywhere but on the parade ground.

Parades? Reviews? Do away with them. We can't spare time for them in our busy training schedules, anyhow.

For necessary ceremonies, we can adopt other means to make them more effective. A change of command ceremony could better be held in a theater, with the added advantage that *all* the troops could see and hear what was going on.

Inspections? The best inspections are conducted on the job, where the inspector can see not only what the troops look like but also how well they can do their jobs. And these working inspections can be supplemented with frequent spot checks of the liberty-bound.

Perhaps it is time for us to critically examine our hallowed concepts of close order drill in the light of the military technology of the twentieth century. The sacred cow may turn out to be a white elephant.

USMC

Marine Corps Supply Schools
MCB, Camp Lejeune, N.C.

New GV-1 tanker delivers jet fuel for the United States Marines



=Wanted: a Name=

By Col L. E. Hudgins, Jr.

LPD WILL BE THE MODERN SUCCESSOR to present day APA and AKA. Many are planned for the future. It was proposed that the Amphibious Transports Dock be named after former Commandants of the Marine Corps. This was turned down because we needed so many that the Navy would quickly run through available names. Besides, as

The first GAZETTE \$100 monthly prize has been awarded by the Editorial Board. July winner: Maj Leon E. Utter for "Yems, Yams, PG, E-3 and You."

one Navy officer pointed out, of the 16 former CMCs now deceased, all but Gen Russell and Anthony Gale had ships named for them.

The naming guidance then for LPD-1 and future ships of this class will be: named after cities of the United States which in turn have been named for explorers and developers of America. Possibilities would include such names as Astoria, Stockton, Baltimore, etc.

Hence the name *Raleigh* for LPD-1. Any suggestions for LPD-2?

US MC

2301 N. Upton St.
Arlington 7, Va.


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What They Say

I cannot imagine a better reference for those who are looking up matters pertaining to war in any place or time...
LtGen E. A. Craig,
USMC (Ret'd)

If I could have in my library but a single book on warfare my choice would be the master work by Lynn Montross...
General
Matthew B. Ridgway,
USA

War Through the Ages in a thousand pages: a tour de force, highly instructive and immensely interesting.


MajGen
J. F. C. Fuller

Now Marine Corps jets can refuel at 300 knots—over 25,000 feet high. The new GV-1 Lockheed Hercules tanker pumps jet fuel probe-and-drogue style at 300 GPM. There's a hose-pod mounted outboard of the engines on each wing, so the big tanker can handle customers two at a time. The GV-1 can rendezvous

with jet fighters at 1000 miles from its home base to off load 28,000 pounds of fuel.

The first of the GV-1s will go on active duty this year.

LOCKHEED
GEORGIA DIVISION MARIETTA, GEORGIA





OBSERVATION POST

CONTINUED

Blues Belong On the Parade Field

By AMSgt L. F. Hipwell

AFTER TWO TOURS ON RECRUITING duty, totaling six and a half years, I feel somewhat of an authority when it comes to wearing Blues.

I first laid eyes on the Blue Dress uniform back in '41. Sporting this colorful garb was a local Marine home on leave. At that time the uniform was minus the four patch pockets now part of the present day outfit. Nevertheless, this squared away Marine cut a pretty trim figure back in those days and had the local belles gasping for breath.

This incident, plus Pearl Harbor, caused me to make my debut as a recruit at Parris Island a few weeks later. I didn't see another set of Blues until three and a half years later.

The present Blues are well designed, still the best looking military dress uniform there is—bar none. Fitted properly (nearly corset tight) and with quartermaster shine removed from the buttons, Blues can very easily transform fat or skinny Marines into looking like Stony Craig, the almost forgotten comic strip Leatherneck who ate, slept, fought, and worked in Blues. In fact, Craig was the only Marine who could wipe out a bar room singlehanded, rescue the Admiral's daughter from the hatchet men, then hail a passing cab which would take him back to home base just in time to fall out his platoon for the 1000 parade and review.

With an assist from his creator, Craig always had a razor-sharp trouser crease, plus a clean white cap cover and white belt. This comic strip, gung-ho character could go through hell and high water and still pass inspection ten minutes later.

Now, let's face the facts about the Blue Dress uniform. Highly traditional, this uniform appears to be temperamental about how it's worn. A slight wrinkle, a belt too snug or loose, or an accidental smudge on the edge of the cap cover can turn its wearer into a slob. These "unnoticeables" tend to exaggerate themselves and stand out like yellow socks at IG inspection. So-

called "comfortable" fitting coats and quartermaster-shined buttons also tend to degrade the uniform. Snug coats and shined buttons are a *MUST!*

I believe the Blue Dress uniform today is being worn to its fullest extent—parades and ceremonies, recruiting duty, aboard ships, and at special detachments. Let's not push it any further.

Blues on liberty? Maybe and maybe not. "When in Rome, do as the Romans do." What's wrong with proper civilian attire for liberty and leave? They're designed to take a beating that our Blues aren't accustomed to.

Civilian clothes can camouflage cigarette packs, pipes, thick wallets and car keys. Our Blues can't. Modern day civilian attire sheds water. Blues don't.

I don't feel that a set of blues should be used as a free drink gimmick in a cocktail lounge or to impress the doorman at a fancy hotel. Appropriate civilian attire is the approved dress for these hangouts. I firmly believe that a Marine wearing the blue uniform should

be either parading, saluting, addressing, or just standing. The uniform in ranks is at its best surrounded in its own element. But, take it to the city, alone, and it gets pushed around, leaned against, sat on, spilled on, and wrinkled and smudged. By then its wearer is completely out of uniform.

Our Corps has made a good name for itself and I don't feel that public sentiments have, or ever will, change to the extent that our greens cannot be distinguished from gas station attendants, bus drivers, or forest rangers.

It's still stimulating to see squads right smartly executed by a company of Marines clad in Blues. There's nothing sharper than to see the "old man" or a VIP piped aboard with a detachment of Marines on deck, resplendent in their Blues, every button shining. A set of Blues is synonymous with Marine Corps recruiters. These are the specific occasions which I feel the scarlet and blue uniform was designed for.

Our Blue Dress uniform represents 185 years of blood, valor, sweat and tradition. Let's respect the right to wear it—but only at appropriate places and occasions.

USMC

HqBn
MCS Quantico

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Lyman

Marine Corps Gazette • August 1980

PROFESSIONAL SCRAPBOOK

Continued



ant's turn. He received quick permission to take a squad down after the first group. But it was all over before he got halfway.

Both sides had broken off the engagement and the Marines were straggling back, carrying their wounded. They had not even seen the enemy.

The following day, the replacement platoon leader was ordered to patrol the same finger. No slung rifles or conversation this time.

The lieutenant issued a five-paragraph order and carefully instructed the point fire team to keep off the skyline and off the trail. It would be slow going on the wooded, steep slopes, but the lieutenant was determined that his patrol would not be ambushed.

Not a tree trunk, deadfall or bush was

to be left uninvestigated. Every member of the patrol understood.

Into the valley they silently moved, rifles poised. They pooped and snooped with tactical thoroughness through every saddle and over every knob.

It was tedious.

Without incident the troops passed the scene of the earlier ambush. It was a milestone. From that point they could see the valley floor—and still no enemy.

Tension lifted, and the Marines began to bunch up. They took to the trail and moved faster down the hill.

The lieutenant spotted the change. He ordered a slowdown. The troops obliged, but they had lost that valuable feeling that the enemy lurked behind every stone.

Again their advance speeded as their confidence grew. The lieutenant was frantic. He signalled a halt. He ordered the point fire team to fan out on both sides of the trail. He called for a search of possible places of concealment.

The four Marines on the point moved into the trees.

Suddenly, as they stepped from the trail, it was raked by enemy machine-guns.

One Marine was badly wounded by the burst. The return fire from the Marines, however, routed the enemy, killing one of them.

The Marines searched the saddle and

the next knob, but the enemy had disappeared. Since it was a recon patrol and was now faced with the task of hauling a wounded man up the mountain for help fast, the lieutenant radioed his request for permission to withdraw. The request was granted.

The only Marine who was unable to climb back to the MLR under his own steam fortunately lived to fight again.

As for the lieutenant, he is sometimes comforted by the thought that his caution paid off. He is convinced that the enemy was forced to fire prematurely when it became clear that the Marines were not going to file into a trap. He is certain that four Marines—instead of one—would have been carried up that finger that day had he not cleared them from the trail when he did.

And he will tell anybody who will listen that a man who swaggers into no-man's-land is a damn fool.

Capt Peter R. Clapper, USMCR

Air-Ground Teamwork in Algeria

"The sharp distinction which has always been observed between the French Army and the French Air Force exists also in Algeria and has been the cause of a poor utilization of the Air Force in the so-called police actions . . .

"Experience . . . in Indo-China has convinced the writer that the tactical support aircraft is almost entirely ineffective against a smart enemy, that is

Recon Checklist

When you are sent on reconnaissance your commander tells you what he wants to know, where you are to go, and where to report. But you may see other things; note and report them.

WIRE OR MINEFIELDS

Location, type, pattern, extent and width, location of gaps. Covered by fire?

ROADS

Width, type and condition. What vehicles will they carry? Blocked or mined? Condition of shoulders. Are they being used?

BRIDGES

Location, type, size, and condition. What vehicles will they carry? Mined or prepared for demolition? Any fords nearby?

RIVERS AND STREAMS

Width, depth, speed, and direction of current. Condition of banks and bottom. Fords and approaches.

WEAPONS

Location, kind, fields of fire, types of emplacements, size of crew.

TANK OBSTACLES

Location, number, type. Covered by fire? Can they be bypassed? What is necessary to make passage through?

Combat Leader's Notebook

Published by Stackpole Co., 1960, \$2.00
Bookshop Code #AU-11 (\$1.70)

IT ISN'T IN THE BOOK, BUT...



Those who find insignia hard to reset will find this trick a real good bet. Now you can save time and garments, too: Just mark the spot where the points come through.

Works on MEDALS... RIBBONS... BADGES...

enemy forces which are camouflaged, sheltered, or motionless. . . Intelligent coordination is therefore necessary between the infantryman on the ground and the pilot in the air, but that is not the case in Algeria because the ground and air units are not trained together.

"The most desirable type of aircraft is one having a long fuel autonomy—four hours if possible—so that the same aircraft can conduct the engagement through, and it should also be heavily armed, including a cannon firing explosive shells, and have good radio links with the low-echelon ground units. The only existing French aircraft having these characteristics is the Navy's *Corsaire*."—*Cavagnes in Revue Militaire Générale*

OUT OF OUR PAST

HEADQUARTERS U.S. MARINE CORPS
Washington

July 30, 1917

My dear Major Snyder:

Your letter has just been received. I think the weekend is about the maximum period that an officer can get leave for the purpose of getting married. No requests for a greater length of time can be granted until the young officers have completed their course of instruction at Quantico. Please try and impress on them the fact that the country is at war and that not even matrimony should be allowed to interfere with the training of the officers to fit them for the proper performance of their duties.

There is not the slightest chance of Captain Torrey or Barrett being detached from your staff until the course of instruction of the student officers has been completed. I regard this work, upon which you are engaged, as the most important now confronting the Marine Corps, and nothing detrimental to it will be allowed to interfere.

I am glad to hear that you have gotten settled down, and that everything is running along smoothly.

With kindest regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,
John A. Lejeune

This letter was among mementos belonging to the late Col Harold C. Snyder which were handed down to his grand-niece, Mrs. Joe Basolo of Muskogee, Okla., who has donated them to the Marine Corps Museum. At the time of Gen Lejeune's letter, Major Snyder was CO, Training School, at Quantico. He served with the Marines in France during WWI, and died in 1933 after having been retired from active service for several years.

The Ten Commandments of Marshal Foch

- Keep your eyes and ears ready and your mouth in the safety notch, for it is your duty to see and hear clearly; but as a rule you should be heard mainly in the sentry challenge or the charging cheer.
- Obey orders first, and, if still alive, kick afterwards if you have been wronged.
- Keep your arms and equipment clean and in good order; treat your motor or other machine as though it belonged to you and was the only one. Do not waste ammunition, gas, food, time, nor opportunity.
- Never try to fire an empty gun, nor at an empty trench, but when you shoot, shoot to kill, and forget not that at close quarters a bayonet beats a bullet.
- Tell the truth squarely, and take your punishment. A good soldier won't lie, he doesn't sulk, and is not a squealer.
- Be merciful to the women of your foe and shame them not, for you are a man; pity and shield the children in your captured territory, for you were once a helpless child.
- Your enemy is the enemy of humanity until he is killed or captured; then he is your brother or fellow soldier, beaten or ashamed, whom you should not further humiliate.
- Keep your head clear and cool, body clean and comfortable, and feet in good condition, for you think with your head, fight with your body, and march with your feet.
- Be of good cheer and high courage; shirk neither work nor danger; suffer in silence, and cheer the comrades at your side with a smile.
- Dread defeat, but not wounds; fear dishonor, but not death, and die game; and whatever the task, remember the motto of the division, "It Shall Be Done."

Ensure Responsibility

Navy Regs and the MarCorMan are specific and unmistakeable when they say that responsibility cannot be delegated. Nevertheless, almost every order published states that such and such an officer is responsible for such and such duties. Who do they think they're kidding? Such a statement is meaningless. A commander can assign duties to the officers and men under his command, but cannot delegate to them his responsibility.

Ensure is another very popular word in directives. Orders direct individuals to ensure that a job is done. They even go so far as to direct that one individual

ensure that another individual do something. One of the very first things an officer or NCO learns is that he can't make anyone do anything. His only recourse is to make them sorry they didn't do what he told them to.

Some OD's orders are written in such a way that if a sentry on post drops dead, the OD is guilty of disobedience of orders. He failed to ensure that the sentry did his job properly. An OD or anyone else in the military can supervise, but they cannot ensure. Don't tell them to.

Col W. F. Prickett

HANDLING PW'S

SEARCH: Right after capture, search prisoners. Remove weapons and documents. Mark for identification with prisoner, and turn over to escort to take to interrogator. Let prisoner keep helmet, money, gas mask, messkit, identification, badges and decorations, and personal keepsakes if they don't have intelligence value. Search nonwalking wounded and take them to nearest aid station. Use other PW's for litter men.

SEGREGATE: Separate PW's into 3 groups—officers, NCOs, privates. Prevent leaders making others security minded and minimizes organized escapes. Segregate enemy deserters, civilians, women. Maintain segregation.

SILENCE: Forbid prisoners talking to each other. Don't furnish comfort items to prisoners. Interrogators get better response if they are first to furnish such items. However, don't deny necessary water, food, clothing, medical aid.

SPEEDY EVACUATION: After search, hustle PW's to rear for interrogation. Some have information useful to us now.

SAFEGUARD: Prisoners are valuable. Lives were risked in their capture. Be sure they get to interrogation center, and quickly.

Combat Leaders Field Notebook
Published by Stackpole Co., 1960, \$2.00
Bookshop Code #AU-11 (\$1.70)

Jensen, O. T.

Fr Ofc Asst SecNav
To 3dMarDiv

Kaseman, G. W.

Fr FMFPac

To NAS Pncla

Kelly, P. W.

Fr 3dMAW

To SDiego St Col

Kennedy, D. D.

Fr MCAS El Toro

To Chapman Col Cal

Lee, H. M.

Fr FMFPac

To 3dMarDiv

Leu, R.

Fr 2dMarDiv

To 2dMAW

MacQuarie, W. L.

Fr 1stMAW

To HQMC

Martin, B. G.

Fr 2dMAW

To Univ of Omaha

McCombs, G. W.

Fr 1stMarDiv

To SDiego St Col

McManus, J.

Fr 1stMarBrig

To Univ of Hawaii

McNeil, J. P.

Fr MCS Quant

To 3dMarDiv

Moore, J. R.

Fr Norton AFB Calif

To U of Redlands Cal

Morrison, G. W.

Fr USS Princeton

To MCS Quant

Nickerson, R. L.

Fr MCS Quant

To 2dMAW

Radies, E. J.

Fr MCS Quant

To 2dMarDiv

Rasmussen, H. B.

Fr MCSC Barstow

To Okinawa

Rickett, G. A.

Fr 3dMAW

To MCRD SDiego

Robinson, E. J.

Fr MCS Quant

To MCB CamLej

Ross, J. D.

Fr Pt Mugu Calif

To Univ of Omaha

Simmons, E. H.

Fr Ciudad Trujillo

To MCS Quant

Steman, L. H.

Fr 1stMarBrig

To Univ of Hawaii

Stevenson, H. F.

Fr MCB CamLej

To MCSActy Phila

Terry, W. C.

Fr MCS Quant

To Okla St Univ

Wallace, H.

Fr MCSC Barstow

To 1stMarDiv

Warren, S. G.

Fr MCS Quant

To Okla St Univ

Wasson, G. E.

Fr AirFMFPac

To Chapman Col Cal

Whitaker, W. H.

Fr NAS Atla

To 1stMAW

Wilcox, W. D.

Fr MCS Quant

To LBeach Col Calif

Wilson, R. W.

Fr Stf CinCEur

To Okla State Univ

Retired

Cross, T. J.

MCS Quant

0302
8Aug

McReynolds, W., CO ServBn,
MCS Quant

Murphy, W. A., LegalOff,
MCB CamLej

Opp, R. D., CO 3dBn 12thMarRegt,
1stMarBrig

Remington, R. M., OinC Scols,
3dMarDiv

Schnettler, E. L., OpOff,
MCAF Iwakuni

Shoden, J. C., CO MTSqdn-253,
1stMAW

Sims, W. J., ExOff, MCAA Yuma

Smith, J. D., CO 3dBn 7thMar,
1stMarDiv

Smith, L. W., CO 2dReconBn,
2dMarDiv

Stewart, R. A., Head Pers Sec,
AvnBr, HQMC

Thorpe, H. R., Head LogBr, HQMC

Tulipane, T., CO VMT, 3dMAW

Weir, W. A., S-3 MCAF Iwakuni &
MWSG-17, 1stMAW

WDAug

0304

WDAug

3002

WDAug

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10AUG

7302

WDAug

7307

WDAug

3002

WDAug

15AUG

7302

WDAug

7331

WDAug

7333

WDAug

7

Hodde, G. V. Fr AirFMFLant To 1stMAW		7333 WDAug	Schmagel, A. O. Fr 1stMAW To MCS Quant	7302 WDAug	Menzies, H. D., ExOff VMA-224, 2dMAW
House, A. E. Fr LanForTrUPac To SDiego State Col	0302 By12Sep	Sims, C. N. Fr TACRON 10 To 2dMAW	7335 1Aug	Meyer, R., Asst S-3, MAG-33, 3dMAW	
Johnson, J. H. Fr Ft Bliss Tex To ForTrps FMFPac	0302 15Aug	Skyvaril, W. J. Fr MB Bermuda To Maxwell AFB Ala	0302 By22Sep	Parnell, E. A., CO ORSqn, 2dMAW	
Joslyn, W. G. Fr FMFLant To 2dMarDiv	0302 WDAug	Slaton, C. H. Fr HQMC To Univ of Md	7333 WDAug	Rash, R. S., CO VMF-312, 2dMAW Riggs, T. W., CommOff, MCAS Beaufort	
Kearns, T. J. Fr MCS Quant To Geo Wash Univ	0302 By22Sep	Spaulding, J. D. Fr 2dMarDiv To CinCPac	0302 WDAug	Schroeder, C. W., Career&Welfare Off, 3dMAW	
Keenan, L. W. Fr FMFLant To 3dMarDiv	0130 WDAug	Storm, W. W. Fr MCS Quant To Univ of Tex	3002 1Aug	Shields, J., SafetyOff, 3dMAW Silva, D. A., S-3, 3dBn 7th Mar., 1stMarDiv	
Kellogg, W. O. Fr HQMC	7333 WDAug	Stansberry, R. E. Fr HQMC To MCSC Barstow	3002 WDAug	Sivert, P. S., CO MHS-362, 3dMAW Winter C. G. CO H&HS-17, 1stMAW & ISO, MCAF, Iwakuni	
Keyes, E. B. Fr FMFLant To Univ of Wash	0802 By1Sep	Toups, T. J. Fr 9thMCRRD To HQMC	0302 By13Sep	Captains	
Lawrence, R. T. Fr 1stMarDiv	0302 WDAug	Uffelman, P. R. Fr MCS Quant To NAG Korea	3002 WDAug	Temporary Promotions	
Lewandowski, T. F. Fr MCS Quant To Univ of Omaha	7304 WDAug	Van Cleve, R. R. Fr MCS Quant To Univ Omaha	0302 By26Sep	Acey, J. B. Adams, J. A. Arnold, W. P.	
Lucas, E. M. Fr 5thMCRRD	0115 By26Sep	Veach, H. C. Fr 2dMAW To High Pt Col NC	0302 By26Sep	Beery, R. L. Bowers, D. V.	
McNeely, R. L. Fr MCS Quant To Geo Wash Univ	0302 WDAug	Wade, R. Fr HQMC	0302 By15Sep	Boyer, R. L. Briggs, L. J.	
Mendenhall, H. E. Fr 3dMAW	7302 By12Sep	Wallace, C. M. Fr Keesler AFB Miss	7304 WDAug	Celli, J. G. Collassard, B. S.	
Mills, N. B. Fr 1stMarBrig To Ohio State Univ	0302 WDAug	To 2dMAW	7304 WDAug	Cowart, J. G. Cunningham, J. F.	
Miniclier, J. F. Fr ForTrps FMFLant	3502 By26Sep	Ward, R. A. Fr HQMC	7302 By12Sep	Fisher, W. S. Fisher, A. T.	
Moise, F. V. Fr ForTrps FMFLant	0195 WDAug	Weaver, C. A. Fr MCAS CherPt	7302 By26Sep	Freeman, B. H. Geraghty, G. W.	
Montague, P. B. Fr 2dMAW	7305 WDAug	To 1stMAW	7331 1Aug	Goins, R. F. Gray, J. T.	
Morin, D. E. Fr HQMC	3002 By12Sep	Wildey, R. L. Fr Monterey Calif	7302 By12Sep	Heims, S. H. Holdridge, G. L.	
Morrison, C. L. Fr 3dMarDiv	1803 WDAug	To MIT	7333 1Aug	Jackett, D. E. Janis, R. V.	
Nesher, C. M. Fr Columbia Univ	0302 WDAug	Wiley, N. C. Fr 3dMAW	7333 WDAug	Locke, F. A. Logan, F. M.	
Nesbitt, C. E. Fr MCS Quant	0302 1Aug	To Chapman Col Cal	7333 WDAug	Loilll, F. J. Lowrey, B. G.	
New, N. C. Fr Monterey Calif	7333 By12Sep	Zielinski, E. L. Fr BUWEPS WashDC	6602 WDAug	Marks, J. W. McFarland, T. G.	
Panchison, W. Fr HQMC	7302 WDJul	To 1stMAW	0302 WDAug	Miller, R. C. Monahan, J. P.	
Pates, B. A. Fr 4thMCRRD	0302 WDAug	Scofield, P. C. 1stMarDiv	0302 WDAug	Morra, J. A. O'Neill, L. E.	
Patton, W. B. Fr Monterey Calif	0302 WDJul	Thomson, R. P. HQMC	0302 31Aug	Rahm, C. G. Sasko, G. M.	
Pickett, P. G. Fr 3dMAW	7333 WDAug	Retired	0302 WDAug	Schulken, J. E. Seeley, D. C.	
Payette, J. Fr 2dMAW	7302 WDJul	Bowler, J. A. MCB CamPen	0302 31Jul	Shelton, J. L. Sheridan, J. J.	
Pechar, G. Fr MCAS El Toro	7335 WDAug	Carter, R. N. 1stMarDiv	1802 31Jul	Sime, C. K. Slattery, W. P.	
Pottebaum, L. F. Fr MCB CamLej	3002 15Jul	Kronberg, W. A. ForTrps FMFLant	2502 31Aug	Stoy, C. H. Stuckey, R. D.	
Powell, J. B. Fr 3dMarDiv	2502 WDAug	Leffler, B. Williamsp Pa	0302 31Jul	Sudduth, D. E. Taylor, C. H.	
Pryor, B. H. Fr MCS Quant	7302 By12Sep	Mouvery, G. J. MCASy Phila	0302 31Jul	Twilley, P. A. Tyler, J. T.	
Rainer, M. A. Fr 1stMarDiv	0802 WDAug	Scofield, P. C. 1stMarDiv	0302 31Jul	Valentine, H. C.	
Rieder, A. R. Fr 3dMAW	7333 WDAug	Thomson, R. P. HQMC	3002 31Aug	Deaths	
Roark, W. N. Fr AirFMFLant	7333 WDAug	Deaths, Retired	0915 15Jun	Deaths	
Ryan, U. F. Fr MCS Quant	0302 WDAug	Jackson, T. P. Shreveport, La.	25May	Recent Command and Staff Assignments	
Russell, M. R. Fr MCAS CherPt	7305 WDJul	Smith, W. T. Rochester N Y	23Jun	Allen, N. D., Asst SupOff, MCAS Kaneohe	
Schied, J. P. Fr HQMC	1302 WDAug	Recent Command and Staff Assignments	25May	Ball, R. E., ExOff MABS-24, 2dMAW	
Sykes, G. V. Fr MCS Quant	7302 By12Sep	DeVol, A. O., CO H&MS-24, 2dMAW	25May	DeVol, A. O., CO H&MS-24, 2dMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	0802 WDAug	Glasgow, J. M., CO 3dBn, MCRD SDiego	25May	Ghaffar, J. R., CO VMF-312, 2dMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	7333 WDAug	Hall, W. L., Airfield Op Off, MCAS Kaneohe	25May	Harris, C. D., ExOff VMF-312, 2dMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	7333 WDAug	Heineman, H., AsstMaintOff, MCS Quant	25May	Harris, C. D., ExOff VMF-312, 2dMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	0302 WDAug	Herndon, J. L., ExOff VMF-312, 2dMAW	25May	Harris, C. D., ExOff VMF-312, 2dMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	7305 WDJul	Hunt, R. G., CO 1stForReconCo, 1stMarDiv	25May	Harris, W. C., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	1302 WDAug	Kelly, J., Comptroller, AirFMFPac	25May	Harrison, D. F., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	1302 WDAug	Lynch, J. O., ExOff VMF-235, 2dMAW	25May	Hochreiter, P. F., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	0302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Hough, J. A., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	7302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Hyde, C. J., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	1302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	0302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	7302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	1302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	0302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	7302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	1302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	0302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	7302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	1302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	0302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
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Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	0302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	7302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	1302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	0302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	7302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	1302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	0302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	7302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
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Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	0302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	7302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	1302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	0302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
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Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	0302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	7302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	1302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	0302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
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Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	1302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	0302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	7302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	1302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	0302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	7302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	1302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	0302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2dMAW	25May	Jones, R. M., CO 1stMAW	
Thom, J. P. Fr MCS Quant	7302 WDAug	McKamy, D. I., CO MABS-27, 2d			

Captains

Temporary Promotions

Transfers

Byrd, J. A.	0802	Guell, E. M.	7332	Newton, O. D.	4302	Steele, R. B.	6302
Fr Stf PhibGru 1 To 2dMarDiv	WDAug.	Fr 3dMAW To MCS Quant	By22Aug	Fr HQMC To MCS Quant	5Aug	Fr HQMC To Ft Holabird Md	WDAug.
Cameron, R. A.	7305	Habgood, C. R.	0802	North, O. K.	0130	Stevens, G. B.	4302
Fr 1stMAW To MCS Quant	By22Aug	Fr HQMC To Taiwan	WDJul	Fr ForTrps FMFPac To MCB CamPen	WDAug	Fr MCRD SDiego To Tengan Okinawa	15Jul
Campbell, G. C.	3010	Hajtun, P.	3010	Orr, J. H.	0130	Stewart, A. M.	3002
Fr HQMC To 2dMarDiv	10Aug	Fr HQMC To 3dMarDiv	10Aug	Fr 3dMarDiv To ForTrps FMFPac	WDAug	Fr MCSC Barstow To 1stMarDiv	WDAug.
Cannon, F. S.	3002	Hatch, R. L.	0302	Osimo, M. C.	4602	Strandquist, J. H.	0802
Fr Yorktown Va To MCS Quant	By23Aug	Fr MB WashDC To 2dMarDiv	WDAug	Fr MCB CamLej To HQMC	By15Sep	Fr MCRC NPT To MCS Quant	WDJul
Carey, C. A.	7335	Higginbotham, R. L.	0302	Palmer, K. P.	7304	Strope, J. H.	3002
Fr 1stMAW To 2dMAW	WDAug	Fr 1stMCRRD To 3dMarDiv	WDJul	Fr MCS Quant To 2dMAW	WDAug	Fr HQMC To MCSC Albany Ga	1Aug
Carroll, D. I.	7333	Hippler, R. E.	7333	Parell, W. K.	7302	Stadt, J. C.	0302
Fr 3dMAW To Monterey Calif	WDJul	Fr 1stMarBrig To Monterey Calif	WLJul	Fr 2dMAW To MCS Quant	By22Aug	Fr MCS Quant To Geo Wash Univ	Anderson
Carson, W. G.	3002	Hook, R. A.	0302	Parchen, J. W.	7333	Sullivan, J. E.	0202
Fr HQMC To MCB CamLej	1Aug	Fr MCRD SDiego To 3dMarDiv	WDAug	Fr 2dMAW To MCS Quant	By22Aug	Fr FMFLant To 1st MAW	Appleton
Cassidy, G. W.	7331	Howard, E. R.	7302	Park, H. E.	3036	Swift, J. N.	0802
Fr MCS Quant To Univ of Md	WDAug	Fr 9thMCRRD To MCS Quant	By22Aug	Fr 1stMarBrig To USS Princeton	WDAug	Fr 1st Anglico To PhibGrul	Barnes
Clark, F. A.	0302	Huss, M. A.	7335	Perry, V. A.	1302	Thatcher, J. L.	7305
Fr Lewiston Me To Univ of Md	By12Sep	Fr 12th MCRRD To 1stMarBrig	WDAug	Fr 3dMarDiv To Univ of Md	By12Sept	Fr 1stMAW To Utah State Univ	Abernathy
Collie, J. G.	1802	Ishill, J. B.	7336	Pierson, E. F.	0302	Thomas, F. L.	3010
To ForTrps FMFLant To USS Forrestal	WDJul	Fr ElecLab SDiego To Litton Ind Calif	WDAug	Fr Steubenville Ohio To 1stMarDiv	WDJul	Fr Tsingy Taiwan To ForTrps FMFLant	Adams
Courtney, D. G.	0130	Jerrett, F. R.	7335	Plante, D. P.	7333	Thurston, F. H.	7337
Fr 2dMAW To 2dMarDiv	WDAug	Fr 2dMAW To NAS Pncla	WDAug	Fr 2dMAW To MCS Quant	By22Aug	Fr 2dMAW To MCS Quant	Adams
Curnutt, J. R.	6302	Jones, C. F.	7333	Plummer, J. R.	7335	Turner, J. S.	0302
Fr MCRD PISC To NTC Bain Md	WDAug	Fr 2dMAW To MCS Quant	By22Aug	Fr 2dMAW To MCS Quant	By22Aug	Fr MCS Quant To Saigon Vietnam	Appleton
Daggett, S. P.	1803	Jozwicki, H. S.	1502	Ramsey, L. E.	3402	Wahlfeld, H. W.	1802
Fr 3dMarDiv To 1stMarDiv	WDAug	Fr MFFPac To MCS Quant	WDAug	Fr MCSC Albany To MCAS Beaufort	WDJul	Fr 1stMarDiv To W Ill Univ	Arace
Damon, R. K.	1302	Juranech, J. M.	3510	Presson, R. E.	7335	Webster, C. B.	0302
Fr ForTrps FMFLant To Ft Belvoir Va	WDJul	Fr MCS Barstow To 3dMarDiv	WDAug	Fr 1st MAW To MCS Quant	By22Aug	Fr USS Princeton To 1stMarDiv	Archie
Danielson, D. C.	7302	Justice, H. E.	3010	Ramsey, L. E.	3402	White, F. V.	0302
Fr 1stMarBrig To Univ of Omaha	By15Sep	Fr MCB CamLej To Tsoying Taiwan	WDAug	Fr MCSC Albany To MCAS Beaufort	WDJul	Fr Lee Va To USS Essex	Blackwell
Davis, J. A.	3010	Keene, G. A.	2502	Rourke, R. E.	3002	Wildermuth, L. K.	2502
Fr MCSC Barstow Fr 3dMarDiv	WDAug	Fr 2dMAW To Ft Monmouth NJ	WDAug	Fr Coronado SDiego To 1stMarDiv	WDAug	Fr 2dMarDiv To 2dMAW	Bordie
Davis, W. B.	3010	Kittler, S. J.	7333	Rozinski, F. X.	7302	Wilder, G.	0302
Fr 3d MarDiv To MCSC Bartow	WDAug	Fr 2dMAW To MCS Quant	By23Aug	Fr Willow Grove Pa To MCAS CherPt	WDAug	Fr MAAG Saigon To MCS Quant	Borger
DeLong, C. S.	2502	L'Heureux, G. A.	2502	Ryan, J. E.	3030	Willis, J. E.	7333
Fr MCS Quant To Univ of Omaha	By19Sept	Fr MCAS Beaufort To 2dMarDiv	WDAug	Fr 1stMarBrig To MCRD SDiego	WDAug	Fr 1stMAW To LCreek NorVa	Brown
Dittmann, W. R.	0802	Laine, E. R.	1802	Schlick, J. K.	0130	Wynn, N. B.	1802
Fr FMFLant To Univ of Md	By12Sep	Fr HQMC To MCS Quant	2Aug	Fr 1stMAW To 2dMAW	WDAug	Fr MCS Quant To 3dMarDiv	Brooks
Donahue, J. J.	0302	Latall, R. F.	7333	Schulte, E. W.	4302	Released From Active Duty	By12Sep
Fr 2dMarDiv To Pottsville Pa	WDAug	Fr 1stMarBrig To NS WashDC	WDAug	Fr MCAS CherPt To HQMC	By1Aug	Casper, M. H.	7333
Donnelly, J. A.	1802	Lazzo, J. W.	7333	Schultz, R. H.	7302	Gavin, L. T.	7335
Fr MB WashDC To Univ Md	By12Sep	Fr NAS Pncla To 2dMAW	WDAug	Fr ForTrps FMFLant To 2dMAW	WDAug	McGarry, V. J.	7302
Dotson, T. E.	7302	Lindell, C. A.	7307	Searles, R. M.	3002	Retired	By12Sep
Fr MCAS El Toro To Chapman Col Calif	By12Sep	Fr Monterey Calif To Princeton Univ	By12Sep	Fr TrpsFMFLant To MCS Quant	By23Aug	Barnidge, J. L.	1310
Drummond, M. D.	1302	Long, E. E.	1360	Sewell, C. A.	7302	D'Angelo, J. J.	31Jul
Fr LanForTraUPac To Rensselaer Poly In	WDAug	Fr MCB CamLej To 3dMarDiv	WDAug	Fr 1stMAW To MCS Quant	By22Aug	D'Angelo, J. J.	2002
Dryden, W. J.	1320	Macbeth, F.	3510	Seymour, R. A.	0302	Dudden, J. F.	2715
Fr 3dMarDiv To MCRD PISC	WDAug	Fr 1stMarBrig To MCB CamPen	WDJul	Fr 1stMCRRD To Univ of Md	By12Sep	MCS Quant	31Aug
Dupont, J. A.	0130	Manhard, A. H.	7302	Sharpe, W. N.	7305	Deaths	Galpin, H. M.
Fr MCRD SDiego To 3dMarDiv	WDAug	Fr 2dMAW To Monterey Calif	WDJul	Fr 2dMAW To Univ of Calif	By22Aug	1st MAW	7333
Faraklas, T.	3050	Mazwell, H. L.	1802	Sharpe, W. W.	7305	Martin, R. E.	9Jul
Fr 3dMAW To MB NB Phila	1Aug	Fr 1stMarDiv To Indiana State Col	By15Sept	Fr 2dMAW To MCS Quant	By22Aug	Willow Grove Pa	7302
Filimore, W. D.	0302	McCool, W. G.	7305	Sherman, J. R.	7331	Deaths, Retired	Franklin, H. L.
Fr ForTrps FMFLant To LanForTraULant	WDAug	Fr 1stMAW To MCS Quant	By22Aug	Fr MCS Quant To Univ of Md	By12Sep	Arcadia, Fla.	Ju
Finne, D. D.	0302	McCrary, N. B.	7304	Siegmund, P. L.	7302		
Fr MCS Quant To Univ of Minn	By26Sep	Fr MCAS El Toro To MCS Quant	By22Aug	Fr 2dMAW To MCS Quant	By22Aug		
Frey, H. I.	1302	McDonald, R. C.	0302	Sinclair, J. E.	0802		
Fr 2dMarDiv To 3dMarDiv	WDAug	Fr 1stMarDiv To Ft Benning Ga	By 1Sep	Fr Ft Sill Okla To 2dMarDiv	WDAug		
Fritsch, B. D.	7331	McGee, J. H.	7333	Shagerberg, A. E.	0302		
Fr 1st MAW To NAS Pncla	WDAug	Fr NAS Pncla To MCS Quant	By22Aug	Fr I&L Slake City To Ft Benning, Ga	By1Sept		
Froncek, R. A.	0802	McGraw, N. B.	0302	Smigay, D. B.	3002		
Fr MCRD PISC To MCS Quant	By23Aug	Fr MCAS El Toro To MCS Quant	By22Aug	Fr 2dMAW To MCS Quant	By23Aug		
Gentile, V. J.	1802	McCurdy, W. B.	7302	Smith, J. T.	7332		
Fr I&I Stf Bflo To MCS Quant	By22Aug	Fr MCS Quant	By23Aug	Fr MCB CamLej To Monterey Calif	WDJul		
Godfrey, E. J.	3010	Merriam, B. A.	6602	Smith, R. E.	1302		
Fr 1stMarDiv To 3dMarDiv	WDAug	Fr MAD NATTC MFS To 1stMAW	WDAug	Fr MCB CamLej To Ft Belvoir Va	WDJul		
Graham, R. H.	1802	Mitchell, E. M.	2602	Smith, R. H.	1802		
Fr 9thMCRRD To MCSC Barstow	WDAug	Fr ForTrps FMFLant To 1stMarBrig	WDAug	Fr MCS Quant To 3dMarDiv	WDAug		
Graves, A. L.	3402	Moore, J. W.	7331	Smols, J. K.	0302		
Fr MCSC Albany To 6thMCRRD	WDAug	Fr Lenoir Rhine NC To 3dMAW	WDAug	Fr MCB 29 Palms To Univ of Iowa	By6Sep		
Grayum, W. E.	7333	Morgan, J. G.	7331	Snyder, E. N.	0302		
Fr NAS Seattle To Univ of Wash	WDAug	Fr MCRS JAX To 3dMAW	WDAug	Fr MCS Quant To Univ Md	By12Sep		
Gregory, M. G.	1302	Needham, M. J.	7333	Spence, A. J.	3502		
Fr 1stMarDiv To Ft Belvoir Va	WDJul	Fr MCS Quant To NAS Glen	WDAug	Fr 1stMCRRD To 2dMarDiv	WDAug		
Gubany, M. W.	0302						
Fr MCS Quant To 3dMarDiv	WDAug						

0302	Aug	Thatcher, A. D.	Weida, G. A.	Rogers, C. W.	Streit, R. J.	Doughty, C. C.	2502	Reynolds, T. F.	2502
		Theer, R. E.	Yurish, J. L.	Rooney, J. P.	Sundstrom, D. A.	Fr 1stMarDiv	WDAug	Fr 3dMarDiv	WDAug
		Tuggee, M. L.	Zalewski, T. A.	Rowe, L. R.	Swan, R. G.	To MCS Quant		To 2dMAW	
		Vogier, L. D.	Zook, W. G.	Scarborough, A. E.	Tague, F. J.	Durrant, J. D.	By23Aug	Richardson, R. G.	0702
				Schimeneck, J. G.	Fr 2dMAW		7335	Fr ForTrps FMFPac	WDAug
				Schnabel, J. A.	To MCS Quant	Robinson, L. C.		To USS Talladega	
				Schorr, F. S.	Thomas, J. A.	Fr MCS Quant		Fr MCS Quant	3502
				Schwartz, R. H.	Tierney, D. T.	To 3dMarDiv		Fr 3dMarDiv	WDAug
		Abernathy, J. M.	Hacala, J. P.	Schwarz, M. E.	Tomkiewicz, J. J.	Dusek, L. M.	0802	Rogers, W. B.	2502
		Adams, G. P.	Hardin, D. T.	Scibeck, R. B.	Tomkins, P. B.	Fr 3dMarDiv	WDAug	Fr 3dMarDiv	WDAug
		Adams, E. E.	Harris, D. P.	Scott, J. R.	Tomlinson, W. N.	To 1stMarDiv		To 2dMAW	
		Agor, R. R.	Harrill, S. M.	Sears, W. H.	Tork, D. E.	Fabricius, R. E.	7398	Ronan, P. J.	3610
		Aldridge, J. R.	Hart, R. W.	Seay, H. L.	Tragana, J. J.	Fr NAS CorpC		Fr 1stMarDiv	WDJul
		Allen, W. H.	Haywood, P. C.	Seta, D. R.	Tremayne, S. M.	To 1stMarBrig		To 2dMAW	
		Allen, J. M.	Hearn, G. C.	Shannon, R. T.	Tremmel, D. F.	Forrester, R. H.	1302	Fr 1stMarDiv	
		Anderson, E. R.	Hickey, P. J.	Sherman, A. C.	Trott, J. K.	Fr 3dMarDiv	WDAug	To MCSA Phila	
		Anderson, L. M.	Hicks, R. D.	Shirley, J. R.	Tucker, W. F.	To 2dMarDiv		Fr 3dMarDiv	
		Andler, W. K.	Hines, M. J.	Siegfried, D. G.	Vaupel, M. C.	Forrester, R. H.	3095	Scheney, K. I.	WDAug
		Appleton, B. B.	Hirzman, R. W.	Speth, W. H.	Volyn, M. J.	Fr 1stMAW		Fr 3dMarDiv	
		Arace, R. D.	Hocart, W.	Spikes, C. R.	Waguespack, V. J.	To MCB CamLej		To MB WashDC	
		Babes, R. L.	Hoppmeyer, H. E.	Spoftord, T. R.	Walker, R. J.	Glenston, D. A.		Schmidt, J. E.	0802
		Bailey, R. T.	Howerton, P. F.	Stewart, D. M.	Wall, F. J.	Fr ForTrps FMFPac		Fr 2dMarDiv	WDAug
		Baker, P. A.	Hubbell, C. O.	Stock, G. L.	Wamsley, W. H.	To USS Paul Revere		To Ft Sill Okla	
		Ball, S. F.	Hunt, J. J.	Stone, A. C.	Wells, W. K.	Gonzales, L. H.		To USS St Paul	0302
		Banks, E. J.	Hyatt, G.	Stouffer, R. W.	Wever, J. B.	Whaley, R. G.		To MCRD SDiego	WDAug
		Barr, J. J.	Jankulow, A. E.	Youngman, J. L.	White, C. E.	Fr 3dMarDiv		Fr 3dMarDiv	WDJul
		Barry, J. M.	Jansen, P. T.	Beary, R. L.	Whit, R. K.	Greene, P. A.	1302	Scovell, J. D.	7335
		Bazant, S. K.	Jarvis, E.	Spofford, T. R.	Wolfe, R. W.	Fr 3dMarDiv	WDAug	Fr 1stMAW	WDJul
		Bearce, G. R.	Jenkins, C. L.	Stewart, D. M.	Youngman, J. L.	To MCRD SDiego		To 2dMAW	
		Beaulieu, R. J.	Jensen, T. R.	Stock, G. L.	Strasser, J. H.	To 2dMAW		To 3dMarDiv	
		Bergmann, W. R.	Johnson, J. L.	Stone, A. C.		Hageman, R. A.	7304	Szafranski, L. J.	0802
		Bibler, J. N.	Johnston, G. W.	Stouffer, R. W.		Fr 2dMAW	WDAug	Fr ForTrps FMFLant	WDAug
		Bishop, A. K.	Jones, M. E.	Youngman, J. L.		To 1stMAW		To MCS Quant	
		Blackwell, T. S.	Jorgensen, C. B.	Just, F. W.		Harte, J. H.	2502	Thompson, D. W.	2502
		Bordie, G. A.	Karns, R. E.	Karr, J. A.		Fr 1stMarDiv	By23Aug	Fr ForTrps FMFLant	WDAug
		Borger, L. J.	Kearny, F. G.	Keys, G. F.		To MCS Quant	7335	Tirschfield, W. J.	0802
		Brady, J. W.	Kershner, J. L.	Kratzer, D. H.		To 2dMAW	WDAug	Fr 1stMarDiv	WDAug
		Brandon, J. R.	Lamont, G. F.	Kroll, F. W.		To 1stMAW		To 3dMarDiv	
		Bredderman, P. J.	Lehfeldt, B. R.	Barton, D. A.		Hoffman, R. L.	7333	Tremblay, P. A.	7333
		Brennan, J. B.	Lefchen, T. W.	Batterson, D. A.		Fr 2dMAW	WDAug	Fr 2dMAW	WDAug
		Brennan, R. V.	Lewis, C. W.	Bateman, J. H.		To 1stMAW		To 1st MAW	
		Bordie, G. A.	Liebmann, G. H.	Behme, J. E.		Harte, J. H.	2502	Troxell, J. M.	9901
		Bruder, G. A.	Light, T. B.	Fr MCS Quant		Fr 1stMarDiv	By23Aug	Fr 1stMAW	WDAug
		Brusha, D. R.	Linke, W. M.	To 1stMAW		To MCS Quant	7333	Holben, D. S.	9901
		Bruell, D. L.	Little, J. W.	Benjamin, W. D.		To 2dMAW	WDAug	Fr 1stMAW	WDAug
		Burgoyne, J. F.	Lundell, J. C.	Fr 1stMarDiv		To 1stMAW		To 2dMarDiv	
		Burns, J. P.	Mackey, R. P.	Macoubrie, D. P.		Hoffman, R. L.	7333	Holme, M. E.	9901
		Caracio, V. D.	Malloy, C. S.	Majeski, V. P.		Fr 2dMAW	WDAug	Fr 1stMAW	WDAug
		Carroll, W. R.	Malone, P. C.	McAdams, K. G.		To 1stMAW		To 3dMarDiv	
		Carter, S. D.	Marsh, R. L.	McCarthy, R. D.		Hulme, M. E.	0802	Ingels, L. T.	9901
		Cattell, J. B.	Martin, S. D.	McCloskey, A. J.		Fr 3dMarDiv	WDAug	Fr 1stMAW	WDAug
		Chalmers, R. H.	Massa, F. M.	McCormack, F. J.		To ForTrps FMFPac		To NAS Pncela	
		Chesney, J. A.	McAdam, K. G.	McCormack, F. J.		Fr 1stMAW		Voss, P. W.	1803
		Clark, J. W.	McCarthy, R. D.	MacCollom, W. G.		To USS Chilton		Fr 3dMarDiv	WDAug
		Colcaire, R. J.	McClain, W. A.	McCormack, F. J.		To USS Monrovia		To MCS Quant	
		Collins, T. M.	McCormick, V. A.	McCollom, W. G.		Jezsik, L. C.	9901	Ward, T. T.	0802
		Cook, J. J.	McCormick, V. A.	McCollom, W. G.		Fr 2dMAW	WDAug	Fr 3dMarDiv	WDAug
		Corbell, D. H.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To MCS Quant		To 1stMAW	
		Cotton, E. A.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		Johansen, P. J.	0302	Watson, J. B.	0802
		Cowles, F. B.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		Fr 2dMarDiv	By23Aug	Fr 3dMarDiv	WDAug
		Crawford, J. O.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To MCS Quant	7333	Welsh, D. G.	9901
		Crisenolo, G. P.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		Kavanaugh, C. W.	0302	ForTrps FMFLant	WDAug
		Crocker, D. G.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		Fr NAS Pncela	WDAug	Whalon, P. G.	0802
		Crowley, T. J.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 2dMAW		Fr 3dMarDiv	
		Culpeper, W. A.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		Kazalunas, J.	3402	Fr 3dMarDiv	
		Cutrone, V. A.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		Fr 3dMarDiv	WDAug	To 3dMarDiv	
		Daniel, W. D.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		Kennedy, T. J.	0302	Fr 3dMarDiv	
		Davis, D. L.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To USS Galveston		To 2dMarDiv	
		Davis, P. J.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To MCS Quant		Wiley, B. H.	9901
		Debny, D. B.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		Kupper, G. T.	0802	McDowell, J. D.	Jun61
		DePalma, D. P.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		Fr 3dMarDiv	WDAug	Powers, J.	Dec61
		Dettie, R. F.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 1stMarDiv		Stein, W. L.	Jun62
		Dill, D. D.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 3dMarDiv		Suits, J. S.	Jul61
		Doane, E. R.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 1stMAW		Sutton, V. D.	Jun62
		Doherty, D. G.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		Hodges, D. F.	0302	Tuel, J.	Sep61
		Donovan, J. A.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 2dMarDiv	By1Aug	White, J. D.	Jul61
		Dowd, E. F.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 1stMAW	0302	Zasio, A. R.	Mar62
		Downey, P. J.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		Holmes, D. L.	7335		
		Drew, T. C.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		Fr 3dMarDiv	WDAug		
		Driscoll, N. R.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 1stMAW			
		Dupont, D. H.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		Hodges, D. F.	0802		
		Dyer, B. T.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 2dMarDiv	WDAug		
		Eberle, D. R.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 1stMAW			
		Ebersole, W. S.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		Hodges, D. F.	2502		
		Eccles, D.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 2dMarDiv	WDAug		
		Ellenberger, F. H.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 1stMAW			
		Erlingham, C. J.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		Hodges, D. F.	0302		
		Eas, G. A.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 2dMarDiv	WDAug		
		Fabricius, R. E.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 1stMAW			
		Farley, W. R.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		Hodges, D. F.	1302		
		Fauvette, B. L.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 2dMarDiv	WDAug		
		Feilcy, D. R.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 1stMAW			
		Fennell, P. D.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		Hodges, D. F.	0302		
		Fifillan, W. E.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 2dMarDiv	WDAug		
		Flanagan, D. M.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 1stMAW			
		Fogarty, W. A.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		Hodges, D. F.	0302		
		Foster, T. W.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 2dMarDiv	WDAug		
		Fowler, R. F.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 1stMAW			
		Fritsch, J. R.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		Hodges, D. F.	0302		
		Garber, T. K.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 2dMarDiv	WDAug		
		Garcia, J. T.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 1stMAW			
		Garland, W. L.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		Hodges, D. F.	0302		
		Gee, K. W.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 2dMarDiv	WDAug		
		Genz, C. D.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 1stMAW			
		Gier, D. E.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		Hodges, D. F.	0302		
		Gillespie, A.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 2dMarDiv	WDAug		
		Goelet, M. P.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 1stMAW			
		Graham, T. C.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		Hodges, D. F.	0302		
		Graham, R. M.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 2dMarDiv	WDAug		
		Griffith, W. A.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 1stMAW			
		Griffith, D. H.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		Hodges, D. F.	0302		
		Grizelle, G. H.	McCormick, F. J.	McCollom, W. G.		To 2dMarDiv	WDAug		
						To 1stMAW			
						Hodges, D. F.	0302		
						To 2dMarDiv	WDAug		
						To 1stMAW			
						Hodges, D. F.	0302		
						To 2dMarDiv	WDAug		
						To 1stMAW			
						Hodges, D. F.	0302		
						To 2dMarDiv	WDAug		
						To 1stMAW			
						Hodges, D. F.	0302		
						To 2dMarDiv	WDAug		
						To 1stMAW			
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						To 2dMarDiv	WDAug		
						To			

GOING UP!

GOING UP! GOING UP! GOING UP!

Yes! The Board of Governors has approved a price raise to be effective soon! But you can still get a new membership or extend your present membership at a 30% saving if you act now!

New Membership: *3 yrs \$9.50; *2 yrs \$7.00; 1 yr \$4.00

Extension 1 yr to 3 yrs \$6.50; 2 yrs to 3 yrs \$3.50



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APPLICATION BLANK

1—RANK—4

5—NAME—21

21—STREET ADDRESS—40

CITY

41-59

STATE

- USMC USMCR USN USA USAF RET CIV
 NEW MEMBERSHIP 3 YRS \$9.50 2 YRS \$7.00 1 YR \$4.00
 EXTENSION 1 YR TO 3 YR \$6.50 2 YR TO 3 YR \$3.50
 CHECK OR M.O. ENCLOSED BILL ME

Do not write below this line

60-61	62-66	67-68	69-70	71-75	76	78-79
State	P.O.	Cat.	Exp.	Membership		Rank

*Sustaining Membership. With 2 or 3-year memberships you choose the automatic renewal plan. When present membership "expires" you'll still get Gazette and be billed for renewal. Your membership won't cease unless you resign.

No presents with this offer—NO premiums.



MEMO TO MICHAEL:

Your recent letter to the company has been brought to my attention. I am particularly interested in this paragraph,

I am in the fifth grade at Braun School and am very interested in aviation. When I grow up I want to be a aeronautical engineer if my mother will let me

Michael, I certainly hope you keep your desire to make a career in aviation. In my opinion it is one of the most challenging opportunities for the young men of America. The helicopter industry, and aviation in general, is helping to keep our country strong and we look forward to the help that boys like you can give when your time comes. The backbone of the aircraft industry is the engineer. We will always need good engineers with imagination and vision. You have that vision now. Please keep it. I'm sure that you can count on your mother's support when you are ready to take your place among the other young men who are playing a vital role in a vital industry.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Kaman

... IN
NATIONAL
DEFENSE

KAMAN
IS
PART
OF
THE
PLAN

